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Strange Spaces and Stranger Sensibilities: 
Feminist Counter-Publicity in the Digital Age 
 
by 
Bonnie Marilyn Washick 
 
Chair: Elizabeth Wingrove 
 
This dissertation offers a theoretical account of the politics of feminist computer-
mediated communication (CMC), arguing that both the discursive dimensions of CMC 
and the affordances of CMC platforms cultivate new public subjects. The analysis 
challenges dominant approaches to the politics of online public speech that remain 
tethered to liberal public sphere theory or more recently, to radical democratic theory. I 
do so by attending to the enduring significance of embodiment—specifically, the 
embodied particularity of public speakers and of their addressees—in over thirty years of 
feminist CMC. Examining diverse moments from that history, I suggest that feminist 
CMC contributes to democratic theory and theories of language politics through its 
enactment of a “feminized” public subject: a subject whose acknowledged vulnerabilities 
demand attention to social and political inequality as they reframe it and whose 
communicative practices engender productively new, and newly contrary, postures of 
agonistic struggle. 
 viii 
Chapter One explores early discourse about “cyberspace” as a new public sphere. 
Disambiguating conflicting accounts of what disembodied communication enabled, I 
show how a liberal conception of public speech was rearticulated as both an ideal and an 
impossibility online, thus diminishing the perceived political value of CMC. Chapter Two 
examines feminist speech on Usenet, an early and influential CMC platform. I illustrate 
how affordances of public CMC defanged the political speech of Usenet feminists, 
rendering it the equivalent of what Lauren Berlant terms “female complaint.” Chapter 
Three argues that the “safe spaces” of the contemporary feminist blogosphere cultivate 
an alternative “feminized” subject whose complaints are better understood as political 
demands that challenge rather than reflect neoliberal hegemony. Chapter Four considers 
the recent migration of trigger warnings (TWs) from online to offline spaces, in order to 
probe the reception of the “feminized” political subject. Pursuing the affective 
resonances between what researchers have termed “white fragility” and the reception of 
TWs, I consider how a viscerally-charged rejection of embodied vulnerability works to 
sustain the phantasmatic figure of an abstract, sovereign self in left-progressive as well as 









THEORIZING THE POLITICS OF COUNTER-PUBLICITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
… they fight as much for the preservation of themselves as they fight for the 
preservation of others. This movement toward consciousness—born of techno 
advocacy practices that span computer mediated and non-computer mediated contexts–
is a threshold where we can see ourselves through the eyes of others and by way of 
panoramic views.  
- Tara L. Conley, “An Open Letter  
to Amanda Marcotte”1 
 
I.  Introduction 
  This dissertation offers a theoretical account of the politics of feminist computer-
mediated communication (CMC). I proceed by tracing the development of collaborative, 
formally open-access online feminist speech communities over more than thirty years. 
My account attends to the entanglement of, on the one hand, the “poetic” function of 
public address in cultivating—through generic form, style, mode of delivery, protocols, 
and content—the subjects who write, read, “share,” and comment, and, on the other 
hand, the materialization of ideals of public speech in built CMC platforms and speech 
practices. 
  Political theory is not well prepared to make sense of the political work of online 
feminist speech communities and practices. In point of fact, CMC—feminist or 
otherwise—has not been a central site of analysis for contemporary political theory. This 
                                                
1 Tara L. Conley, “An Open Letter to Amanda Marcotte,” The Feminist Wire, March 3, 2013, 
http://www.thefeministwire.com/2013/03/an-open-letter-to-amanda-marcotte/ (accessed December 20, 
2015). 
2 Warner, Publics and Counterpublics 114. 
3 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. 
4 Boeder, “Habermas’ Heritage: The future of the public sphere in the network society”; Dahlberg, “The 
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is surprising given a robust and diverse literature that identifies speech, writing, and 
communicative exchange as central to, if not constitutive of, democratic praxis. I 
collectively refer to this literature, which includes deliberative, agonistic and radical 
approaches to democracy, as well as rhetorical approaches to language politics, as 
discursive democratic theory.  
To the extent CMC has been taken up, discursive democratic theorists have 
tended to proceed by implicit or explicit reference to Jürgen Habermas’s liberal public 
sphere theory or, more recently, by reference to radical democratic theory, especially that 
of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Little has been done to theorize the poetics of 
online public speech, to borrow and elaborate on what Michael Warner terms the “poetic 
world building” function of publics.2 Analyzing the varied linguistic practices and the 
material context of CMC that structure relationships between strangers, my dissertation 
articulates a politics of feminist CMC that extends beyond sheltering or bearing witness 
to that which is excluded by a (neo)liberal hegemony. What’s more, my study of feminist 
CMC disrupts theoretical and popular accounts of feminist activism as “stuck,” whether 
by the challenges of organizing across different politicized identities in order to address 
complex, global problems, or “stuck in the past,” as post-feminists would have it. 
 
II. The Long Shadow of Liberal Public Sphere Theory 
  Jürgen Habermas’s liberal bourgeois public looms large in the study of online 
public speech. As theorized in his Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (STPS), the 
                                                
2 Warner, Publics and Counterpublics 114. 
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liberal public sphere is an imagined but no less real zone of democratic participation.3 
Formally open to all, the public sphere stands apart from the (also public) state, as well as 
a private sphere, comprised of the economy and an intimate sphere of the conjugal 
family. On Habermas’s account, deliberation and discursive exchange in the public 
sphere enables “the people” to be represented and rationalized. The outcome of citizenry 
deliberation is “public opinion,” which directs and constrains the state, thereby 
submitting power to reason, supplementing formal democratic institutions like voting, 
and safeguarding against a tyranny of the majority.  
  Those who take their bearing from Habermas’s liberal public sphere theory have 
largely proceeded by asking whether or to what extent public discourse on CMC reflects 
Habermas’s model, or how it might better do so.4 Early enthusiasm that CMC might 
foster a revitalized public sphere, characterized by robust, self-directed public discussion 
of matters of common concern, has largely been supplanted by criticism of CMC’s 
democratic potential, much of which suggests “we”—citizens of developed 
democracies—might be worse off than ever before. These critiques typically cite one or 
more of four overlapping concerns: CMC fails to deliver on the promise of universal access; 
CMC fragments or fails to cultivate a unitary public; CMC is inadequately connected to institutions 
which translate the people’s will as “public opinion” into policy; and CMC has been co-
opted by commercial interests. I survey these concerns below. 
                                                
3 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. 
4 Boeder, “Habermas’ Heritage: The future of the public sphere in the network society”; Dahlberg, “The 
Internet and Democratic Discourse: Exploring the Prospects of Online Deliberative Forums Extending 
the Public Sphere”; Charles Ess, “The Political Computer: Democracy, CMC, and Habermas,” in Ess, 
Philosophical Perspectives on Computer-Mediated Conversation; Gimmler, “Deliberative Democracy, the Public 
Sphere and the Internet”; Douglas Kellner, “Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Democracy: A Critical 
Intervention,” in Hahn, Perspectives on Habermas; Saco, Cybering Democracy: Public Space and the Internet. 
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Historically, the liberal bourgeois public sphere did not deliver on the promise of 
inclusivity. Instead, it was white, property-owning men who peopled “the public” and 
served as its mouthpiece.5 Nonetheless, Habermas argued that because bourgeois 
practices of publicity were grounded in a universalistic discourse, they can and have 
provided means for excluded others to make claims upon the state.6 In other words, the 
claim is that the non-inclusivity of the idealized liberal public reflected contingent, 
historical conditions and thus did not determine the liberatory potential of the discursive, 
ratio-critical practice of publicity.7 Many imagined that, with the development of CMC, 
the historical and technological conditions were ripe for a truly inclusive public sphere: 
Relatively low-cost access to a myriad of sources and information, relatively low barriers 
to expressing one’s views, and the ability to cross borders (both literal and metaphorical) 
were cited as reasons why CMC might deliver on the promise of a universal public 
sphere.  
 “Digital divide” scholarship offered a powerful rejoinder to the implicit 
technological determinism of these accounts, exploring the persistence and even 
exacerbation of offline inequality in the wake of CMC’s development.8 Literature on the 
“digital divide” has compellingly critiqued the notion that the Internet is broadly 
accessible and that those who do have access have equal means—education, finances, 
                                                
5 Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy”; 
Warner, Publics and Counterpublics. 
6 Habermas, “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere,” in Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, 429. 
7 Habermas’s later work on a theory of communicative action may rightly be understood as a means of 
articulating that ideal as realizable apart from “a single epoch” and its limited beneficiaries. See: Habermas, 
“Further Reflections on the Public Sphere,” 442. 
8 “Technological determinism” is a term coined by Raymond Williams in 1974 to capture to the common 
presumption that “new technologies are invented… in an independent sphere [that is, apart from extant 
relations of power], and then create new societies or new human conditions.” See: Williams’ Television: 
Technology and Cultural Form. To be clear, I do not mean to indicate here that Habermas’s account in STPS 
is technologically determinist.  
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skills—with which to make use of it.9 At the same time, this literature does not contest 
the presumption of the liberal bourgeois public sphere as only historically, contingently 
non-inclusive. In response to the question of inclusivity, this literature can be read as 
concluding “not yet.” Related, digital divide scholarship tends to affirm a sharp line 
between on- and offline realities, implying that addressing inequalities in the latter will 
resolve those observed in the former.10  
Habermas himself does not address the digital divide, but is not sanguine about 
the prospect for CMC to revitalize the public sphere. Writing in 2006, he grants that the 
Internet has “reactivated the grassroots of an egalitarian public of writers and readers” 
but suggests that “the rise of millions of fragmented chat rooms” caters more to 
“isolated issue politics” than the broad public deliberation on matters of general 
concern.11 A more recent comment expresses a similar concern, emphasizing the need 
for “experts” to “filter” and “focus[] the attention of a dispersed public of citizens.”12 
                                                
9 See, for example: Chadwick, Internet Politics: States, Citizens, and New Communication Technologies; Menzies, 
Whose brave new world? The Information Highway and the New Economy; Last Moyo, “The Digital Divide: 
Scarcity, Inequality and Conflict,” in Creeber and Martin, Digital Cultures; Norris, Digital Divide: Civic 
Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Internet Worldwide; Doug Schuler, “Reports of the Close Relationship 
between Democracy and the Internet May Have Been Exaggerated,” in Jenkins, Democracy and New Media.  
10 Rheingold shared this view, suggesting an increase in women’s “visibility” would address an initial 
“barrage” of harassment online. Rheingold, The Virtual Community, “Chapter Nine: Electronic Frontiers 
and Online Activists” http://www.rheingold.com/vc/book/9.html. 
11 Habermas, “Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic 
Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research,” 423 (Footnote 3). Interestingly, 
R. Stuart Geiger has suggested the filtering role Habermas imagines experts playing is being fill, but by 
algorithms. Geiger argues a manufactured “integration,” and not “fragmentation,” ought to be of concern. 
See: Geiger, “Does Habermas Understand the Internet? The Algorithmic Construction of 
the Blogo/Public Sphere.” 
12 Jürgen Habermas, quoted in Stuart Jeffries, “A Rare Interview with Jürgen Habermas” Interestingly, the 
interview was prompted in part by the creation of Habermas imposter Twitter account. 
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Many others shared Habermas’s concern with what was being parsed as CMC’s tendency 
to fragment a unitary public.13   
In “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of 
Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World,” Nancy Fraser raises another issue, namely 
asymmetries between transnational public discourse and the institutions that might 
translate public opinion derived there into policy. Reminding theorists studying Internet 
publics that the concept of the liberal bourgeois public sphere “was developed not 
simply to understand communication flows but to contribute a normative political theory 
of democracy,”14 Fraser critiques the unreflective use of the term “transnational,” 
arguing it fails to given an account of appropriate participants or what governing entity 
may be constrained and directed by the public opinion formed in such a sphere. Calhoun 
bridges concerns with inadequate institutional uptake and commercial capture, indicating 
that the growing disconnect between global finance and institutions makes it unclear 
“how and where… activism and organizing [generated or supported by online public 
speech] can connect to and influence powerful institutions.”15 
  At this point, the staying power of liberal public sphere theory owes less to 
political theory, whose enthusiasm for Habermas’s account following publication of the 
first English translation of STPS in 1989 waned in the face of sustained feminist and 
other criticism. Scholars in communications and media studies, however, have found in 
Haberamas’s account conceptual tools to make sense of the democratic possibilities of 
                                                
13 Calhoun, “Community without Propinquity Revisited: Communications Technology and the 
Transformation of the Urban Public Sphere”; Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0. 
14 Fraser, “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a 
Post-Westphalian World.” 
15 Calhoun, 392. 
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digital media. Of particular use was the contrast Habermas presented between a historical 
public sphere, where citizens voluntarily discussed matters of common concern and a 
mass public dominated by powerful corporate interests.  
  The fact that early adopters who imagined CMC as capable of radically shaking 
up a public imagined as ossified by mass and especially television broadcast media were 
also drawn to a Habermasian vision of liberal publicity surely facilitated the uptake of his 
work in communications and media studies. Notably, influential early adopter and author 
of The Virtual Community, Howard Rheingold, cites Habermas’s work.16 However, others 
were likely influenced by what Michael Warner describes as a “treasur[ed]” and “mythic” 
narrative in Western societies where the democratization of literacy and print led to the 
development of modern democracy.17  
  While Habermas’s approach has fallen out of vogue in political theory, the liberal 
ideal of a public comprised of individuals who abstract from their particular 
embodiments and material conditions in order to discuss matters of general concern 
remains influential. Those interested in the politics of online public speech must contend 
with the durability of this ideal, which is both reflected in popular, mainstream 
discussions of CMC and made manifest through the affordances of what would come to 
be recognized as “public” CMC. Thus, my first chapter narrates the means by which a 
“civil,” liberal conception of public speech was articulated as both ideal and largely 
impossible online at a crucial moment in the expansion of CMC to a broader public.  
 
 
                                                
16 Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier..  
17 Warner, The Republic of Letters, ix. 
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III. Decentering Liberal Public Sphere Theory 
Recently, theorists have turned to agonistic or radical democratic theory to 
challenge the primacy and appropriateness of liberal public sphere theory as a lens 
through which to make sense of or evaluate online speech.18 Of particular note is the 
work of Frances Shaw whose study of Australian feminist blogging prompted her turn to 
the agonistic or radical democratic theory of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau. This 
section uses Shaw’s work as an inroad for exploring what an agonistic or radical 
democratic theory to the politics of online public speech might bring to the study of 
feminist CMC. 
In their germinal work, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics (1985), Laclau and Mouffe reject all foundational grounds or “given” content to 
social-political identities, movements, and claims, arguing that the content and 
justification for social-political categories are contingent, reflecting political articulations 
in relation to other categories and from within a discursive structure. A discursive 
structure is more or less hegemonic depending on the degree to which it is able to 
“dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a 
centre” by articulating a logic of equivalence between particular differentiated elements 
and by excluding or disarticulating other, “disruptive” elements.19 
                                                
18 Lincoln Dahlberg was one of the first to suggest such a course. More recently, Dahlberg has figured 
radical democratic theory as one “framework” among three others—liberal-individualist, (liberal) 
deliberative, and autonomous Marxist—for studying and evaluating the democratic possibilities of online 
public speech and invites his readers to evaluate the different assumptions regarding democracy and CMC 
which underpin each. See: Dahlberg, “The Habermasian Public Sphere: Taking Difference Seriously?”; 
Dahlberg, “Rethinking the Fragmentation of the Cyberpublic: From Consensus to Contestation.” 
19 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 112. 
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Mirroring feminist political theorists’ and other’s earlier arguments that liberal 
public sphere theory be understood as hegemonic,20 Shaw illustrates how hegemonic 
conceptions of both “politics” and “participation” prevent the political blogging of 
Australian women and feminists from being recognized as such.21 Similarly, Shaw argues 
that feminist bloggers’ creation of “safe spaces” through barring anti-feminist speech is a 
necessary means for preventing such speech from dominating, making it possible to 
articulate their own counter-hegemonic speech.22 
  Like the feminist bloggers she studies, Shaw challenges the erasure of feminist 
blogging as a political act. Her richly ethnographic study offers a rejoinder to those who 
would characterize online feminist speech communities as anti-democratic, because 
unwilling to adhere to a liberal ideal of inclusivity, and also to those who continue to 
utilize liberal public theory to evaluate the politics of online public speech. Finally, 
Shaw’s observation that Australian feminist bloggers countered claims made about 
women’s absent “voices” with the assertion that mainstream political bloggers fail to 
“hear” or “listen” suggest fruitful points for further inquiry. 
  However, there are moments when Shaw’s account of the political work of 
feminist blogging risks devolving into a valorization of pluralism, as when she 
characterizes the outcome of online discursive activism as enabling the visibility of 
“unpopular ideas.”23 If we consider speech a form of political action—what Shaw terms 
“discursive activism”—what exactly is the speech of the feminist bloggers Shaw studies 
                                                
20 Eley, “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century,” in 
Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere; Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere”; Warner, Publics and 
Counterpublics; Warner, The Republic of Letters; Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference. 
21 Shaw, “The Politics of Blogs: Theories of Discursive Activism Online.” 
22 Ibid.; Shaw, “Still ‘Searching for Safety Online’: Collective Strategies and Discursive Resistance to 
Trolling and Harassment in a Feminist Network.”  
23 Shaw, “The Politics of Blogs,” 47. 
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doing? While there are moments where we are directed to note the different language—
e.g., “listening” and “hearing”—deployed by feminist bloggers, these are characterized as 
different ways of conceptualizing politics rather than a different discursive practice. By 
and large, the political work of feminist blogging is figured as pertaining to visibility. So, 
for example, practices like moderation enable feminist counter-hegemonic discourse to 
appear and so also contest hegemonic discourse, and the appearance of feminist counter-
hegemonic discourse bears witness to exclusion and marginalization from dominant 
publics as well as liberal public sphere theory. 
I agree with Shaw’s overarching point, namely, that feminist blogging is rightly 
understood as political. What’s more, I agree that the radical democratic theory of Laclau 
and Mouffe aptly describes conflict over the contingently fundamental ideas that 
materially structure our lives, identities, and what meanings they have. But the aspiration 
of bloggers who characterize the creation of “safe spaces” as a form of feminist activism 
is not only to be visible, but also that their speech and action might cultivate a world in 
which such spaces are no longer necessary. As with much discursive democratic theory, 
the means by which feminist blogging might achieve desired (or other) ends remains 
underspecified.24 Being able to articulate ideas that counter a hegemonic discourse may 
rightly be understood as a prerequisite to the latter, but it leaves open the question of the 
worldly effects of such speech.  
                                                
24 Wingrove, “Getting Intimate with Wollstonecraft: In the Republic of Letters.” Discursive democratic 
theory has long figured the circulation of speech and writing as a. For example, letter writing and the 
circulation of newspapers in the late 18th and early 19th centuries have been credited with cultivating a new 
sense of the self as a citizen and member of a nation, and through these, as having a legitimate claim on 
the nation-state. 
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I argue that what Shaw terms counter-public theory can be productive here in 
ways she perhaps misses by pairing the work of Nancy Fraser with that of Michael 
Warner and characterizing them both as “overcoming the requirement for full inclusion 
that [liberal] public sphere theory requires.”25 At the same time, radical democratic theory 
may make it difficult to fully articulate the political work of feminist bloggers. 
Indeed, Shaw seems aware of the latter when, quoting from Aletta Norval, she 
writes “the ‘role of practices, passions and the visceral dimensions of identification’ have 
been under-theorised.”26 Continuing to draw on Norval, Shaw writes that Laclau and 
Mouffe “provide[] the tools to conceptualise the role of affective devices such as 
sarcasm, satire, hyperbole and other affective…language use[d] in the political process… 
by accounting for the role of disarticulation at times of discursive dislocation.”27 Drawing 
from David Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis’s concept of “dislocation,” “times of 
discursive dislocation” refer to moments when one experiences dissonance between that 
which is hegemonic or held to be common sense, and one’s lived experience. In sum, 
Shaw suggests Mouffe’s and Laclau’s radical democratic theory gives us tools for 
recognizing feminist bloggers’ use of language that frames hegemonic discourse as 
absurd, “as counterhegemonic discourse, and… properly understood as political 
action.”28  
  Again, I agree with Shaw’s analysis of feminist blogging as a means of contesting 
                                                
25 Shaw, “The Politics of Blogs,” 44. This description does not adequately represent the work of either 
Fraser or Warner. In fact, Fraser’s classic critique of Habermas’s liberal public sphere theory, in which she 
characterizes the Habermasian ideal as hegemonic and proposes directions for critical theory that seeks to 
understand “actually existing democracy”—rife as it is with pervasive structural inequality—seems quite 
amenable to Shaw’s commitments. See: Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere.” 




hegemonic discourses. Indeed, how feminist bloggers’ use mockery and affectively 
charged language to cast as nonsensical the reigning “common sense” is a practice of 
feminist CMC that I take up here (Chapter 3). But mocking hegemonic discourses—
contesting and framing their “givens” as absurd—is not new to feminist praxis. As Shaw 
notes, “[f]eminism has a strong tradition of discursive political activism, whether through 
consciousness-raising groups, critical media analysis or interventions in the use of 
language.”29 Thus one wonders if and how the feminist bloggers Shaw studies develop or 
depart from earlier feminist discursive activism and if and how the affordances of 
(different) digital mediums might matter.  
 Attending to these questions is particularly important given scholarship that 
suggests feminist speech may be rendered ineffectual as mere complaint. Lauren 
Berlant’s work on what she terms the genre of female complaint traces the ways in which 
women’s counter-public speech may yet be contained in such a way that it participates in 
the durability of the hegemonic discourse it contests.30 Thus, one possible worldly effect 
of constructing online “safe spaces” is that they contribute to the durability of the world 
as is, where such spaces are needed. 
  What Berlant directs us to consider is how labor and discontent can be channeled 
in ways that ensure that the same labor will continue to be needed, and the same 
discontent will endure. In other words: discontent can propel one to find succor that 
enables one to get by, but may also keep one attached to merely getting by. Berlant is not 
unsympathetic to the pleasures of feeling that one belongs, that one is understood and 
recognized; indeed, the desire to understand this attachment motivates her work. 
                                                
29 Shaw, “The Politics of Blogs,” 42. 
30 Berlant, “The Female Complaint.” Social Text  (1988): 237-59. 
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However, she is critical of intimate publics for containing and defanging political speech 
and action by cultivating subjects who complain, commiserate, and survive hardships 
that reflect deep-seated structural inequality, but cannot fundamentally challenge those 
structures.31   
Similarly, in analyzing the impossible position feminists found themselves in 
following the sex scandal and impeachment of former U.S. President Bill Clinton, 
Melissa Deem writes: “[f]eminism is caught within discursive traps which restrict the 
possibilities of women and feminists to articulate positions within the political. 
Consequently, feminism is in a bind: either refuse to speak or not be heard.”32 Given that 
the feminists Shaw studies responded to a hegemonic discourse of absent women and 
feminist “voices” by suggesting that mainstream bloggers do not “listen,” it is all the 
more important to ask if and how feminist bloggers’ call to “listen” evades reception as 
ineffectual complaint—how it might, following Deem, “be radically recontexualized” and 
create “new speaking positions.”33 
  Undoubtedly, feminists bloggers’ contest the figuration of their “voices” as 
absent in Shaw’s study, but to make “listening” matter in the sense of materializing the 
ideals and world envisioned by the feminist bloggers, Shaw turns to ethics rather than the 
bloggers’ practices.34 Speaking of the limits of civility, or “‘respect for difference’ as a 
norm of [liberal] political debate,” Shaw writes: 
The possibility of affording equal respect to all parties in a discussion is 
constituted by power relations and the discursive expectation of particular 
groups. A self-critical and open aspect in a discussion will go part-way to 
                                                
31 Shaw, “The Politics of Blogs: Theories of Discursive Activism Online.” 
32 Deem, “Scandal, Heteronormative Culture, and the Disciplining of Feminism,” 87. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 44. 
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overcoming… barriers to equality, but the assumption that all people in public 
space will take each other equally seriously in spite of hegemonic discourses and 
power relations is false. Agonistic democracy, combines with the prospect of an 
ethics of listening, may provide one solution to this problem. To engage in a 
politics of difference… there is an ethical imperative to critically examine one’s 
own politically derived norms… This ethical imperative to ‘listen across 
difference’ is required to overcome discursive expectations in political discourse, 
and such an ethics is more at home within an agonistic understanding of 
democracy.35 
 
Shaw’s commitment is to decenter liberal public sphere theory so that feminist blogging 
can be recognized as a form of activism. But she undercuts the force of discursive 
activism by suggesting women and feminists come to feminist blogs as “listeners” and 
use the blogs—figured as “safe spaces”—as strongholds in which to discuss matters and 
concerns already held in common, namely, dissent from and criticism of mainstream 
conceptions of politics. It remains unclear how and why those who do not already see 
and practice listening as a political act—including feminists, women and otherwise—
might come to do so.  
 
Ethical Agonism & Strategic Radicalism 
  Shaw’s turn to ethics is not unique, although it is one of which Mouffe—whose 
theoretical work most centrally informs Shaw’s own—is skeptical.36 An ethical 
imperative to listen may seem to pair well with Mouffe’s framing of agonistic 
“adversaries” as those who “see themselves as belonging to the same political 
                                                
35 Ibid., 46. 
36 Chantal Mouffe, “The Ethics and Politics of Democracy: An Agonist Approach,” in Greif, Hajo, Weiss, 
Martin Gerhard, and Österreichische, Ludwig, Ethics, Society, Politics, Publications of the Austrian Ludwig 
Wittgenstein Society.  
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association, sharing the same symbolic space.”37 But Mouffe insists that “the 
establishment of frontiers, the determination of a space of inclusion/exclusion” is 
properly understood not as ethical but rather as political because such space-making 
projects always entail boundary-creation, and thus the presence of a “constitutive 
outside” that inevitably excludes or limits.38  
  Indeed, Shaw might find in the “agonistic respect” of William Connolly—
characterized by Mouffe as “another version of pluralistic ethics”—a better support for 
her turn to ethics.39 Mouffe suggests that turning to ethics skirts the political “moment of 
decision:” 
To envisage… a confrontation [between conflicting hegemonic projects] in 
political, not ethical terms, requires asking a series of strategic questions about the 
type of ‘we’ that a given politics aims at creating and the chain of equivalences 
that is called for.40 
 
These strategic questions center on who or what practices will be excluded on contingent 
and constructed, political grounds.  
  I am also skeptical of the increasingly central role ethics is imagined to play in 
materializing a politics that challenges durable structural inequality and global capital.41 I 
discuss this ethical turn in Chapter Four, but two observations are called for here. First, 
the turn to ethics typically retains or incorporates political investments that remain 
unacknowledged as such, or in any event remain under-theorized. Second, Laclau and 
Mouffe’s enduring interest in strategy may shed light on why many on the radical Left 
                                                
37 Ibid., 318. 
38 Ibid., 323. 
39 Ibid., 323. 
40 Ibid., 323. 
41 Washick and Wingrove, “Politics that Matter: Thinking About Justice and Power with the New 
Materialists.” 
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might make a turn toward ethics. In the face of the global environmental devastation, 
durable structural inequality, and durable visions of subjectivity and agency as discrete 
and sovereign, “strategic” considerations may well seem altogether inadequate to the 
task.  
  Put otherwise: when it seems the match is set so that you’re always just evading 
check-mate, one may have more interest in how to change the rules that delimit strategic 
“chains of equivalence” than in accepting the current terms of play. From this 
perspective, elaborating an ethics that would alter how people understood their capacities 
and obligations to others is eminently political. Even so, such an approach raises 
questions about reception, especially outside academia. In other words, for these ethical 
visions to matter—to materialize chastened subjects who embrace the non-sovereign 
agents in practice and not only in theory—we need an account of the ways in which the 
imagined worlds and new conceptions of agency and responsibility posited might be 
picked up.  
   I am more interested in the positive affect that attaches to such ethical visions, at 
times bluntly contrasted with a wounded, identitarian politics.42 This might have 
something to do with what Mouffe characterizes as using ethics to avoid the political 
moment where something is expelled, or deemed unacceptable. And yet, it is not clear to 
me that Mouffe’s strategic outlook would not likewise cast bad affect as an obstruction. 
As the saying goes (and as feminists using CMC have been advised for decades): you 
catch more flies with honey than with vinegar.  
  Here it is helpful to return to a point gestured at earlier via Shaw: though 
                                                
42 Rosi Braidotti, “Affirmation Versus Vulnerability: On Contemporary Ethical Debates.” 
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language is seemingly central to Laclau and Mouffe’s radical democratic theory, they do 
little to attend to the particular operations of language in situated speech contexts. Yes, 
we can see how articulating and countering claims, using analogy and metaphor to recast 
old issues in a new light have been central to the rearticulation of freedom and equality. 
But we are less able to account for how and when such speech acts are, to use J. L. 
Austin’s terms, “felicitous” and when others were not.43 We might say that language 
largely functions by analogy to illustrate the ways in which political identities, 
movements, communities are (re)constructed in relation to each other in the political 
field of discourse. 
  As a result, the theoretical account that enables us to explicate how a historical 
hegemony was articulated and disarticulated may be less well suited to help us identify 
those practices that would generate—as Laclau and Mouffe certainly work toward—a 
broad Left counter-hegemonic project. To the extent Laclau and Mouffe—and those 
who take up their theory—allow the existing rules of play and of players to dictate sound 
strategy, they may even obscure the sorts of outcomes they seek. What I will call a poetic 
approach to the study of online public discourse, one that centers the cultivation of 
speaking subjects and the materialization of ideals of public speech, is better suited to 
such challenges. 
 
IV.  The Poetics of Public Address 
  As with Habermas’s critics and those, like Shaw, who have brought radical 
democratic theory to bear on the study of CMC, Michael Warner is invested in 
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decentering liberal public sphere theory. However his work focuses more broadly on 
theorizing publics, understood as peculiarly modern phenomena by which strangers are 
constituted as particular sorts of subjects and/of imagined collectives by means of 
indefinite address. In Warner’s work, a public is as “poetic world making.”44 In saying 
this, Warner is highlighting that the scene making of public address, or its capacity to 
cultivate the subjects and collectives it presumes to already exist through generic form, 
style, mode of delivery, protocols, and the content of discursive claims.  
  In Warner words: “Public discourse says not only ‘Let a public exist,’ but ‘Let it 
have this character, speak this way, see the world in this way.’”45 Thus, these protocols, 
modes of circulation, and claims anticipate and shape not only who could possibly 
receive the address but also whose speech will be recognized as a legitimate contribution 
to “public” discourse. In other words, publics undergird and are productive of particular 
relations of power, creating and recreating worlds and subjects where some are figured as 
reasonable, and articulate, while others are figured as emotional and their speech 
incoherent or absurd. Typically, Warner continues, the poetic function of publics is not 
only obscured by the constitutive presumption of a public’s existence embedded in 
public address—that is, public address presumes the audience it creates—but also by 
“the dominant tradition of the public sphere.”46 
  Warner’s study of the ideologization of print in revolutionary America offers 
insight into what a poetic approach to the study of feminist CMC looks like, directing us 
to consider the historical, technological, and rhetorical dimensions of public sphere 
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communication that are critical to understanding its particular, political possibilities and 
manifestations.47 So, for example—and contrary to the pervasive common sense 
conception of print as “disembodied”—Warner demonstrates that early U.S. colonists 
had an entirely different notion of being public and publishing. In this earlier 
ideologization, the contiguity of hand and paper, of going to print and public circulation, 
were conceived of as an extension of presence, a means by which a person could expand 
the scope of his personal visitation.  
  Following Warner, I ask by what means, by what rhetorical overtures and 
practices, embedded and enabled by what designed elements of CMC, has the 
“disembodiment” of online public speech been materialized? What practices does the 
ideologization of CMC as disembodied cultivate? And, finally, by what means might a 
counter-public practice contest by supplanting that ideologization with another? In the 
context of CMC this requires one to attend to the built form of CMC public spaces, as 
well as the rhetorical practices and discourses that tell us something about the strangers 
we might expect to encounter online, and how we are able and expected to act. 
 
Design and Affordances 
Attending to the public “spaces” of CMC requires attention to the built design of 
different platforms and the ways in which they support or constrain action. The term 
“affordances” is helpful here. Coined by perceptual psychologist James J. Gibson, 
affordances describe the possibilities for action that a particular environment “offers the 
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[actor], what it provides or furnishes.”48 For example, in my office, a chair affords sitting 
(but also standing on if I have need to reach a book on a top shelf); pens and paper 
afford writing (which affords communicating); a computer, screen, mouse and keyboard 
afford typing, communicating across distance, researching, and many other things. 
Affordances highlight the relational nature of action: sitting, writing, typing and so on are 
actions I (have the opportunity to) undertake with objects in my environment.  
Thinking through affordances also suggests that the value perceived in objects 
and the environment reflects a particular perspective. For example, while brush-covered 
ground affords walking, a cleared path affords the same, but also speed, ease, the use of 
carts, and so on for humans. However, brush-covered ground afforded shelter, nutrients, 
and so on for other species. The positive value many would ascribe the path presumes a 
human’s perspective, and perhaps also some dogs.  
Working with CMC platforms, I am concerned with human perspectives; 
nonetheless, in digital environments (but certainly also others), not all human actors have 
the same knowledge or means with which to discern or make use of an affordance. 
Indeed, as taken up by Donald Norman and, through him, human-computer interaction 
(HCI), the term affordance often delimits perceived affordances, the perception of which is 
influenced by design, convention and, I would add, expert knowledge.49  
By way of example, consider the embedded link, that is, a hyperlink appearing in 
the body of digital text that, when clicked, navigates to or opens another website 
containing referenced or otherwise relevant information. Assuming they are functional, 
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Jack Gieseking, William Mangold, Cindi Katz, Setha Low and Susan Gaegert 
49 D. Norman, “Affordances and Design,” Interactions 6, no. 3 (1999): pp. 38-43.  
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an embedded link always affords navigation to the linked page and a computer mouse 
always affords clicking. However, it is the distinct (designed and learned) appearance of 
an embedded hyperlink, denoted by a different color font and underlined when a mouse 
hovers over it, that indicates “that clicking on that location is a meaningful, useful action 
to perform.”50 In researching feminist uses of CMC platforms, both affordances and the 
ease with which they are perceived, utilized, and adapted will matter.  
In a digital environment (as in many others), affordances are the product of 
design and built into software; in other words, they could be otherwise. As with other 
technology, Norman notes that designed affordances of digital interfaces reflect 
“culture.” He seems to take “culture” as unified, but we can imagine instead multiple, 
competing cultures. Though the product of design, affordances of CMC often come to 
be experienced as necessity. The fact that altering a digital environment to change its 
affordances can be exceedingly difficult, both technically and because it flies in the face 
of what already is, compounds this experienced sense of necessity (see discussion of 
moderation in Chapter Two). In this sense, attending to the built design of CMC allows 
me to elaborate how design can both reinforce a dominant culture and appear inevitable 
or even necessary.  
 
A Poetic Approach to Feminist CMC 
  In the context of Shaw’s study and my own analysis of feminist blogging, a poetic 
approach to the study of feminist CMC directs us to consider “listening” as a practice of 
publicity variously constrained and enabled by ideals of public speech and built 
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environments that reflect or contest such ideals. How, one might ask, do feminist blogs 
cultivate subjects who listen, who understand listening to be a political act, and who—in 
the “safe spaces” of feminist blogs—demand that both readers and speakers “listen?” 
Understood as an expectation to move outside one’s own experience in order to gain an 
awareness of structural conditions which shape that experience, “listening” subjects 
might be cultivated by feminist bloggers providing and enforcing a comment policy 
(discussed in Chapter Three). 
  Because the blogs which enable feminists to create online “safe spaces” are taken 
as given in Shaw’s account, we also lose sight of the prior activism of feminists—
discursive and always also material—to create new moderation tools and common 
practices that made it possible for feminist practices of counter-publicity to “go public” 
online: to not be propelled into CMC deemed private, and to take the form of formally 
open-access forums.51  
  Attending to practices of feminist CMC over thirty years, I find that feminist 
speech continues to be “received” by many as “complaint,” despite widely different 
manifestations over time and across different CMC platforms. I want to suggest that this 
is not necessarily indicative of the ineffectiveness or capture of feminist speech and/as 
political action, but it is rather indicative of, to use Joan Scott’s terms, the “paradoxes” of 
feminist speech.52 Rather than get too caught up in the reception of feminist CMC as 
complaint, we should as Melissa Deem suggests, consider  by what means complaint 
                                                
51 While Shaw is correct to identify how a liberal imperative to “include” all contributions is used to frame 
feminist blogs as anti-democratic, it is nonetheless the case that “safe spaces” are formally open-access. 
52 Scott, Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man. 
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becomes “dangerous.”53  
  On this point, it is helpful to keep in mind Sara Ahmed’s work on the “feelings of 
structure,” or the ways feelings enable “structures to get under our skins.”54 Ahmed 
argues the circulation or obstruction of good feelings is party to the cultivation of 
subjects who are viscerally drawn to particular visions and practices of “happy” political 
subjects—no matter how theoretically or practically bankrupt—and repulsed by 
alternatives.55 Attending to affectively charged responses to the “safe spaces” of 
contemporary feminist blogging, I suggest feminist CMC may enable a dangerous form 
of complaint by cultivating what I term a feminized subject whose obligation to strangers 
addressed extends beyond good intentions to encompass an awareness of durable 
structural inequality.     
 
V.  Outline of the Dissertation 
My first chapter (“Cultivating ‘the Real’ Cyberspace: The Ontopolitics of 
Computer-Mediated Communication”) explores how Cyberspace came to be understood 
as a space for the public at large, rather than the exclusive domain of elites and geeks. 
This development hinged on ontologizing, or giving an account of the fundamental 
nature of, both Cyberspace and the speaking subject who would appear there. Drawing 
on early (1990s) accounts of “the electronic frontier,” I show how establishing the 
irrelevance of embodied particularity and vulnerability was central to ontological 
imaginaries of Cyberspace.  
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The disembodiment of Cyberspace speakers has been addressed by others (e.g., 
Rosi Braidotti, Vivian Sobchack)56; unaddressed, however, are important differences in 
what disembodiment was understood to enable. Some envisioned online disembodiment 
as a means by which a liberal public might be perfected; others favored a vision of 
Cyberspace as a theater of the imagination, restricted only by what an individual could 
code. I refer to these as liberal and libertarian practices of publicity online.  
In reconstructing these alternative visions, I show how initial commitments (as 
well as resistance) to “civilizing” Cyberspace were transformed by what was increasingly 
presented as online “violence.” Central in this regard is Julian Dibbell’s “A Rape in 
Cyberspace” and responses to it, where the embodied and vulnerable status of “virtual” 
subjects was debated in deeply gendered (and quite uncivil) terms. The upshot, I argue, 
was the re-articulation of a liberal conception of public speech as both ideal and 
impossible owing to the empirical dominance of a libertarian practice. The result was a 
diminished sense of the value and effects of online speech. 
In Chapter Two (“‘Unconventional’ Women and the Paradoxes of Early Feminist 
CMC”) I draw from digital archives to trace the halting appearance of a feminist practice 
of counter-publicity on Usenet, a non-centralized CMC network credited with shaping 
how social media is conceived and designed. I highlight two key moments in this early 
history. First, I examine how feminist speech was initially shunted into modes of CMC 
deemed private (e.g., mailing lists), where embodiment and vulnerability might be 
properly contained. This development left intact practices of publicity premised on 
disembodiment, to which women had tenuous access.  
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I then elaborate the fragility of the promise of disembodied speech in considering 
a second moment: the unruly speech of an individual, transgender feminist provocateur 
whose attempts to speak online “without regard to gender” were met with strong 
resistance, including banishment from several CMC platforms. The chapter concludes by 
exploring subsequent efforts by feminists on Usenet to create new moderation tools and 
practices, affordances designed to enable feminist speech to “go public.”    
My third chapter (“Embodying Public Speech: The Feminist Politics of Safety 
Online”) takes up the “safe spaces” of contemporary feminist blogs and the un- or even 
anti-democratic practices their creation and maintenance entail. Rooted in feminist 
traditions of consciousness-raising, online safe spaces raise a set of familiar concerns: 
specifically, that the aspiration for “safety” marks a withdrawal from the risky work of 
politics or functions as a cudgel to silence intra-feminist critique in the name of 
solidarity.  
Drawing on what Judith Butler terms the “social ontology” of the body, I suggest 
that the creation and maintenance of online safe spaces constitute a counter-public 
practice that figures the democratic subject as embodied, vulnerable, and entangled in 
relations of obligation; this figuration contests both empirically dominant libertarian and 
normatively dominant liberal practices of publicity online. Within these safe spaces, 
feminist bloggers appropriate affective stances associated with authoritative public 
discourse, notably mocking contempt, which they direct towards dominant practices of 
publicity premised on disembodied speakers. In these ways feminist bloggers can be seen 
as embracing the risky world of politics, inviting but also demanding participants to 
practice different ways to be and speak in public.  
 26 
A final chapter (“On ‘Trigger Warnings’: Tough Subjects, Revolting Subjects, and 
The Publicization of Structural Harm”) takes the recent migration of “trigger warnings” 
(TWs) from online to offline spaces as an inroad for exploring the reception of a vision 
and practices of a feminized democratic subject. Drawing from Sara Ahmed’s work on 
the politics of emotion, I argue that TWs threaten the positive affect of sturdy, resilient 
speakers that signals “fitting” participants in online speech and classrooms, if not also 
politics, broadly conceived. I conclude by staging an encounter with contemporary 
theorists who envision affirming, ethical self-cultivation as a means to dethrone what 
Stephen White terms modernity’s “Teflon subject.” I propose online feminists cultivate a 
democratic subject not unlike the one that recent political theory has sought to cultivate 
via affirming visions of ethical life. Shaped by challenging, even uncomfortable, 
negotiations of “safety” and its failures, the feminized democratic subject of feminist 
blogging, I argue, is less fragile in the face of the bad feelings that make coalition-
building so challenging. In line with research on unconscious bias and white fragility, the 
reception of TWs suggests the staying power of the modern, independent, autonomous 
democratic subject owes in part to a visceral, affectively charged rejection of alternatives 
experienced as “killjoys.”57
                                                









CULTIVATING “THE REAL” IN CYBERSPACE:  
THE ONTOPOLITICS OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION 
 
I.  Introduction 
In 1993 journalist Julian Dibbell stumbled upon a discussion of “virtual rape” in a 
corner of Cyberspace called LambdaMOO. Struck by the seeming misnomer and 
sincerity with which it was applied, Dibbell sought out “the facts” of the virtual rape and 
closely followed ongoing discussions, eventually publishing an article on the subject in 
the Village Voice.1 Dibbell opens the article, titled “A Rape in Cyberspace,” by asking his 
readers to: 
shut [their] ears momentarily to the techno-utopian ecstasies of West Coast 
hippies and look without illusion upon the present possibilities for building, in 
the on-line spaces of this world, societies more decent and free than those 
mapped onto dirt and concrete and capital… to behold the new bodies awaiting 
us in virtual space undazzled by their phantom powers, and to get to the crucial 
work of sorting out the socially meaningful differences between those bodies and 
our physical ones.2  
 
All this must be done in order to “wrap our late-modern ontologies, epistemologies, 
sexual ethics, and common sense around the curious notion of rape” in Cyberspace, 
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which might function—as it would for Dibbell—to “unsettl[e]… the way [he] looked at 
the rest of the world.”3  
Undoubtedly, John Perry Barlow—co-founder of the still-extant Electronic 
Frontier Foundation—was one of the West Coast hippies Dibbell would like his readers 
to shut out, at least for a moment.4 In what would become an iconic early missive on 
computer-mediated communication (CMC) Barlow mused, that “the opening of 
Cyberspace” had resulted in “humanity… undergoing the most profound transformation 
of its history.”5 Barlow continued: “Coming into the Virtual World, we inhabit 
Information. Indeed, we become Information. Thought is embodied and the Flesh is 
made Word. It’s weird as hell.”6 Barlow would go on to write of Cyberspace as the next 
frontier of human civilization. 
Dibbell and Barlow’s rhetoric may seem outlandish in our contemporary 
moment, where CMC is common—even ubiquitous—in much of the world, and yet 
humanity seems much the same, for better or worse. In the early 1990s, however, this 
language would not have seemed so bizarre to the mostly U.S. American audience it was 
intended for, or rather its bizarreness would have been matched by that which it 
described, namely: increased access to computer-mediated communication and its 
conceptualization as a space for “the public.” This chapter returns to this extended 
moment in an effort to tease out the stakes of the differences between Dibbell and 
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https://w2.eff.org/Misc/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/HTML/crime_and_puzzlement_1.html, 
(accessed March 23, 2015). Portions of “Crime and Puzzlement” were first published to The WELL, a 
bulletin board service. 
6 Ibid. 
 29 
Barlow, and the import of their shared imaginary of computer-mediated communication 
as a world apart—what was called “Cyberspace.” This retrospective inquiry better 
positions us to understand and evaluate the democratic possibilities of online public 
discourse, both then and now.  
I argue that ontologized accounts that attributed a fundamental nature to both 
Cyberspace and the speaking subject who would appear there enabled CMC to serve as a 
site of consolidation for a disembodied democratic subject at a time when this familiar 
modern vision was under increasing worldly duress. Drawing on accounts of “the 
electronic frontier” in early 1990s print media and online forums, I show how 
establishing the irrelevance of embodied particularity and vulnerability was central to 
ontological imaginaries of Cyberspace. 
The disembodiment of Cyberspace speakers has been noted by others7; 
unaddressed, however, are important differences in what disembodiment was 
understood to enable. While some envisioned disembodiment as a means by which 
Habermas’s liberal public might be perfected, others refused the expectation of sincere 
and civil communication this implied, favoring a “cyberpunk” vision of Cyberspace as a 
theater for individual expression and imagination, restricted only by what an individual 
could imagine or code.  
In reconstructing these alternative visions, I show how initial commitments (as 
well as resistance) to civilizing Cyberspace were transformed by what was increasingly 
presented as online violence. Central in this regard is Julian Dibbell’s “A Rape in 
Cyberspace” and responses to it, where the embodied and vulnerable status of virtual 
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subjects was debated in deeply gendered (and quite uncivil) terms. The upshot, I argue, 
was the re-articulation of a liberal conception of public speech online as ideal and in 
perpetual deferment. One effect of this re-articulation was a diminished sense of the 
meaning, efficacy, and even “realness” of public CMC, which repeatedly fell short of an 
ideal many thought it was uniquely suited to realize. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section Two, I survey the theoretical 
framework that supports my analysis. Section Three provides a short survey of public 
computer-mediated communication framed as “Cyberspace.” Sections Four and Five 
trouble a monolithic account of Cyberspace, illustrating how contestation over this space 
played out by reference to distinct accounts of the fundamental nature of the world 
CMC offered, and thus of the  different modes of “being” online and relations to 
strangers one encountered there that could be cultivated. I close by discussing why I 
believe turning to CMC and the onto-imaginaries that have narrated its incorporation 
into our lives offers important sites of analysis for those interested in what William 
Connolly has called “less stingy” visions of the democratic subject.8 
 
II.  Ontologized Subjects 
My approach represents an attempt to bring public sphere literature in 
conversation with that of contemporary theorists concerned with ontological accounts of 
the subject and conditions of her socio-political existence. The former has mostly moved 
from qualified enthusiasm to brooding skepticism regarding CMC’s democratic 
potential—a perspective reflected in Western popular discourse—with the noted 
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exception of CMC’s use in non-democratic countries.9 However, these assessments are 
haunted by the durable specter of Jürgen Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere. In other 
words, they tend to take as given that this public represents the proper or ideal form of 
democratic public discourse, bemoaning the “fragmentation” of the public or failure of a 
“general public” to coalesce and operate as a limit to national government.10 Other 
accounts, like Jodi Dean’s Blog Theory, expressly eschew Habermas’s ideal public, but 
nonetheless produce an account—not unlike Habermas’s—of the near-total capture of 
citizens’ attention by commercial interests.11 
It is here that I find it helpful to think with political theorists interested in socio-
political ontologies of the human, as they direct us to consider what is being presumed as 
“real.” At the same time, this literature has had little to do with CMC to date. This strikes 
me as a missed opportunity, given the role of public discourse in shaping and 
materializing the modern ontology—including the masterful, self-directed, self-interested 
democratic subject—that this literature is interested in dethroning, not to mention 
CMC’s importance as a contemporary form of networked entanglement.12 
My source material directs me to consider ontology as well: in speaking of the 
“nature” of Cyberspace, public figures like Barlow rely upon and construct an imaginary 
of CMC and those using it that envisages new ways of being. Working primarily with 
mainstream print media I tease out competing ontologized accounts of Cyberspace, that 
                                                
9 This exception is unsurprising if we understand a Habermasian model to be the presumed backdrop. 
10 Fraser, “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a 
Post-Westphalian World”; Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, 31. 
11 Dean, Blog Theory: Feedback and Capture in the Circuits of Drive, 4. I am not unsympathetic to Dean’s 
analysis, however, she remains at an unhelpful level of abstraction, rarely working with the prose of those 
bloggers she figures as a monolithic group decidedly under the thumb of “communicative capitalism.” 
12 Particular imagined collectivities (e.g., “The Republic of Letters”) and physical communicative sites 
(e.g., the salon) were importantly constitutive of the modern subject. 
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is, accounts which posit particular visions of CMC and those using it as “real.” These 
“ontopolitical imaginaries”—or simply: onto-imaginaries13—underpin different political 
projects and hail different figures of the democratic subject. For example, whether or not 
“a rape in Cyberspace” is taken to be nonsense, a misnomer that diminishes “real” sexual 
assault, or an obvious harm requiring collective action, will turn on the question of the 
“nature” of Cyberspace.  
The term onto-imaginary is meant to capture an account of what is fundamental 
that draws from the always also discursive matter of being human—lived experience, 
practices, institutions, built environments, encounters with human and nonhuman 
others—and shapes what we make of this matter, where “make of” speaks to both 
“understanding” and “materializing.”14 Onto-imaginaries offer conceptual and aesthetic 
frameworks, calling attention to what “makes sense,” but also what does or does not 
“feel right.” Finally, ontological imaginaries are partial—referencing some matter and not 
others—and so also political. To the extent they are picked up, an onto-imaginary may 
                                                
13The term ontopolitical imaginaries is also intended to signal my engagement with scholars interested in 
ontology considered in relation to the human qua meaning-making animal, especially William E. 
Connolly’s “ontopolitical interpretation” (Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization). Connolly’s ontopolitical 
interpretation highlights the fact that political claims and interpretation always rest, however 
surreptitiously or uncomfortably, on a vision of what exists or must be presumed to exist. By contrast, 
ontopolitical imaginaries begin from more or less overt accounts of “nature,” teasing out the political 
projects and modes of being human they might or do support. In the context of burgeoning CMC 
publics, baldly asserted onto-imaginaries relayed something of what to expect, what to feel, how to 
behave, and how to evaluate the words and behaviors of others “online.” Other works that have been 
influential in shaping my use of this term: White, Sustaining Affirmations: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in 
Political Theory and Markell, Bound by Recognition, Theory. Jane Bennett helpfully encapsulates this term in a 
critical exchange of which I was a part. Bennett, “Ontology, Sensibility, and Action,” 82-89. 
14 A fair amount has been said about the metaphors that framed and accompanied the development of the 
early public Internet. Mostly stemming from communication and (new) media studies and legal 
scholarship, this literature has done a great deal to illustrate the ways in which different metaphors shape 
the built design of the CMC (an information superhighway should be fast), ease of use and access (for the 
metaphor of information superhighway to be meaningful I must have some familiarity with large 
highways), legislation, and even users’ expectations (on a superhighway, I and many others swiftly move 
toward our own destinations, not communicating or coordinating much).  
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stand in for “the real,” and so delimit the possible as well as the coherence of some lived 
experiences. 
Central to the political work of onto-imaginaries is the management of a certain 
fundamental vulnerability of being human. Note here that I am not speaking of an 
imagined vulnerability, but am making a very general ontological claim, namely that, to be 
human is to be vulnerable: to the worldly conditions one is born into, to death. Here, I 
am in good company. This vulnerability is captured by Arendt’s non-sovereign human 
actor who is, as Linda Zerilli says, “a beginner,” and who would be paralyzed without the 
capacity to forgive because of a fundamental unpredictability of words and action taking 
place amongst others with whom we share the world.15 Drawing from Arendt, Patchen 
Markell has described this fundamental facet of being human as resulting from “[t]he fact 
of human finitude… interpret[ed] not in terms of morality, but rather in terms of the 
practical limits imposed upon us by the openness and unpredictability of the future.”16 I 
also want to draw in thinkers whose discussion of fundamental human vulnerability is 
not oriented primarily towards the future, those—like Charles Taylor, Judith Butler, 
Donna Haraway—who identify the ways in which being human means that one is always 
already dependent upon others and shaped by the material-semiotic practices and 
institutions that produce the recognizable, the normal, the real. 
As others have illustrated, a modern onto-imaginary manages human vulnerability 
by displacing it from the democratic subject—imagined in his purest forms as a 
disembodied expression of reason—onto the bodies of disparaged Others.17 That this is, 
                                                
15 Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom.  
16 Markell, Bound by Recognition, 5. 
17 See discussions in White, Sustaining Affirmation, and Brown, States of Injury. 
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in some sense, a grossly insincere onto-imaginary does not mean that it is detached from 
the real matter of being human. The strength of this onto-imaginary—as with any onto-
imaginary—is in its uptake, that is, in its being lived and built into our practices, 
institutions, the material and immaterial structures we move in, common sense, and so 
on. To that end, throughout this analysis I aim to take seriously what makes the 
“fantastical” durable, lived, and felt as real. 
My primary sites for observing visions and practices of the democratic subject are 
CMC, and its early adopters, emissaries, and malcontents. By looking to onto-imaginaries 
and situating myself in public sphere scholarship, I seek to explain the ways CMC 
cultivates fundamental—felt and lived—understandings of ourselves and the relationship 
among our bodies, words, and those of the strangers we address. Contrary to what we 
might expect, the fact that these understandings—these onto-imaginaries—transcend 
CMC is not challenged but illustrated by the now commonplace sense of a sharp 
distinction between on- and offline realities, with the former generally considered to fall 
short of “the real.” Put otherwise, I do not take the demarcation between on- and offline 
reality as given, but rather constructed and contested. This is not to say that there are no 
distinctions between, for example, face-to-face conversations and CMC, but rather that 
the meaning attributed to these distinctions is not given, but shaped through onto-
imaginaries, selectively—politically—drawing from some experiences and not others. As 
will be seen, the demarcation between online activity and real life was far less certain in 
the early 1990s, when Cyberspace was commonly depicted as a literal space in which 
humanity might appear to itself, undivided by material insecurity and politicized 
identities. 
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III.  Cyberspace: An Introduction 
While we may now think of “Cyberspace” as simply a dated term for “the 
Internet,” in the 1990s it more narrowly encompassed sites of interactive, formally open-
access computer-mediated communication.18 At the heart of the early public CMC—its 
figuration in mainstream print media and its digital manifestation—were online forums, 
notably Usenet’s newsgroups and the “conferences” hosted on Bulletin Board Services 
(BBSs), and Multi-User Domains or Dungeons (MUDs), like LamdbaMOO, which 
supported real-time interactive role-playing.19  
Both forums and MUDs were initially entirely text-based. What this means in the 
case of forums is probably clear; for example, participants were not able to upload a   
photo to associate with their username or “handle.”  
                                                
18 Brian A. Connery provides a typical example of the way Cyberspace was distinguished from the 
Internet and, before the latter’s dominance, other infrastructure supporting CMC: “And debates 
continue—at the national level regarding the Internet itself… and within the cyberspace of newsgroups 
and discussion lists…” in “IMHO: Authority and Egalitarian Rhetoric in the Virtual Coffeehouse,” in 
Porter, Internet Culture,  171. See also: Annette N. Markham, “Metaphors Reflecting and Shaping the 
Reality of the Internet: Tool, Place, Way of Being” (paper presented at the Association of Internet 
Researchers Conference, Toronto, Canada, October 16-19, 2003), 
http://markham.internetinquiry.org/writing/MarkhamTPW.pdf. 
19 A distinction is generally made between online forums and MUDs in the type of public discourse they 
facilitated. MUDs are understood to have primarily supported synchronous or “real-time” 
communication. One effect of how this was conceived is that the MUD kept no record of public 
conversations, or more accurately, narratives of the words and actions of participants—one had to “be 
there” as a conversation unfolded in order to participate. By contrast, while roughly synchronous 
communication could unfold on a BBS, these primarily supported asynchronous public communication, 
meaning that—barring deletion or “freezing” of commenting—one could respond to a conversation 
thread begun days, weeks, or even years later. Charging for minutes of usage added to the asynchronous 
feel of forums as many would log off when composing a response in order to minimize cost. However, 
this distinction breaks down some because MUDS had forum-like boards and both BBSs and MUDs 
typically supported (synchronous) chat and (asynchronous) email conversations that were private insofar 
as directed to particular, invited, or addressed individuals. It was also not atypical for the contents of an 
email to be posted as a contribution to public conversation. See: Peter Kollack and Marc A. Smith, 
“Communities in Cyberspace,” in Smith and Kollack, Communities in Cyberspace, and first-hand accounts 
cited throughout this chapter.  
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In the context of a MUD, participants created an avatar by choosing a name and 
writing a description that other users could see and then navigating environments (e.g., 
LamdbaMOO’s many-roomed mansion) described entirely by text, as in a book. 
FIGURE 1: Screenshot of the Object-Oriented MUD, LambdaMOO.20  
 
 
Retroactively, we might call these “social media”—indeed, some have21—but that term 
overlooks a dimension that mattered a great deal at the time: Cyberspace understood as a 
meaningfully distinct place, a different plane of being in which we, too, might be 
fundamentally different. 
                                                
20 Screenshot from Aula, “LambdaMOO,” MMOs Through My Eyes, 
http://cultureofmmos.blogspot.com/2010/04/lambdamoo.html, (accessed December 20, 2015). The 
letters “E,” “S,” “W,” and “N” indicate directions the user walked or attempted to walk 
21 Adam Estes, “The Well, One of the Earliest Social Networks, Is Facing Destruction,” Motherboard, July 
4, 2012, http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/social-networks-just-aren-t-what-they-used-to-be (accessed 
February 22, 2015); John K. Waters, The Everything Guide to Social Media. Those familiar with the “choose 
your own adventure” genre of children’s books might find it helpful to think of a MUD as such, as there 
were parameters to these environments (e.g., walking south, by typing “S,” was only possible in a MUD 
building if there was a hall or room built into the design south of one’s location). Likewise, the actions of 
other characters were not pre-determined but unfold, along with one’s own actions, in real-time. 
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Experiences or first-hand accounts of public CMC were crucial to conveying the 
sense that Cyberspace afforded new spaces for being and interacting with others. For 
many, a BBS called the WELL, or a detailed account of another’s experience thereof, 
would serve as a first introduction to Cyberspace.  
The WELL, or Whole Earth ’Lectronic Link, was founded in 1985 by Larry 
Brilliant and Stewart Brand of Whole Earth Catalog fame.22 It was, as the connection to 
Brand might suggest, a stronghold of the West Coast hippies Dibbell referenced and a 
font (one is tempted to say “WELLspring”) of cyber-utopian thought. WELL members 
paid a monthly subscription ranging from $8 to $15 and, through the mid-1990s, an 
additional hourly rate to read and post in online forums called “conferences.”23 
Conferences covered a range of interests—politics, Grateful Dead songs, computers, 
sexuality, and WELL policies—which members were expected to participate in using 
their real names.24  
The WELL powerfully shaped the discourse that accompanied increased access 
to CMC platforms beyond the elite spheres of the university, military, and tech industry 
in the early through mid-1990s.25 Its cultural clout can be traced in part to its base in the 
                                                
22 Hafner, The Well: A Story of Love, Death & Real Life in the Seminal Online Community. For an early and 
much abbreviated version: Katie Hafner, “The Epic Saga of The Well: The World’s Most Influential 
Online Community (And It’s Not AOL)” Wired 5 no. 5 (May 1997), 
http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/5.05/ff_well_pr.html.  
23 Ron Pernick, “A Timeline of the First 10 Years on the WELL,” The WELL, 1995, 
http://www.well.com/conf/welltales/timeline.html (accessed August 12, 2014). 
24 The WELL—still in existence today—also has several “private” conferences, to which one must 
request and be granted access. Of particular note interest for my research is the Women on the Well 
(WOW) conference, which requires that prospective members speak with a conference host or 
administrator in order to audibly “verify” that one is a woman. 
25 The Internet’s predecessor, ARPANET, was funded by the U.S. Department of Defense, and 
developed at university and military research labs. Outside these venues, employment in the tech industry, 
centered around the San Francisco Bay Area, could provide access to CMC platforms. Access continued 
to be restricted to these venues—the state, the university, the tech industry, and those connected to 
them—until the emergence of commercial service providers in the late 1980s. These were not limited to 
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San Francisco Bay Area, the heartland of CMC development.26 As such, WELL 
members were far more likely to be called upon as experts, or to position themselves as 
experts to old media outlets who were playing catch-up. Indeed, several early edited 
volumes on the Internet that included accounts of the WELL were also edited by WELL 
members.27 Additionally, the WELL offered free access to journalists.28 The result was 
the dissemination of dozens of first-hand accounts of the WELL and of Cyberspace 
from the perspective of WELL members. These appeared in mainstream print media 
including The New York Times, Harper’s Magazine and The San Francisco Chronicle; 
burgeoning digital cultures print media such as Wired; scholarly journals; edited volumes, 
and even several dedicated books.29 
 
IV.  Cyberspace as the Frontier of Human Civilization 
“Crime and Puzzlement,” the piece from which Barlow is quoted above, offers 
an account of the events that led to his co-founding the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(EFF), which promised to “raise and disburse funds for education, lobbying, and 
                                                                                                                                            
Internet service providers (ISPs), but rather included bulletin board services like the WELL, which 
provided members with an email account, homepage, in addition to the more widely discussed forums or 
“conferences.” By the early 1990s ISPs had become the most common means of accessing CMC 
platforms, including BBSs. 
26 Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture. 
27 For example: Dery, Flame Wars; Ludlow and Godwin, High Noon on the Electronic Frontier. 
28 Hafner, The Well: A Story of Love, Death & Real Life in the Seminal Online Community. 
29 For example (in chronological order): Sterling, The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic 
Frontier; Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier; Dery, Flame Wars; Brook 
and Boal, Resisting the Virtual Life: The Culture and Politics of Information; Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the 
Age of the Internet; Leeson, Clicking In: Hot Links to a Digital Culture; Ludlow and Godwin, High Noon on the 
Electronic Frontier.; Cherny and Weise, Wired Women: Gender and New Realities in Cyberspace, edited by Lynn 
Cherny and Elizabeth Reba Weise; Seabrook, Deeper: Adventures on the Net; Hafner, “The Epic Saga of The 
Well: The World’s Most Influential Online Community (And It’s Not AOL)”; Hafner, The Well: A Story of 
Love, Death & Real Life in the Seminal Online Community; Fred Turner, “Where the Counterculture Met the 
New Economy: The WELL and the origins of virtual community,” Technology and Culture 46, no. 3 (2005), 
485-512; Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the Rise of 
Digital Utopianism. 
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litigation in the areas relating to digital speech and the extension of the [U.S.] 
Constitution into Cyberspace.”30 However, a close reading suggests that “Crime and 
Puzzlement” was the first in a series of attempts to resolve a fundamental tension 
between two different Cyberspace onto-imaginaries: Cyberspace as a theater for 
individual expression and play, and Cyberspace as the frontier of human civilization.  
This tension is captured in the opening of “Crime and Puzzlement,” in which 
readers are introduced to two decidedly suspicious characters in a WELL conference on 
hacking that had been organized by Harper’s Magazine. It was the use of pseudonyms that 
marked these characters—Acid Phreak and Phiber Optik—as suspicious on the WELL, 
where the norm (and, technically, the requirement) was for user accounts to be made using 
one’s real name. Even if one posted pseudonymously, posts were linked to public user 
profiles which were supposed to provide one’s real names; Acid Phreak and Phiber Optik 
did not comply with this expectation and it was this in the context of the hacker conference 
that earned them the label of “crackers.”31 Short for computer-cracker, “cracker” was 
                                                
30 Barlow, “Crime and Puzzlement.” 
31 The role of anonymity and pseudonymity in CMC is more complicated than typically presented. 
Feminist critiques of the presumptively disembodied, masculine-gendered subject of Cyberspace can 
overstate the prevalence of anonymity and what it signified. For example, Lisa Nakamura writes: “The 
ability to participate anonymously or, as was and remains far more common, pseudonymously was an 
integral part of why Barlow and other net utopians saw the Internet as valuable” (Nakamura, “Afterword: 
Blaming, Shaming, and the Feminization of Social Media,” in Magnet and Rachel Dubrofsky, Feminist 
Surveillance Studies). Anonymity or pseudonymity would be offered as solutions to problems of inequality 
recast as problems of reception (see, for example, Rheingold, The Virtual Community, Chapter One, 
http://www.rheingold.com/vc/book/1.html). But, as Barlow’s depiction of Acid Phreak and Phiber 
Optik suggests, anonymity and pseudonymity also signified suspicious, even nefarious characters. What’s 
more, pseudonymity—which Nakamura notes was far more common than anonymity in early CMC—
came to be powerfully associated with cisgendered men adopting a virtual gendered identity other than 
that with which they identified for expressly nefarious ends. This iconization likely owed to high-profile 
accounts like that of “Alex,” a cisgendered man, who represented himself as a severely disabled woman 
name Joan Sue Greene, as part of an experiment to “see what it felt like to be female, and to experience 
the intimacy of female friendship,” which included “pressuring” women for virtual sex and using “Joan” 
to set himself up on dates (Lindsy van Gelder, “The Strange Case of the Electronic Lover,” Ms. Magazine 
(Oct. 1985). This is part of the story behind the “rule of the Internet” which says “there are no girls on 
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used to describe a subset of hackers who used their expertise for vaguely nefarious 
purposes—perhaps just for fun, perhaps to gain access to private information for 
personal gain.  
Later, the nefarious character of Acid Phreak and Phiber Optik seemed 
confirmed via their differentiation from Barlow and the other “techno-hippies” who 
were willing to adhere to a code and participate in civil discussion: 
After several days of strained diplomacy, the discussion settled into a moral 
debate on the ethics of security and went critical. The techno-hippies were of the 
unanimous opinion that, in Dylan's words, one "must be honest to live outside 
the law." But these young strangers apparently lived by no code save those with 
which they unlocked forbidden regions of the Net… 
 
Civility broke down. We began to see exchanges like:   
 
Dave Hughes: Clifford Stoll said a wise thing that no one has commented on. 
That networks are built on trust. If they aren't, they should be.    
 
Acid Phreak: Yeah. Sure. And we should use the 'honor system' as a first line of 
security against hack attempts. 
 
Jef Poskanzer: This guy down the street from me sometimes leaves his back door 
unlocked. I told him about it once, but he still does it. If I had the chance to do it 
over, I would go in the back door, shoot him, and take all his money and 
consumer electronics. It's the only way to get through to him.   
 
Acid Phreak: Jef Poskanker (Puss?  Canker?  yechh)  Anyway, now   
when did you first start having these delusions where computer hacking was even 
*remotely* similar to murder?   
 
The “breakdown” here refers to Acid Phreak’s abrupt, contemptuous dismissal of 
Hughes’ comment, followed Poskanzer’s sarcastic extension of Acid Phreak’s response 
to the “real world,” and finally, name-calling on the part of Acid Phreak. 
                                                                                                                                            
the Internet” and infamous refrain, “tits or GTFO [get the fuck out,” which functions as a demand to 
prove one is a woman (by providing a photo of ones breasts) or leave. 
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As Barlow narrates it, a second encounter—this time with an FBI Special Agent 
who sought Barlow out for information on hackers while investigating the theft of Apple 
source code—provides an opportunity for “cyberpunks” like Acid Phreak and folks like 
Barlow to see themselves as one in their shared disdain for the hapless Agent Baxter who 
doesn’t understand what it means for source code to be stolen (we are told he was 
expecting something physical, irreplaceable, which might be returned if found).  
Weaving throughout the narrative are Barlow’s reflections on “the opening of 
Cyberspace,” its “nature” and the insufficiencies of our existing means of making sense 
of and legally ordering this new world. These ruminations constitute an onto-imaginary 
that supports a vision of Cyberspace as a promising new space for the general public, 
rather than an exclusive realm for elites and geeks. In the following section I discuss the 
former imaginary before illustrating how Barlow’s account attempts to absorb it into a 
conception that would have wider appeal. 
 
Repurposing Gibson’s Dystopian Cyberspace 
The term “Cyberspace” was coined by science fiction author William Gibson in 
the short story Burning Chrome. In a later novel, Neuromancer (1984), a voice-over from 
children’s documentary provides a detailed and oft-quoted description of what 
everybody in Gibson’s fictional world already knows: 
Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate 
operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts... A 
graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in 
the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace 
of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights, receding.32  
                                                
32 William Gibson, Neuromancer, 51. 
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Gibson’s definition of the term “Cyberspace” as a “hallucinate[ed]” “nonspace” creates a 
jarring dissonance. The alliterative term Cyberspace rolls off the tongue and purports to 
convey some information about what the unknown word means: Cyberspace is some sort 
of space. However, the sleek abstraction of Cyberspace quickly bumps up against the 
clunky reality that it is not a space, revealed and embodied by the awkward term 
“nonspace” which, in both form and content, seems strikingly close to “nonsense.”  
In this Cyberspace, one operates as a “disembodied consciousness.”33 The “elite” 
“cowboys” who do so cultivated “a certain relaxed contempt for the flesh.”34 The body 
is debased to “meat,” a “prison,” and—as Neuromancer’s antihero Case illustrates by 
replacing organs so he can continue a drug habit—a costly and vulnerable tool of 
escape.35  
Gibson’s Cyberspace is more akin to a drug-induced hallucination than an 
inhabitable, collective world: Neuromancer paints a dystopian future-scape wherein people 
opt out of reality, and corporations and technology are the only agents. The exultation of 
a mind separated from an enfeebled body is not depicted as a good or desirable thing; 
instead, it marks a misidentification of reality and the surrender of autonomy in the face 
of what is, in fact, a “mindless” pleasure or distraction, which is no less destructive for 
being unreal. The “console cowboy” is the opposite of that other cowboy of popular 
science fiction, Star War’s Han Solo—Case is tricked and never redeemed, he is unable to 
rise above his appetites, and he doesn’t “get the girl.” 
                                                
33 Ibid., 5. 
34 Ibid., 6. 
35 Ibid. 
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Despite its dystopian bent, early CMC adopters—who were often synonymous 
with early CMC “builders” or hackers—found in Neuromancer a rich language to describe 
what they were doing and experiencing. For example, in explaining the purpose of a new 
digital cultures magazine, Mondo2000, its editor-in-chief and prominent WELL member 
R. U. Sirius (a.k.a. Ken Goffman) takes for granted that readers will be familiar with 
Gibson’s Cyberspace. He writes:  
Mondo 2000 is here to cover the leading edge in hyperculture… We’re talking 
Cyber-Chautauqua: bringing cyberculture to the people! Artificial awareness 
modules. Visual music. Vidscan magazines. Brain-boosting technologies. William 
Gibson’s Cyberspace Matrix—fully realized!36 
 
R. U. Sirius and other early adopters/builders did not so much discount the power of 
corporations seeking to exploit consumer and other appetites depicted in Neuromancer, 
but imagined themselves to come out on top. They would, to use R.U. Sirius’s words: 
“High-jack technology for personal empowerment, fun and games.”37 That these 
words—“empowerment,” “fun” and “games”—appear side-by-side marks a rejection of 
the valuation implied by Gibson’s description of Cyberspace as a “hallucin[ated]” 
“nonspace.” What’s more, they eagerly embraced the imagined separation of mind and 
body as a condition of this “empowerment, fun and games.”  
This cyberpunk onto-imaginary cultivates a hyper-modern subject, by which I 
mean it invites and enables individuals with access to it to more nearly realize the 
modern form of human subjectivity which, to use Stephen K. White’s language, “dreams 
ultimately of frictionless motion,” or the more nearly perfect translation of individual will 
                                                
36 R. U. Sirius, , quoted in Dery, Flame Wars, 14. 
37 Ibid. 
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into reality.38 Agency is still conceived of as mastery and the subject is still imagined as 
disembodied, but his defining characteristic does not seem to be reason: it is instead 
masculine-gendered creativity or play.  
I say masculine-gendered because of the acceptance and even admiration of 
actions—like those of the Mr. Bungle, the “virtual rapist” to be discussed below—which 
manifest as a successful imposition by an individual on others and/or the resistance of 
an individual to be required to act in proscribed ways. In other words, there is a sort of 
“penetrative” quality to the play, a masterful “shaping” typically gendered masculine.39 
Reason is perhaps even demoted, recast in terms of logic and thus merely the tool by 
which one builds, breaks or rebuilds the world. Finally, he is atomistic in the extreme: 
there are no visions that attach him to others in relations of responsibility or care. The 
various “prosthetics”—including Habermas’s intimate, domestic sphere and the 
voluntary associations of Alexis de Tocqueville— which function to, in a sense, 
humanize the otherwise atomistic modern subject are absent in the cyber-punk imaginary 
of Cyberspace.40 
This onto-imaginary both reflected early-adopters’ lived experiences and shaped 
the built form of Cyberspace itself. The prevalence of early-adopters who built, coded, 
and hacked Cyberspace surely lent itself to the lived experience of agency as mastery. 
Paired with the experience of a way of seeing, thinking, and a practice—programming—
                                                
38 White, Sustaining Affirmations: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory 
39 This is not to say that women were formally excluded from this subject position, but rather that they 
were would be less likely to have access to it: they were less likely to be early adopter/builders, and they 
were more likely to have experiences that made a state of “disembodiment” less achievable (e.g., sexual 
overtures that called one back to one’s body, or demands that one prove that one is a woman by 
displaying bodily “proof”). 
40 It is through the intimate, domestic sphere that Habermas’s bourgeois subject recognizes his common 
humanity. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society. 
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that those outside the elite spheres that provided access found alien, the experiences of 
early-adopters confirmed a sense of exceptionalism.41 It also paved the way for, 
borrowing Gibson’s terms, “a certain relaxed contempt for the flesh,” at least for those 
who couldn’t imagine getting out of it by logging in.42 Finally, the “job-based” nature of 
work in the tech industry, which required one to move from one team and project to 
another, lent itself to an atomistic sense of the self. 
 
Cyberspace as the Next, New American West 
While Cyberspace was a familiar term amongst CMC early adopter-builders, 
summoning shared cultural objects, practices and language, it is Barlow who is credited 
with popularizing the term.43 In doing so—in fact, in order to do so—Barlow 
dramatically refigured Cyberspace. Barlow opens “Crime and Puzzlement” by situating 
himself in a “saloon,” having a conversation with “Howard”—almost certainly Howard 
Rheingold, author of The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier—noting 
the appearance of “two strangers,” the two crackers—Acid Phreak and Phiber Optik—
mentioned above. It’s several paragraphs before the reader understands “where” this 
saloon is: the WELL, which Barlow characterizes as “an example of the latest thing in 
frontier villages.”44 It takes another paragraph still, before one finds how to get there: 
“To enter it, one forsakes both body and place and becomes a thing of words alone.”45 
                                                
41 For example, see: Ellen Ullman, Close to the Machine: Technophilia and its Discontents (NY: Picador, 2012 
(1997); Fred Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture. 
42 Ullman, Close to the Machine. 
43 Sterling, The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier; Turner, From Counterculture to 
Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the Rise of Digital Utopianism, 171. 
44 Barlow, “Crime and Puzzlement.” 
45 Ibid. 
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Citing Gibson and describing Cyberspace as “an immense region of electron 
states, microwaves, magnetic fields, light pulses and thought,” language that references 
Gibson’s Cyberspace and its uptake amongst early adopters, Barlow immediately recasts 
it in terms of the American West, writing: 
Cyberspace, in its present condition, has a lot in common with the 19th Century 
West.  It is vast, unmapped, culturally and legally ambiguous, verbally terse 
(unless you happen to be a court stenographer), hard to get around in, and up for 
grabs.  Large institutions already claim to own the place, but most of the actual 
natives are solitary and independent, sometimes to the point of sociopathy.  It is, 
of course, a perfect breeding ground for both outlaws and new ideas about 
liberty.46 
 
In likening Cyberspace to the “19th Century West,” Barlow cashes in on a rich language 
of metaphor and myth that, as historian Richard Slotkin illustrated, has repeatedly been 
used to reinvent America.47 Speaking of the use of frontier myth by 20th century U.S. 
politics including U.S. Presidents, Kennedy, Johnson and Reagan, Slotkin writes that it 
offered “a model of successful and morally justifying action… Those who were 
persuaded to identify with [it] found that it entailed more than a simple affiliation… Its 
central purpose was to summon the nation as a whole to undertake (or at least support) a 
heroic engagement” in the “struggle” at hand, whether communism or government 
overreach.  
There were, undoubtedly, already traces of frontier mythology in Gibson’s 
Cyberspace: “console cowboys,” a restless movement indicative of an inability to “settle” 
                                                
46 Ibid. 
47 Kolodny, The Lay of the Land: Metaphor as Experience and History in American Life and Letters; Slotkin, 
Gunfighter Nation; Slotkin, The Fatal Environment: The Myth of the Frontier in the Age of Industrialization; Slotkin, 
Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860. 
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down.48 However, paired with the alien language of “electron states, microwaves, 
magnetic fields, light pulses and thought,”49 Cyberspace would likely continue to appear 
as an exclusive realm for the elite, the strange, the fearful. Recasting these figures as 
characters in a Western—the “solitary,” the “sociopath[s],” the “outlaws”—provides a 
conceptual and aesthetic framework for making sense of those who feel at home in “an 
immense region of electron states.” Even crackers like Acid Phreak and Phiber Optik, 
can be saved, and their “bad behavior” explained in terms of youth and media-induced 
bombast: “they were like another kid named Billy, many of whose feral deeds in the pre-
civilized West were encouraged by the same dime novelist who chronicled them.”50 Such 
framing would make Cyberspace and the host of characters seen to inhabit it in 
mainstream media intelligible and so less fearful; we may even admire them. It also 
implies a different “bad guy”: the media.  
At the same time, references to “frontier villages” and “town meetings” from an 
author whose prose pairs well with the reminder—ever-present in his writings—that he 
spent most of his life in “actual cow-towns” offers a vision of who and how we might 
“be” in Cyberspace: pioneers, prospectors, settlers.51 While this new frontier may not be 
for everyone, it is for “most,” even more so than the mythologized American West. As 
                                                
48 These traces are not unique to the works of Gibson. Slotkin addresses the influence the 1950s Western 
had on science fiction, notably Star Wars and Star Trek, in Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in 20th 
Century America, 635-636. 
49 Barlow, “Crime and Puzzlement.” 
50 Ibid. 
51 Though a role for “prospectors” is not central to Barlow’s early (FF) missives, it is implied in language 
like “the opening of cyberspace.” Cyberspace as an endless frontier for entrepreneurial economic 
expansion becomes more prominent in Barlow’s writing, frequently attached to the loss of a physical 
frontier, including his own Wyoming ranch. For example, in a later Harper’s Magazine interview, Barlow 
says: “the fact is, there is very little economic room in the physical world these days. If you’re making 
something you can touch, and doing it well, then you are either an Asian or a machine” (quoted in Paul 
Tough, “What Are We Doing Online?” Harper’s Magazine (August1995), 36. See especially: John Perry 
Barlow, “Selling Wine without Bottles,” in Ludlow and Godwin, High Noon on the Electronic Frontier. 
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Barlow writes: “entering into a world in which no one has a body, physical threats begin 
to lose their sting.”52 Thus Cyberspace, in Barlow’s framing, offers the prospect of 
independence, small town community, and prosperity without the risks of savage 
animals, Indians or environs. 
Interweaving descriptions of a cyberpunk Cyberspace with accounts of his 
Wyoming cattle ranch and language hailing the mythic frontier, Barlow draws upon 
shared cultural imaginary to map ambiguous “electron states” onto the American West. 
In so doing he refigures Cyberspace as a space in transition—as when he writes “in its 
present condition”—which can and should be actively shaped.  
A month after the publication of “Crime and Puzzlement,” Barlow, casting 
himself as “an emissary between the magicians of technology and the wary populace who 
must incorporate this magic into their daily lives,” both clarifies and expands the mission 
of the EFF, tasking it with “bringing civilization to Cyberspace.”53 I quote him at length 
below: 
… our original objectives were more modest… In essence, we were prepared to 
fight a few civil libertarian brush fires and go on about our private work.    
 
However, examination of the issues surrounding these government actions 
revealed that we were dealing with the symptoms of a much larger malady, the 
collision between Society and Cyberspace. We have concluded that a cure can lie 
only in bringing civilization to Cyberspace.   
 
Unless a successful effort is made to render that harsh and mysterious terrain 
suitable for ordinary inhabitants, friction between the two worlds will worsen. 
Constitutional protections, indeed the perceived legitimacy of representative 
government itself, might gradually disappear.    
                                                
52 Barlow, “Crime and Puzzlement.” 
53 Mitchell Kapor and John Perry Barlow, “Across the Electronic Frontier,” Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, July 10, 1990, https://w2.eff.org/Misc/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/HTML/eff.html, 
(accessed March 19, 2015). 
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We could not allow this to happen unchallenged, and so arises the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation. In addition to our legal interventions on behalf of those 
whose rights are threatened, we will:    
 
[-] Engage in and support efforts to educate both the general     public and 
policymakers about the opportunities and challenges posed by developments in 
computing and telecommunications.    
[-] Encourage communication between the developers of technology, 
government, corporate officials, and the general public in which we might define 
the appropriate metaphors and legal concepts for life in Cyberspace.    
[-] And, finally, foster the development of new tools which will endow non-
technical users with full and easy access to computer-based telecommunications.54    
 
This call to “brin[g] civilization to Cyberspace” presumes it—civilization—already exists. 
The “action items” affirm this; the problem with Cyberspace, in Barlow’s framing, isn’t 
who is there, it’s who is not and why: “the general public,” which finds no “suitable” 
place in the “harsh and mysterious terrain” of Cyberspace. In short: civilization and a 
broader American public go hand in hand.  
Like the cyberpunk vision of Cyberspace, Barlow forwards a vision of 
Cyberspace as a space of disembodied thought or mind. However, the figure of the 
human subject is more conventionally modern; he presumes a will to reasonably discuss 
matters of general concern as formally equal subjects.55 With this view, Barlow 
encourages the reader to frame the aforementioned “breakdown of civility” as the result 
of artificial divisions—a mere developmental stage—rather than a fundamentally 
different view of what Cyberspace was and how one should act when there. 
                                                
54 Kapor and John Barlow, “Across the Electronic Frontier.”  
55 Barlow is hardly alone in this vision. Others, like Howard Rheingold, speak of the possibility of 
Cyberspace to afford salons, as in enlightenment France. Rheingold also quotes Habermas extensively in 
his book The Virtual Community. Echoing Habermas’ account of the decline of the bourgeois public 
sphere, Rheingold is concerned with commercialization. In other words: the people are imagined to 
already be (or to be capable of becoming) the modern, reasoning, publically opining subject; and this is 
imagined to be desirable for democracy.  
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Fred Turner, touching on the Harper’s Magazine forum of which Barlow also 
speaks, makes a related point: “the forum itself modeled the WELL’s own vision of 
computer-mediated communication… contributors took part in a seemingly 
nonhierarchical, disembodied conversation among equals, and they did so in the same 
computer ‘space’ supposedly being attacked by these very hackers. It is this form of 
conversation, and the image of hackers participating in it, that Harper’s made visible to its 
readers.”56 However, Turner attributes this vision to new communalism, his term for a 
portion of the 1960s counterculture movement who disengaged in politics as they 
participated in the back-to-the-land movement.  
I think Turner’s attribution vastly underestimates what was a broad investment in 
this egalitarian vision of bodiless public discourse, whose history extends far beyond the 
1960s. Additionally, Harper’s also reported the publication of Barlow’s credit records by 
Phiber Optik, a move that fits poorly with the vision Turner attributes to the WELL. It 
is Barlow’s account that reframes Phiber Optik’s action: though spook[ed],” Barlow 
explains that he responded by asking Phiber Optik to “give [him] a call.”57 He reports 
having a conversation with “an intelligent, civilized, and surprisingly principled kid of 18 
who sounded, and continues to sound, as though there's little harm in him to man or 
data.” This paves the way for Barlow to shift the blame for their initial “incivility” to 
mainstream media portrayals of hackers, expressly including Harper’s editors, and to 
further rehabilitate Phiber Optik’s actions by reference to the seemingly timeless 
“adolescent sport” of “teenage boys.” 
                                                
56 Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture, 169-170. 
57 Barlow, “Crime and Puzzlement.” 
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Barlow thus recasts the cyberpunk subjectivity of Phreak and Optic as a 
developmental stage, perfectly amenable to the cultivation of civilly debating citizens of 
Cyberspace. At the same time, Barlow’s onto-imaginary breaks with that of modernity by 
excising precisely the vulnerabilities—bodily and economic—that in modern States of 
Nature motivated naturally free, self-interested individuals to consent to be governed. 
Finally, Barlow envisions the fundamental state of human being as an unproblematic, 
organic community. It is fear—owing to our vulnerable physical state—that divides and 
turns us one against the other, and media and governments leverage fear to consolidate 
their power. In Cyberspace, where we are invulnerable, we can “be” without fear.  
 
Civilizing Cyberspace 
Two things are needed to “civilize” Cyberspace. The first, already underway in 
Barlow’s recasting it in terms of the next, new American West, is making Cyberspace 
recognizable as a space for the imagined collective of “the general public.” The second 
revolves around “access.” Regarding the first, early EFF publications indicate an 
awareness that the “reality” of Barlow’s Cyberspace depends on its uptake by the general 
public. Aside from his own rhetorical efforts to refigure Cyberspace, Barlow speaks 
repeatedly of finding metaphors that would illuminate the “nature” of Cyberspace. 
Simultaneously, hailing an imagined organic community by reference to a single 
“distributed Mind,” Barlow encourages EFF supporters to 
turn some of the immense processing horsepower of your distributed Mind to 
the task of finding useful new metaphors for community, expression, property, 
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privacy and other realities of the physical world which seem up for grabs in these 
less tangible regions.58 
 
Similarly, Barlow encouraged digital “natives” to “share [their] sense of hope and 
opportunity with those who feel that in Cyberspace they will be obsolete eunuchs for 
sure.”59 This line is particularly interesting, both signaling and resolving the fragility of 
the modern (masculine) subject whose agency is conceived of in terms of mastery and is 
threatened by an environment it does not know how to navigate, much less subdue.  
In addition to encouraging the “natives” to be helpful—a vision that occludes the 
violence inflicted on indigenous Americans—Barlow and the EFF advocate the design of 
more accessible, user-friendly software. For all that such software may be desirable, when 
packaged alongside the specter of “obsolete eunuchs,” the expansion of such user-
friendly designs extends the promise of agency as mastery in Cyberspace, for those 
individuals accustomed to it; it also risks “empowering” those in positions of power who 
could threaten EFF’s vision. In these ways, Barlow and the EFF attempt to more broadly 
materialize that which his Cyberspace onto-imaginary takes as already existing.  
In the face of increased publicity around fearful objects—hackers, crackers, 
computer worms, not to mention easy access to pornography— Barlow’s Cyberspace 
attempts to subsume its earlier instantiation as a cyberpunk space of play, figuring it as a 
developmental stage rather than a fundamental state. Equally important, it supplies a 
conceptual and aesthetic framework for a broader public not only to make sense of 
Cyberspace, but also to imagine themselves as a part of its settlement. Taken together, 
Cyberspace as the frontier of human civilization represents a landless world of 
                                                
58 John Perry Barlow, “Crime and Puzzlement 2,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, July  21, 1990, 
https://w2.eff.org/Misc/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/crime_and_puzzlement.2.txt.  
59 Barlow, “Crime and Puzzlement.” 
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opportunity and community in which the safety afforded by leaving the physical world 
behind provides a standpoint from which to reconsider common sense understandings 
of the relationship between individuals and the state. The human subject is figured as 
fundamentally the same as in a modern onto-imaginary, although now situated in a world 
without vulnerability—a Cyber-State of Nature—where we can expect a radically 
different outcomes. In place of the pervasive presence of fear, Barlow imagines 
increasing individual empowerment and collective engagement: an organic community 
and a standpoint from which to question to the legitimacy of government power so 
premised on the insecurity of material bodies and possessions. 
The drama of this (symbolic) resolution between the cyberpunk Cyberspace and 
Cyberspace as the next, new American West played out in multiple settings: the EFF 
released several different accounts narrating its founding in 1990 alone,60 which were 
echoed or expanded upon in edited volumes on Cyberspace with subtitles situating the 
reader “on the electronic frontier.”61 Barlow himself became something of a public 
intellectual, gaining entry to high-level talks, including a face-to-face conversation with 
President George Bush, Sr. and a seat at the 1994 World Wide Web Consortium. He 
would also accrue a motley collection of accolades and titles, including “the Thomas 
Jefferson of Cyberspace,” “One of the 25 Most Influential People in Financial Services,” 
“Professor of Cyberspace.”  
                                                
60 In addition to “Crime and Puzzlement” and “Crime and Puzzlement 2,” see: Kapor and Barlow, 
“Across the Electronic Frontier”; Barlow, “A Not Terribly Brief History of the Electronic Frontier." 
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While Barlow’s re-branding of Cyberspace in terms of the frontier resonated 
widely, the “civilization clause” was less successful and certainly was not embraced by 
those attached to the cyberpunk vision. Indeed, Barlow’s high-sounding prose became 
something of a joke amongst those attached to Cyberspace as a space of play and 
creativity. The following section introduces one such character and gestures towards the 
abandonment by Barlow and others of efforts to civilize Cyberspace. 
 
V.  Forsaking Civilization in Cyberspace 
Julian Dibbell’s “A Rape in Cyberspace” is pitched as an account of how a virtual 
rape and its aftermath “turned a database into a society.”62 It is also an account of how 
the author came to question his common-sense understanding of Cyberspace and the 
relationship among bodies, words, and strangers addressed therein; and Dibbell’s essay is 
expressly presented as a prod for others to do the same. He begins with “the facts” of 
the virtual rape; I do the same below. 
The virtual rape took place in LambdaMOO, a popular role-playing MUD (see 
Figure 1 above) and consisted of the attribution of sexual acts by one LambdaMOO user 
(“Mr. Bungle”) to two others (“legba” and “Starsinger”). Mr. Bungle hacked a 
LambdaMOO sub-program that allowed him to control legba and Starsinger. He then 
made it appear that they were, among other things, “sexually service[ing]” him and 
engaging in sexual intercourse with a kitchen knife.63 Legba, described as a woman, and 
Starsinger, described as “brown-skinned” and “of indeterminate gender,” were still able 
to control their characters—e.g., they protested and relocated—but they could not 
                                                
62 Dibbell, “A Rape in Cyberspace,” tagline from p. 7. 
63 Ibid. 
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prevent Mr. Bungle from also relocating and continuing the virtual assault. The virtual 
rape stopped when a “wizard”—that is, a LambdaMOO programmer—came upon the 
scene and was able to kick Mr. Bungle out of the LambdaMOO system.  
Dibbell did not witness the rape himself; instead he came upon an intense 
discussion of what to do about it. He reports that LambdaMOO users were clearly 
shaken and wanted to take action to prevent future instances of virtual rape. While there 
was a clear consensus that something should be done, debate raged—and sometimes 
slogged—over what that something would be. Eventually, another wizard acted alone, 
“toading” Mr. Bungle, meaning that his character was permanently deleted.  
In response to these occurrences, LambdaMOO’s Archwizard, or master 
programmer, unilaterally implemented a “system of petitions and ballots whereby anyone 
could put to popular vote any social scheme requiring wizardly powers for its 
implementation, with the results of the vote to be binding on the wizard.”64 The result 
was a series of tools and institutionalized practices for responding to virtual rape and 
other forms of sexualized harassment especially common for those identifying as 
women.65 
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Dibbell closes the article by reflecting on a conception of free speech premised 
on, to use his words, a “tidy division of the world into the symbolic and the real.”66 He 
had, it seemed, been an adherent of a Barlow-esque, that is, a modern onto-imaginary of 
Cyberspace and the mode of human subjectivity it supported. It was not only the virtual 
rape and its aftermath that served as a prod for Dibbell to reconsider, but rather his time 
moving in the space of LambdaMOO. 
 
Reception of “A Rape in Cyberspace” on the WELL 
 Roughly a week after its publication, Dibbell’s piece became the subject of a 
WELL conference, in which both Dibbell and Barlow would participate. For the most 
part, Dibbell’s account was met with a hard line of resistance from WELL members. 
Those who understood Cyberspace as a space for individual expression and play framed 
the virtual rape as an instance of play which participants consented to—regardless of 
what happens—by “being” there. For example, Mondo 2000 editor R. U. Sirius 
responded: 
these people all volunteered to act in a theater of the imagination and then got 
scared. Do we want Disney World? As the simulacrum becomes a bigger part of 
our lives, do we demand that people clip their imaginations at the place where it 
feels comfortable... community standards? We're entering the "Be careful what 
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you say" era, where everything is mediated by politesse… I think that freedom 
would be well-served by simple toughening up.67 
 
Here, R. U. Sirius grants that Legba and Starsinger were impacted—they felt “scared” 
and “hurt” (a term he uses later)—but suggests that they consented to these and any 
other possibility by going online. Their feelings may be real, but they don’t and shouldn’t 
matter how on-line action and interaction is understood or how it might be governed. 
Most granted that the virtual rape was offensive, but drew a sharp line between 
the disembodied self of Cyberspace and an embodied, “real world” self. With this line 
drawn, legba, Starsinger and Dibbell become objects of scorn, “hysterics”: they are 
unable to “distance” themselves from what is ontologically envisioned as at a distance: 
minds and bodies.68 But the problem seems to extend well beyond this moment, as 
critics suggest this instance represents a larger threat to society in its further muddying 
the “already overextended” “legal definition” of “forcible rape.” 69  
Dibbell, party to the conversation, and particularly concerned by this last 
accusation, explains that he decided to use the language of “virtual rape” because those 
who had similar experiences chose that language, noting that “much of the negative 
response [came] from guys who [he] suspect[ed] just don’t take sexual harassment 
seriously.”70 In reply, Dibbell is accused of being sexist to men.71  
The specter of “culture wars,” the women’s movement, and identity politics 
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hangs over the discussion like a thick cloud threatening the reality of onto-imaginaries 
that posited these social and political investments as somewhere on the spectrum 
between meaningless and impossible in Cyberspace. At one point R. U. Sirius writes: 
“This all seems to be part of the ‘women’s movement’ to degrade themselves by being 
too emotionally reactive to support basic freedoms...”72 Months later, in a revised and 
expanded version of “A Rape in Cyberspace,” Dibbell reflects on the responses he 
received, the most enduring and heated of which hailed from the BBSs [bulletin board 
services] of Cyberspace, writing: “The more I ponder the furious online response to my 
story, the more I suspect the real object of that fury was not LambdaMOO nor 
America’s latest culture wars, but the ambiguous nature of online discourse itself.”73 
One might be tempted to draw a sharp distinction between MUDs, like 
LambdaMOO, and forums, like the WELL, which might look something like this: 
MUDs—like The Sims, Second Life, or World of Warcraft—are for play, while forums 
are for discussion which, if not always serious, at least can be said not to be games. But 
the individuals involved did not draw this distinction; indeed, commenters on the WELL 
repeatedly resisted one member’s suggestion that what LamdbaMOO did in their own 
space was of no concern. Dibbell’s article, increasingly common mainstream reports of 
sexual harassment online, and agitation for regulating pornography online and elsewhere, 
prompted an abandonment of the vision of Cyberspace as a frontier of human 
civilization.74 Later the same year, in a keynote essay in Computer World, Barlow is now 
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associating civilization with presumptively male, but perhaps questionably masculine 
“[s]ettlers”: 
Settlers, a milder sort, come in with their women and children and are repelled by 
the savagery and license of their predecessors, whether mountain men, 
prospectors, or Indians. They send for troops to secure the frontier for the 
Rotary Club and the PTA. They elect representatives, pass laws, and, pretty soon, 
they've created another place which is boring but which at least appears 
predictable.75 
 
He advises “young pioneers” not to “come to this wild place expecting to civilize it, as I 
once did. This frontier may well be permanent[.] And, finding bedlam, please don’t send 
for your troops. They will only get in the way of a future which you will have to invent 
yourselves.”76  
 Certainly Barlow is not wrong to see the historical links between state regulation 
and women and children, figured as “exceptionally” vulnerable figures.77 But then 
Dibbell’s account was not figured as addressing such figures: it addressed the public at 
large. This distinction is significant:  it was fear of an over-reaching state, not practices of 
public speech that assumed embodied speakers, that prompted the abandonment of a 
civilized Cyberspace. The ideal of a liberal, bourgeois public remains intact even as its 
realization is deferred to an illusive future in which cyberpunks “grow up” and accept the 
value and terms of civil debate, and hysterics, like Dibbell, no longer confronted with the 
“offensive” antics of the former, can do the same. This deferral would serve as an 
                                                
75 John Perry Barlow, “Jack In, Young Pioneer!” Electronic Frontier Foundation, August 11, 1994, 
https://w2.eff.org/Misc/Publications/John_Perry_Barlow/HTML/jack_in_young_pioneer.html, 
(accessed: 23 March 2015). 
76 Ibid. 
77 Stoler, Carnal knowledge and imperial power: Race and the intimate in colonial rule; Laura Miller, “Women and 
children first: Gender and the settling of the electronic frontier" in Brook and Boal, Resisting the Virtual 
Life: The Culture and Politics of Information. 
 60 
obstacle to imagining and building CMC conducive to alternative practices of publicity 
no longer tethered to Habermas’s ideal.  
 
VI.  Conclusion 
Critical accounts of Cyberspace suggested that it functioned as a discourse that 
served the interests of the privileged. Notably, feminist scholars have criticized the 
ontologically absurd concept of “mind” and “body” as discrete entities, while 
simultaneously illustrating how this conceptualization supports familiar gendered 
dichotomies: mind/body, masculine/feminine, transcendent/immanent.78 Cyberspace, 
figured as the disembodied space of thought or mind, enabled the (continued) gendering 
of the body as feminine and its (continued) devaluation in a new arena. More recently, 
communications scholar Fred Turner has argued that Cyberspace, depicted as a frontier, 
functioned pragmatically to narrate and ameliorate the more widespread material 
insecurity characteristic of the developing global information economy. Bold cowboy-
types served as a contemporary manifestation of the “truth” that it is the individual who 
directs the course of his life. 
While these accounts are not incorrect, they are, I think, partial. And they have 
had some of adverse effects. For one, they tend to paint a problematically uniform vision 
of Cyberspace, which overlooks the important ways in which the term was refigured and 
contested. While both were premised on CMC as a disembodied space of mind, the 
cyberpunk vision of Cyberspace and Barlow’s Electronic Frontier are at odds in ways 
                                                
78 Grosz, Architecture from the outside: Essays on virtual and real space; Halyes, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual 
Bodies in Cyberpunks, Literature and Informatics; Sobchack, “New Age Mutant Ninja Hackers” in Dery, Flame 
Wars: The Discourse of Cyberculture. 
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that matter in terms of who would see themselves as potentially “at home” in these 
spaces. Aside from flattening out the “landscape” of the early CMC, these explanations 
suggest that the political work of these early spatial imaginaries was limited to a discourse 
that upheld existing offline inequality. But such a partial account misses how these 
contested imaginaries shaped practices of publicity and figures of the democratic subject 
they both hailed and cultivated.  
In particular, it was by means of these ontologized accounts of Cyberspace that 
CMC was conceptualized as a new public space, and its practices of publicity 
consolidated a modern conception of the democratic subject. This happened at a time 
when the modern subject was under increasing duress. Certainly, by 1990, the notion of 
an autonomous, atomistic, and critical-rational subjectivity had been criticized in a wide 
range of scholarship. Feminist and post-colonial theory, in particular, had critically 
interrogated how maintaining, even as fantasy, the existence of such a subject required 
the subordination of a range of others.  
But the duress I speak of is also very much a thing of the non-academic world: in 
short, formal equality for (some) former second-class citizens has not shut them up. In 
various ways, the ongoing agitations of the women’s movement and identity politics, 
manifesting as “race riots” and “culture wars,” all impinge on the coherence of claims to 
universal access to the status of modern subjectivity, and so also on the coherence of an 
ontology undergirding that subjectivity. In this context, Cyberspace—newly refigured as 
the “frontier of human civilization” becomes a site for the subject’s imperiled realization 
as an unmarked member of humanity.  
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Barlow’s civilizing mission was deeply problematic; but in abandoning it he did 
not—nor have many others—give up the ideal of public discourse akin to Habermas’s 
bourgeois public sphere. In many ways, it is built into the design and “normal” practices 
and visions of publicity in online forums, which reflect and cultivate an onto-imaginary 
wherein the modern subject’s sincere intention to communicate and his use of reason are 
already adequate to the task of democratic public discourse… if only everyone would rise 
to the occasion. 
Barring that, we must, regretfully, throw our hands in the air and retreat to 
mainstream media—print and digital—to bemoan the present state of affairs and so 
consolidate, once again, Habermas’s public as an unquestioned ideal and the exclusive 
means by which public discourse can be imagined as democratic. Others hold out hope 
for the realization of this ideal by means of thick-skinned subjects, subjects who cannot 
be harmed by the words of others, and who cannot be imposed upon, or penetrated by 
things external to the self. In a sense this vision represents a move closer to the hyper-
modern subject of cyberpunks whom we might call, in our present moment, Internet 
trolls. 
This hyper-modern subject is achieved through mastery of the self, but also of 
the medium. Indeed, technical “fixes” rather than collective, socio-political approaches 
to the challenges raised by Dibbell’s account have become the norm. By way of example, 
online public forums increasingly ban anonymous posting. The hope—despite a lack of 
evidence—is that being more easily identifiable online will prevent individuals from 
posting bigoted, harassing comments or rape and death threats. While one could get 
around this requirement by, for example, not using one’s real name on linked email or 
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Facebook account, this approach might yet normalize data collection practices that have 
been criticized as indicative of state overreach. 
Individuals like Barlow and Howard Rheingold, speaking from mainstream 
platforms of the democratic potential of CMC, hoped it might offer something akin to 
Habermas’s liberal public and so a means by which “the people” could once more 
overthrow tyranny—this time of mass media and an overreaching state, rather than an 
absolute sovereign—and represent themselves. At the same time they neglected tensions 
between this vision of public discourse and that of John Stuart Mill’s “marketplace of 
ideas,” in part because the demise of the liberal bourgeois public was attributed to mass 
media.79  
On Habermas’s account, by the time of Mill’s treatise on freedom of expression, 
bourgeois norms of “conviviality” and civil, public discourse had eroded (along with 
bourgeois men’s exclusive hold on the rights of citizenship) and public opinion was no 
longer conceived of as the outcome of reasoned debate. Instead, it was viewed as 
another form of power acting on the individual, potentially discouraging him from the 
Enlightenment ideal of thinking for himself. Free public discourse could serve as a 
                                                
79 At this point I am interested in teasing out how and why similar understandings of the liberal speaking 
subject of democratic discourse lead to different visions of liberal publicness in the context of CMC. 
Others have troubled the historical validity of Habermas’s account of a civil, ratio-critical debating public 
existing even for a short time (Herzog, Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders). In a different vein and with a 
different historical-geographic focus, Dena Goodman suggests Habermas fails to account for the 
development and nearest realization of his bourgeois ideal in French salons governed by salonnières who 
cultivated spaces and discursive practices shaped by friendship and reciprocity. Goodman argues the 
moderating force of the salonnières was seen as appropriate and necessary owing to contemporary 
understandings of gendered complementarity, suggesting embodied particularity played a central role in 
the development of the practices of the culture-debating public that Habermas takes as the incubator of 
his liberal bourgeois public. Finally, as women were barred from participation in public discourse, 
Goodman indicates discursive style changed, becoming uncivil, and competitive. See: Goodman, Republic 
of Letters.  
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constraint on the state, but public opinion was thought to represent not “the people” but 
the majority who had tyrannical tendencies. 
These different visions of liberal publicness would play out in CMC as tensions 
between “community” and individual autonomy, understood as a right to “say anything” 
effectively anywhere online.80 Owing to its eventual association with cyber-libertarianism, 
I refer to the visions and practices of publicness cultivated by those who emphasized 
individual autonomy in this way as a libertarian practice of publicity or libertarian 
publicness. As elaborated in my first and second chapters, both liberal and libertarian 
publicness would develop alongside and through interpretation of the “nature” of CMC 
and, more or less implicitly, of human users. While both share an essentially liberal view 
of the speaking subject of democratic discourse as disembodied or abstracted from his 
particular embodied and material conditions, they differ on the prospects and desirability 
of some form of (imagined) virtual community or collective that could act on the 
individual (for good or ill).  
Libertarian publicness would become empirically dominant online, owing in part 
to the design of early CMC, its expansive growth, and developments to accommodate 
growth that centered individual readers’ discretion.81 As such, it would powerfully shape 
common-sense understanding of CMC platforms. So, for example, the delineation of 
“public” CMC platforms, like Usenet newsgroups, and “private” platforms, like mailing 
                                                
80 As Usenet scholar Bryan Pfaffenberger explains: “The sense of bottom-up democracy was built into the 
software... [because], from a technical point of view Usenet encourages everybody to say anything, and it’s 
up to the reader to screen out unwanted material.” See: Bryan Pfaffenberger, “‘A Standing Wave in the 
Web of Our Communications’: Usenet and the Socio-Technical Construction of Cyberspace Values,” in 
Lueg and Fisher, From Usenet to CoWebs: Interacting with Social Information Space, 24. 
81 Pfaffenberger, “‘A Standing Wave in the Web of Our Communications’: Usenet and the Socio-
Technical Construction of Cyberspace Values,” 24. 
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lists, would come to hinge on whether or not there were formal barriers to “say[ing] 
anything.”82  
At the same time, liberal publicness—that is, affecting bourgeois norms of civil 
discourse—would continue to function both as a mark of distinction and an appeal to 
recuperate the lost promise of a truly universal, liberal democratic public sphere. Thus, 
even as political theorists, feminists and otherwise, were critiquing the validity of 
Habermas’s historical account and creating spaces in the Academy from which to 
theorize the operations of the liberal public sphere as a disciplinary ideal, that ideal was 
installed at the heart of CMC. As such, the ideal functioned to distinguish not only 
“inappropriate” public speech, diminishing the epistemic authority of alternative 
practices of public speech, but also “inappropriate” or unlikely places for such speech. In 
the face of ongoing obstructions from “adolescent boys” and the “hysterics” who took 
them too seriously, Cyberspace would become one such place. What followed was a 
diminished sense of Cyberspace as a real public space in which we might reorganize our 
relations to democratic strangers.  
Durable Enlightenment narratives and a closer association with print media 
underwrite the normative dominance of liberal publicness which reproves both the 
excesses of a libertarian practice, in eschewing constraints on the individual in the 
context of CMC, and a feminist counter-public practice that is seen to make excessive 
demands on individual contributors. The dynamic relationship between these two visions 
of liberal publicness and that of the feminist counter-publics I study is central to my 
                                                
82 As will be seen in Chapter Two, there was tremendous pressure for feminist CMC to “go” or remain 
private and intense resistance to even the quasi-public of a moderated newsgroup. 
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dissertation and can be somewhat bluntly parsed as a dynamic between trolls, hysterics, 
and “reasonable men.” 
This chapter is not intended only as a straightening of accounts. And I am hardly 
the first to speak to the ways in which the discourses of Cyberspace as a disembodied 
world served the interests of the privileged.83 By focusing on onto-imaginaries that 
cultivate different understandings of the self and her relation to others, however, I want 
to shift the focus from the fact of inequality to consider how practices of publicity 
cultivate different understandings of the self and differently orient us towards strangers 
in ways that matter for addressing or sidestepping structural inequality. Conceived as 
both ideal and impossible online, Habermas’s liberal public diffuses tensions stemming 
from peoples’ lived experience of the body following them into Cyberspace, by 
minimizing the perceived value and effects of unruly, uncivil online discourse. Thus, 
finally, it serves also as an obstruction to other visions and practices of public speech and 
democratic speakers that take their bearings from “actually existing democracy,” to use 
Nancy Fraser’s terms, including its durable structural inequalities. I turn in Chapter Two 
to a close study of the halting, ten-year development of a feminist practice of publicity in 
early CMC to illustrate this point.
                                                
83 Dean, Blog Theory; Grosz, Architecture from the Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Space, Hayles, How We 
Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cyberpunks, Literature and Informatics; Lisa Nakamura, “Race In/For 
Cyberspace: Identity Tourism and Racial Passing on the Internet,” in Bell and Kennedy, The Cybercultures 








‘UNCONVENTIONAL’ WOMEN AND THE  
PARADOXES OF EARLY FEMINIST COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION 
 
…lest you think that this is a tempest in a teapot, it's not. But the 
issue is not whether Lippmann was libeled but rather whether 
being an unconventional woman is net.death. 
- Valerie Maslak1  
 
I.  Introduction 
Writing in 1993, a matter of months before the moderated Usenet soc.feminism 
would change its charter to ban anti-feminist posts, contributor Pei Hsie wrote: 
In principle... these newsgroups are free and open to anyone who wishes to 
participate, or not participate, for that matter -- but in reality, for women, there is 
no choice, or rather, it has already been made for them. If women do not 
participate they run the risk of being accused of perpetuating stereotypes and 
reprimanded with 'It's your own fault, so don't complain'; and if they do 
participate, they leave themselves open to the abuses of the tirades and rantings 
of the men who dominate these women's issues groups... at this point I think the 
question is: can the views of women supporting their own sex be given fair 
representation here at all?2* 
 
The dilemma Hsie raises and the question she asks mirror those of many feminists in the 
“free and open” newsgroups of Usenet and on other early computer-mediated 
                                                
1 Valerie Maslak, October 19, 1987, response to Dave Collier-Brown, “Mark Ethan Smith: For real?” 
posted to news.admin and misc.legal Usenet newsgroups, October 1, 1987, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/misc.legal/Ej48uajYE3Q/discussion.  
2 Pei Hsieh, April 23, 1993, response to Pei Hsieh, “Has anything changed?”, posted to soc.women, 
soc.men, & alt.feminism Usenet newsgroups, April 14, 1993, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/soc.women/OKKdQZLm5Y4/discussion.  
*Reading note: Because writing conventions of online discourse do not neatly map onto conventions of 
academic prose, I do not use “[sic]” to indicate that grammatical or typographical errors, which are often 
intentional, are the authors’ rather than mine. 
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communication (CMC) platforms. Indeed, as will be seen in Chapter Three, they remain 
relevant today.  
In seeking an answer to Hsie’s question apropos the possibility of women’s fair 
representation—and, more precisely, a “yes”—feminists pursued a range of solutions 
over roughly a decade on Usenet, a non-centralized CMC network credited with shaping 
how social media is conceived and designed. These solutions would shape different 
visions and practices of the feminist subject: some would seem to confirm women’s 
essential difference from men, others seemed to confirm the alignment of men with 
publicness. It would take collective action, new software, and the development of new 
conventions before feminists were able to “go public” in a way that did not affirm a 
conventional gendered dichotomy. 
This chapter traces the development of feminist practices of counter-publicity. 
Where my first chapter focused on how imagining and naturalizing the “space” of CMC 
hailed and cultivated different subjects with different expectations and practices, this 
chapter focuses on the (im)material, built public spaces of CMC and their role in 
supporting, obstructing, and otherwise influencing visions and practices of public speech. 
The key takeaway is this: When it comes to political imaginary and worldly political 
practice, thinking outside the box may well require at least initial adjustments to the box.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: I open with a discussion of contemporary 
feminist theorizing on the challenges of feminist public speech, as well as the means of 
responding to those challenges. In Section III I introduce the Usenet platform that is 
central to this chapter. Section IV discusses early efforts to create a space for women’s 
and feminist speech on Usenet, all of which were dogged by complaint: of men’s 
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dominance, of women’s divisiveness, and so on, before taking up, in section V, the 
disruptive minor rhetoric of an individual feminist provocateur. Section VI sketches the 
development of a moderated newsgroup that would not only be for discussion of 
feminism, but also for discussion by feminists.  I conclude by reflecting on how 
attending to the particular, material and semiotic dimensions of spaces of public 
appearances might matter for those concerned with the state of contemporary feminism.   
 
II.  Containing Feminist Speech 
Melissa Deem writes that “[t]he creation of a specifically feminist public space is 
important, yet it also necessary to recognize that feminist discourses frequently fail to 
engage the political imaginary of what might be termed the public sphere writ large.”3 As 
a result feminism remains a minor discourse in most contexts, perceived as representing 
niche or even “special” interests by a broader public. Deem continues: “This failure is 
not merely the result of a lack of effort on the part of feminists,” but owes to the 
frequent “relegat[ion]” of feminist public speech “to the genre of complaint.”4  
Here, “relegation” is not exclusively attributable to audience reception in a 
constitutively masculine-gendered public sphere, whose conventions distinguish and 
privilege men’s speech and keep “men’s speech” attached to male bodies.5 As Lauren 
Berlant explains, women themselves adopt styles and tropes of the female complaint 
genre when they articulate gendered inequality while remaining attached to an essential 
                                                
3 Deem, “From Bobbitt to SCUM: Re-memberment, Scatological Rhetorics, and Feminist Strategies in the 
Contemporary United States,” 512. 
4 Deem, “From Bobbitt to SCUM,” 512. 
5 Morris, The Pirate’s Fiancée: Feminism, Reading, Postmodernism; for literature on gender and the public sphere 
see my Introduction. 
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“female-ness,” typically characterized by heterosexual desire, mothering, and nurturance.6 
The effect is to affirm the “genericizing patriarchal fantasy” that female sex makes a 
woman and that all women are the same in some essential way.7  
Berlant is not arguing that conventionally feminine desires, attributes, and labor 
are or should be considered of lesser value, but rather that, in taking these things as 
essentially feminine, women affirm the gendered dichotomy that underwrites their 
subordination.8 “Complaint,” then, marks the ineffectual, “juxta-political” speech of 
women whose critiques of gendered inequality remain attached to its “product.”9 
Relatedly, in expecting women to share or value particular “womanly” things, the genre 
of female complaint anticipates recognition and uncomplicated acceptance from other 
women, making it ill-suited to deal with conflict characteristic of politics. 
 Rather than abandon “women” as a politicized identity for reasons stemming 
from the analysis Berlant develops, Deem writes that feminist speech must “become 
risky, even dangerous. The complaint must be transformed in order to open the 
possibilities for speaking positions for women, other than… silence or frenzy.”10 Deem 
offers the “enraged polemical form” of Valerie Solanas’s SCUM (“Society for Cutting Up 
Men”) Manifesto as an example of a specifically feminist minor rhetoric that, in figuring 
the male body as hyper-visible, embodied, and vulnerable, “become[s] risky, even 
dangerous.” Similarly, Berlant argues: 
                                                
6Berlant, “The Female Complaint.”  
7 Ibid., 237-9. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 10. Indeed, Berlant attributes a commodified form of U.S. “women’s culture” to the cementing 
this attachment, inasmuch as that culture offers women the pleasure and solace of recognition afforded by 
“luminous” representations of a uniquely “feminine” love that remains optimistic and loyal in the face of 
suffering and the deferment of improved worldly conditions. 
10 Deem, “From Bobbitt to SCUM,” 532. See also: Deem, “Scandal, Heteronormative Culture, and the 
Disciplining of Feminism.”  
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We [feminists] should see feminism as a metamovement that names the 
emergence of shameless, self-privileging and not self-erased public female voices. 
It is, and should be, a collection of local and specific guerilla actions addressed to 
particular problems and dedicated to making the public sphere safe for women… 
Feminists must embrace a policy of female disidentification at the level of female 
essence… We must align ourselves, in our differences from each other, to 
perform, theorize, constantly intensify the rupture of the private, and inhabit, as 
much as we can, the constantly expanding negative terrain that will transform the 
patriarchal public sphere.11 
 
Both Berlant and Deem advocate feminist speech practices that disarticulate femininity 
from female sex through the appropriation of conventionally masculine—aggressive, 
indecorous, insurgent, unrelenting—modes of address that run roughshod over 
bourgeois norms of unemotional, civil discourse. In this way the public sphere is made to 
feel newly “dangerous” to men unaccustomed to the visibility of male bodies and newly 
safe for women.  
Of course, how this is to be done is a complicated matter. It’s not a simple failure 
of the imagination that has prevented feminists from making political claims that evade 
gendered systems of oppression that disadvantage them in the first place. As Joan Scott’s 
study of French feminist praxis in Only Paradoxes to Offer illustrates, feminists have had to 
work within and against contemporary discursive contexts: “within” in order to appear 
or be heard at all, and “against” in an effort to alter those contexts. The resulting 
“paradoxes”—here, feminists affirming an essential group identity that is simultaneously 
grounds for their subordination—is symptomatic of democratic and republican 
discourses themselves.12  
                                                
11 Berlant, “The Female Complaint,” 253. 
12 Scott, Only Paradoxes to Offer. 
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 Related, Michael Warner, elaborating constraints on, in this case, queer counter-
public speech, explains how: 
speech that addresses a participant as queer will circulate up to a point, at which it 
is certain to meet intense resistance. It might therefore circulate in special, 
protected venues, in limited publications. The individual struggle with stigma is 
transposed, as it were, to the conflict between modes of publicness.13 
 
This “resistance” includes violence and intimidation. It may also, as Warner suggests, 
include “limited” or otherwise restricted publication. Lesbian pulp novelist Vin Packer 
offers an example of the latter, explaining that she only secured her first contract after 
agreeing to not “make homosexuality attractive,” to refuse a happy ending by revealing 
her heroine was a confused straight woman and her lover “sick or crazy.”14  
We could certainly go on here. Even still, CMC would seem to ameliorate if not 
entirely resolve many of these issues. What challenges and possibilities or “dangerous” 
speech did Usenet afford? 
 
III.  Usenet, a Brief Introduction 
Usenet was created in 1980 as a “news service” for the simultaneously created 
network of Unix-users.15 In one sense, Usenet was the software—Netnews—that this 
new Unix-to-Unix network ran. Netnews allowed a “home” computer to automatically 
dial connected computers and search for and copy new content, thereby making it 
available on the home machine and any computers that might likewise dial the home 
                                                
13 Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, 120. 
14 Vin Packer quoting publisher “Dick,” in Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness, 88. 
15 Tom Truscott, “Invitation to a General Access UNIX* Network,” http://www.newsdemon.com/first-
official-announcement-usenet.php. Copies of original viewable as images. 
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computer.16 This automated distribution function, termed propagation, enabled Usenet 
sites to share data—conversations, code, files—through topical newsgroups, often 
described as a precursor to Internet forums.  
Because the Unix operating system was relatively inexpensive, Usenet was 
envisioned as a “poor man’s ARPANET” that would expand access to networked 
computer-mediated communication beyond the U.S. Department of Defense and those 
whom it funded.17 The latter certainly came to be true, but Usenet could hardly be said to 
be “for” the poor man, much less the poor woman. In point of fact, it was primarily U.S. 
American telecommunications and tech industry employees and university faculty, staff, 
and students, a majority of whom where men, who would use Usenet for the better part 
of the 1980s.  
FIGURE 2: Screenshot from Olduse.net, a real time exhibit showing what Usenet 
looked like 30 years prior.18 
                                                
16 Hauben and Hauben, Netizens, 39-40. 
17 Stephen Daniel and Adam Grossman, both cited in Hauben and Hauben, Netizens, 42. ARPANET is 
the predecessor to today’s Internet. ARPA is an acronym for Advanced Research Projects Agency; 
ARPANET refers to the network of computers connected those involved in ARPA. 
18 Olduse.net: A Real-Time Historical Exhibit, http://olduse.net (screenshot from November 4, 2015). 
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 In the late 1980s Usenet became available to a wider audience by means of 
commercial Internet providers and computer bulletin board services, such as 
CompuServe and the Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link, respectively. Usenet’s expanded 
audience would still be limited to those with the means of purchasing a personal 
computer and paying for per-minute dial-up service, or the good fortune of having 
public access via a library. Nonetheless, Usenet was unique in providing formally open-
access, non-commercial CMC that was not closely linked to any one locale.19  
To read and post an “article” to Usenet, one needed a program called a 
newsreader that served as an interface with the data the Netnews software distributed. 
While there were some variation in the affordances of different newsreaders—that is, 
what one could do owing to the newsreader software—all enabled rapid transmission 
and receipt of articles to one or more newsgroup, as well as reader-centered tools that 
offered means of filtering what one read. Reading an article or posting in a Usenet 
newsgroup would be similar to reading emailed contributions to a publicly posted 
mailing list rather than those sent to one’s private email in-box. 
Usenet would come to mean a lot of different things to different people, and 
even some of those who were instrumental in creating it had a hard time defining it. 
Nonetheless, one central account is the “wresting” of power from relatively elite 
actors—sometimes called “net.gods” and later, as they were on the decline, “the 
                                                
19 Usenet was not available globally or even in most places. The contrast is with BBSs, which were 
formally open to all but drew largely local participants because they required that one dial a local phone 
number to connect. As nationwide calling plans were rarely available, non-local users would have to make 
a more costly long-distance dial-up.  
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backbone cabal”—by “the many,” a feat attributable at least as much to “technical 
measures” that changed the ways news was distributed as to “verbal argument.”20  
Both sides would propose, develop, and deploy technical means of enhancing 
individual autonomy—the ability to shape Usenet into what one wanted—though the 
individual in question was not the same. The net.gods generally privileged “the guy who 
pays the bills.” For example, Mark Horton, defending a 1981 proposal to distinguish 
“general interest” from “personal” newsgroups, which would make it easier for a systems 
administrator to exclude the latter, wrote: 
We are making no attempt to mandate what people can say on USENET, 
e.g. censorship.  What we are doing is supporting the rights of the guy who pays 
the bills to decide ‘I only want ‘business stuff’ on my machine’ or ‘I don't want 
offensive stuff since I'm worried about AA/EEO suits.’21  
 
As this might suggest, the gods generally favored something akin to the liberal ideal of 
civil discourse, if only in reaction to the possibility of lawsuits. 
Meanwhile, “the masses”—often imagined as students, although many others 
were included—advocated unregulated speech, foregrounding the reader’s ability to use 
software to shape Usenet in ways that met his needs and reflected his interests. 
Individuals could unsubscribe to unwanted newsgroups; they could hit the j-key to trash 
an article; and many could set up a “kill file” to automatically search headers and dispose 
                                                
20 Bryan Pfaffenberger, “‘A Standing Wave in the Web of Our Communications’: Usenet and the Socio-
Technical Construction of Cyberspace Values,” Lueg and Fisher, From Usenet to CoWebs: Interacting with 
Social Information Space. 
40. The status of these elite actors was derived from their being situated at “backbone sites,” which were 
central (because “upstream”) nodes in the network that comprised Usenet. A site became a backbone site 
by taking on a voluntary leadership role in developing the network. Because of their centrality, backbone 
sites could run up substantial bills, which elite actors indicated could result in the backbone sites being 
shut down.  
21Mark Horton, “comments on comments on proposed USENET policy,” posted to net.news Usenet 
newsgroup, December 25, 1981, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.news/3WtqnvOxPK4/discussion.  
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of articles that included specified words or email addresses.22 The assertion that “That’s 
why we have…” mailing lists, KILL files, n keys, j keys—which allowed readers to tailor 
their subscriptions and reading practices and avoid particular topics or authors—was 
central to the vision of libertarian publicness. 
My research draws me to discussions of Usenet as a public forum whose 
expansion and development was informed by software and patches, and likewise, as an 
imagined space. These discussions were especially fraught in newsgroups, like 
net.women, which were intended to center women’s concerns and create space for a 
public feminist discussion. Both women and men, supporters and opponents, would 
hold up net.women and its successor, soc.women, as exemplifying potential problems 
that the CMC platform Usenet afforded. These problems included an abundance of off-
topic, inaccurate, or repetitive content, including meta-discussion of what was discussed 
and how (“low signal-to-noise ratio”); vitriolic, inflammatory articles or replies that 
served showmanship more than communication (“flames”); irresponsible and even 
intentionally disruptive contributors (“trolls”); oversensitive users who, it was feared, 
could create problems by going to management or suing; and a tendency to split off into 
increasingly specialized, non-general discussion groups (“nichification”). 
 
IV.  Complaint and Containment in Early Feminist CMC 
In August 1983, eight months after its creation, contributors to the Usenet 
newsgroup net.women were embroiled in another “meta” discussion of the early online 
                                                
22 Adam Gaffin, “Killfiles -- The cure for all that ails you,” Version 2.3, The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, September 1994, 
https://w2.eff.org/Net_culture/Net_info/EFF_Net_Guide/EEGTTI_HTML/eeg_79.html#SEC80.  
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forum itself. At issue were the purpose and “misuse” of the newsgroup. While the 
newsgroup had been created as a forum to both “support women” and brainstorm 
solutions to varied manifestations of gendered discrimination, discussion gravitated 
instead toward the validity of feminism and the meaning, desirability, and 
appropriateness of equality between men and women.23 Equally disappointing to many 
was the far from “supportive” tone of discussion and the ratio of contributions from 
men and women.24 Frustrated with the constraints of the discussion, two new 
newsgroups were proposed: net.women.only, in which men were asked to refrain from 
posting, and net.feminists, in which feminists would discuss matters of common 
concern, regardless of gender.25  
Despite a brief but heated debate that never achieved consensus,26 
net.women.only was created, but another six years would pass between the proposal for 
a Usenet newsgroup for the discussion of feminism and its creation.27 Another four 
                                                
23 M. T. Sarantakos, “net.women,” posted to net.news.group UseNet newsgroup, January 6, 1983,  
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.news.group/-ra5rQG6VoY/discussion; Mary T. Sarantakos, 
contribution to topic thread beginning with “net.women,” posted to net.news.group UseNet newsgroup, 
January 8, 1983, https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.news.group/-ra5rQG6VoY/discussion. 
24 As elaborated in Chapter 1, anonymity and even pseudonymity were not the norm in the early years of 
Usenet and CMC, in general. Many used signatures that included not only a real name but also a contact 
phone number, the name of the organization or institution with which they were affiliated, and even a 
home address. Self-identifying was also common in this newsgroup (“As a man…”).  
25 Liz Allen, “net.women.only,” posted to net.women and net.news.groups Usenet newsgroups, August 
19, 1983 https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.women/lw9bfkm0424/discussion; Christine Guzy, 
“net.feminsts,”  posted to net.women Usenet newsgroup, August 25, 1983, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.women/JTPkuuEOvqE/discussion.  
26 Lack of consensus nonetheless resulting in the creation of net.women.only was not particularly strange 
at this moment as there were no formal procedures, only (weak) norms. A (male) systems administrator 
created the group. 
27 Patricia Roberts, “Soc.feminism vote,”  posted to news.groups Usenet newsgroup, May 28, 1989, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/news.groups/fOlajIPTs3g/discussion.  
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would pass before that moderated newsgroup, soc.feminism, would change its charter in 
1993 to bar anti-feminist articles, regardless of how courteously composed.28  
In the intervening years, meta-discussion of the appropriateness of anti-feminist 
articles, the ratio of contributions from men and women, and the punitive tone of 
debates would become firmly entrenched as a staple of net.women, later renamed 
soc.women.29 Efforts to cordon off particularly inflammatory topics would result in the 
creation of a number of other newsgroups, including net.abortion (renamed 
talk.abortion), talk.rape, and soc.men. Meanwhile net.women.only was seen as a failure 
almost immediately, not least of all because the first post came from a self-identified 
man—as did the second, who wrote to point this out.30 Many more posts from men 
would follow, but there were other problems as well: meta-discussion of the 
appropriateness of topics discussed in net.women.only were repeatedly raised in both 
net.women.only and net.women, and traffic declined sharply after the creation of a 
feminist mailing roughly six months after .only was created.31 
 
The Complaint 
Throughout the history glossed above, a familiar complaint would be repeated: 
men dominated the net. Some of this was couched in terms of the ratio of men and 
women posting. For example: 
                                                
28 Cindy Tittle Moore, “New Charter,” posted to soc.feminism Usenet newsgroup, September 10, 1993, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/soc.feminism/AmAKNEJWV2w/discussion.  
29 The “Great Renaming” of 1986 replaced the original, relatively “flat” naming hierarchy with a new 
hierarchy that attempted to distinguish between general, technical/scientific, and leisure-type newsgroups. 
30 Ken Arnold, “finally - (nf),” posted to net.women.only Usenet newsgroup,  
August 28, 1993, https://groups.google.com/d/msg/net.women.only/LzboKtZbn3Y/2aw72CFhZ7AJ.  
31 Indeed, net.women.only would come to serve primarily as a way for people to learn of and request a 
subscription to FeMail. Following the creation of a regular Usenet article alerting existing users to the 
existence of FeMail, net.women.only was decidedly defunct and so deleted, without protest, in 1985. 
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When I first started reading news, I just assumed that net.women would be 
mostly women discussing issues of concern to women. What I found was 
interesting, but not exactly mostly women discussing concerns of women. In fact, 
it seemed like almost all men contributing to the discussion.32 
 
Similarly, Karla Rikansrud reports having “ignor[ed] most this newsgroup for a while, 
because of the plethora of male-submitted, uninteresting articles,” before going on to 
explain that she: 
decided to go through some articles and tally up the submitters... Of the first 141 
articles: 41 were from women [and] 100 were from men... I did the same thing to 
the next 142 articles, this time: 34 were from women [and] 108 were from 
men...33 
 
Others couched men’s “domination” in terms of men redirecting discussion to men’s 
concerns. For example, in advocating the creation of net.men, Gordon Moffett wrote: 
I think that specific issues of maleness in our society go undiscussed, or (in this 
case) now dominate net.women! The flood of articles about men and their 
penises in net.women is the clearest sign of this problem.34 
 
In a similar vein, one woman speaking of both the soc.women and moderated 
soc.feminism newsgroup, prior to its ban on even “civil” anti-feminist articles, wrote: 
they're both dominated by… men saying "you think *you've* got it bad - let me 
tell you about my troubles." There is a tendency to trivialize women's problems, 
and not to listen to what women are saying.  I find it curious (well, not that 
curious, really) that we didn't hear men complaining about the horrible burdens 
that come with power until women starting complaining vociferously about being 
disenfranchised.35 
                                                
32 Liz Allen, “net.women.only.”  
33 RikansrudKB (Karla Rikansrud), “men dominate net.women (flame-ish),” posted to net.women Usenet 
newsgroup, August 15, 1985, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.women/K9K8SB14kr8/discussion. Incidentally, this message is 
visible in Figure 1 above. 
34 Gordon Moffet, “net.men??? yes(!)”posted to net.women and net.news.group Usenet newsgroups, 
January 19, 1984, https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.news.group/CWSCc72RtOg/discussion.  
35 Fred Homan, “Opression of one is opression of all (was Re: fear and,”  posted to soc.women, January 
9, 1991, https://groups.google.com/d/topic/soc.women/HCgULbd2oLs/discussion. 
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Relatedly, feminists repeatedly spoke of feeling stuck teaching the same “Intro to 
Women’s Liberation, 101” class over and over.36 For example, Sophie Quigley wrote: 
It seems to me that right now, net.women serves more as a forum where some 
women (and men) have to explain to some men some very basic feminist ideas. It 
doesn't seem right to me.37 
 
Finally, several noted that domination also took the form of insisting upon a particular 
mode of discourse. “Ms. Sunny Kirstin,” a self-identified transgender woman elaborates: 
The entire net is dominated by men struggling for power... Not the kind of 
numerical domination appropriate to equal opportunity... Rather, it is the kind of 
domination reflective of the male domain… that of domination by most 
successful contention. [O]r, to use *YOUR* [prior correspondent, Andy’s] 
words: "You will have to prove that you are equal to me on a level playing field." 
 
You see, Andy... in this forum, women don't want to prove anything.  We don't 
want to *have* to prove anything. And everytime men enter the forum, it 
becomes a game of domination, rightness, superiority, power. And that is why 
there are so few women posting in this forum.  Because the kind of 
communication which is cooperative and sharing, the kind which comes naturally 
to women, is impossible...38 
 
While it’s certainly true—as many were quick to assure complainants— that other groups 
had similar problems with “garbage and uneducated posting,” “silly postings,” and so 
on,39 these complaints would be echoed in scholarship on “women’s speech” and CMC, 
which found that there were higher rates of participation from men in women’s forums, 
                                                
36 RikansrudKB (Karla Rikansrud), “men dominate net.women (flame-ish).” 
37 Sophie Quigley, “net.[wo]men[.only] and controlled women,” posted to net.women Usenet newsgroup, 
January 22, 1984, https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.women/IAgZw3Etrq0/discussion.  
38 Ms. Sunny Kirsten, contribution to topic thread beginning with RikansrudKB (Karla Rikansrud) “men 
dominate net.women (flame-ish),” August 19, 1985 (cite above). 
39 Brad Templeton, “Would women please get the hell out of net.women (Satire)” posted to net.women 
Usenet newsgroup, August 16, 1985, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.women/39vXei4CysI/discussion.  
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that men often redirected discussions to the validity or relevance of women’s 
experiences, and that men tended to use a more argumentative style.40 
 The complaint of “male dominance” functioned, as Deem and Berlant suggest, to 
contain feminist discourse and prevent it from “engag[ing] the public sphere writ large.” 
Indeed, the search for a solution would propel many into the “private” CMC of mailing 
groups and restricted forums. Ms. Sunny Kirstin explains: 
after net.women failed... net.women.only was created… to keep the men from 
"dominating" the conversation... And when men again refused to respect the 
charter of the newsgroup known as net.women.only... read by all, posted to only 
by women... the women of the net gave up and left the net. That is why there is a 
successful moderated mailing list being operated whose main focus is feminist 
issues.   
 
Despite the failure of net.women.only, women’s only groups remained a popular 
alternative to “public” forums. Perhaps acquainted with net.women.only, other women-
only CMC platforms sought means of barring entry to those who could not confirm that 
they were women. For example, the Women on the WELL (WOW) conference41 
required—and, in fact, still requires—“verification” that one is a woman. Verification is 
                                                
40 Ellen Balka, “Women’s Access to On-line Discussions about Feminism,” Electronic Journal of 
Communication 3, no. 1 (1993), http://www.cios.org/www/ejc/v3n193.htm; Maureen Majella Ebben, 
“Women on the Net: An exploratory study of gender dynamics on the soc. women computer network” 
(PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1994); Susan Herring, “Gender and Democracy 
in Computer-Mediated Communication,” Electronic Journal of Communication 3, no. 2 (1993), 
http://www.cios.org/www/ejc/v3n293.htm; Susan Herring, “Posting in a Different Voice: Gender and 
Ethics in Computer-Mediated Communication,” in Ess, Philosophical Perspectives on Computer-Mediated 
Communication, 115-45; Susan Herring, “The Rhetorical Dynamics of Gender Harassment On-line,” The 
Information Society  15, no. 3 (1999), 151-167; Susan Herring et al., “Searching for Safety Online: Managing 
‘Trolling’ in a Feminist Forum.” The Information Society 18, No. 5 (2002), 371-384; Judy Smith and Ellen 
Balka, “Chatting on a Feminist Network,” in Kramarae, Technology and Women’s Voices, 82-97; Dale 
Spender, Nattering on the Net: Women, Power and Cyberspace;; Laurel Sutton, “Using Usenet: Gender, Power, 
and Silence in Electronic Discourse” (proceedings of the 20th annual meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics 
Society, Berkeley, CA, 1994); Margie Wylie, “No Place for Women: Internet Is Flawed Model for the 
Infobahn,” Digital Media 4, no. 8 (1995), 3-6.  
41 Only those who (also) had access to the WELL bulletin board service would be able to access this 
conference. The WELL began offering access to the Usenet in June 1985. See: Ron Pernick, “A Timeline 
of the First Ten Years of The WELL,” The WELL, 1995, 
http://www.well.com/conf/welltales/timeline.html. 
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achieved by providing a contact phone number so one’s voice can be confirmed to be 
that of a woman, or having an existing member vouch for one’s identity as a woman.42  
On the SAPPHO mailing list, an offshoot of soc.women created in the late 
1980s, discursive style and self-presentation were used as a litmus test of one’s 
womanhood and thus belonging. When a new subscriber asked how one’s gender could 
be determined online, an existing subscriber responded, explaining: “As I recall, we use 
the old McCarthyist definition: If it looks like a duck, and it quacks like a duck, well then 
it’s a duck. (Looks on e-mail result in things like questions about atypical names.)”43 Here 
the respondent’s parenthetical elaborates how one might “look” like a woman on online: 
use a “typical,” that is feminine-gendered name or handle.44 
However, feminine-gendered self-presentation was not sufficient evidence of a 
contributor’s gender: participants were also expected to “quack like a duck,” that is, 
discursively engage each other as women. “Talk[ing] like a man,” as one contributor 
described it, was variously alarming, out-of-place, and grounds for removal.45 This 
included being argumentative; flaming or disparaging ideas or persons one disagreed 
with; presenting oneself as an authority by, for example, avoiding language like “seems” 
that would soften the force of one’s claims; and taking up too much  space by 
contributing more frequently and/or writing longer posts.46 When a woman’s manner of 
speaking was “masculine,” as with one conventionally female-named SAPPHO 
                                                
42 Email and telephone correspondence with current Women on the WELL coordinator, Kathleen Pope, 
September 13, 2014–October 6, 2014. 
43 Unnamed 1, excerpt of email to SAPPHO discussion list (1993), quoted in Kira Hall, “Cyberfeminism,” 
in Herring, Computer Mediated Communication: Linguistic, Social and Cross-Cultural Perspectives, 159. 
44 Conventionally masculine or ambiguously gendered contributors like one participant, “James,” could be 
pushed to justify use of the handle. 
45 Unnamed 2, excerpt of email to SAPPHO discussion list (1993), quoted in Hall, “Cyberfeminism,” 159. 
46 Hall, “Cyberfeminism”; Herring, “Posting in a different voice: Gender and ethics in computer-mediated 
communication.”  
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subscriber, only in-person verification of gender was sufficient to “calm” the controversy 
created by her masculine flaming.47 
By contrast, the feminist mailing list, mail.feminism or FeMail, was proposed in 
net.women by Judy McMullan in February 1984 and created shortly thereafter for the 
discussion of feminist issues regardless of gender.48 Contributions were subject to 
moderation in line with FeMail’s goal of providing not a “women only” space but rather 
a “woman-space.” Men were welcome, but given guidelines for contributing, including 
“talk[ing] about women’s issues, not how women’s issues affect[ed] men.”49 Messages 
that did not meet expectations could be edited or omitted by the moderator who also 
personally distributed FeMail.50 
 
Public Man, Private Women? 
In “containing” feminist speech, the complaint of male dominance would also 
become an important site for affirming dominant masculine conceptions of publicness 
and linking these to particular CMC spaces and speakers. For the most part, early efforts 
to create spaces for women to speak amongst each other or to discuss feminist issues 
                                                
47 The same respondent quoted above explains in more detail: “when J. [an anonymized handle] first 
joined sappho… [s]he upset and offended so many people, there was concern that she was really a man. 
*Lots* of concern… Anyway, it finally calmed down when someone from So. Cal. posted saying that 
while they founder her offensive too, they had met her and she was a woman.”47  
48Judy McMullan, “proposed ‘mail’ newsgroup for feminists,” February 15, 1984, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.women.only/YG3kfBxqkmU/discussion. Net.women 
contributor, Marie Care, reports the list has “already been started” in a March 13, 1984 posting (see: Marie 
Carey, March 13, 1984, contribution to topic thread beginning with(klt), “mailing list,” posted to UseNet 
net.women.only newsgroup, March 11, 1984, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.women.only/q2iwPVbakS0/discussion.)  
49 Unnamed, excerpt to FeMail mailing list (1991), quoted in Balka, “Women Talk Goes Online,” 236. 
50 Initially, Judy McMullan, who proposed the creation of FeMail, served as the coordinator-moderator. In 
June 1986, two new coordinator-moderators took McMullan’s place. Judy McMullan, “feminist mailing 
list,” November 5, 1984, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.women.only/hKAqp5NjKYM/discussion.  
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lent themselves to a narrative of women as essentially different from men, but also a 
monolithic collective. This is most striking in the private women-only mailing lists where 
good or desirable relations between strangers were imagined to unfold naturally. 
However, FeMail would not be entirely immune to these gendered dichotomies. 
Consider that it would become common sense that mailing lists—including those, like 
FeMail, which had no formal bars to access—were “private.”51   
What’s more, FeMail and net.women.only were conflated in revealing ways. 
Some, but in particular the women who had envisioned FeMail as a mailing list for 
women only, suggested they forget the mailing list and simply repurpose net.women.only 
for the discussion of feminism, thereby implying a mailing list that admitted men could 
not be substantively different from a public newsgroup, re-inscribing men as “public.”52  
Others called for the deletion of net.women.only on grounds that it no longer 
served a purpose (and, implicitly, had never been appropriate for the Usenet). User Don 
Stanwyck wrote: 
Again, I call for the decease of the group. There exists a mailing list where people 
can do what they want. Those who are not willing to trade ideas in the 
marketplace, should not have a stall there.53 
 
As the above suggests, women and feminists struggled to find a public CMC platform to 
discuss women’s rights and gender equality, which seemed to confirm the private or at 
least special-interest nature of their discussions. 
                                                
51 The first (ARPANet) mailing lists did not appear to be read this way, even when they circulated in a 
similar fashion. 
52 Beth Mazur, “New Suggestions about Mail List - (nf),”February 23, 1984, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.women.only/kp2itvuRSNg/discussion; Lisa, “New Suggestions 
about Mail List - (nf),” March 1, 1984, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.women.only/DXQdZ3etPAk/discussion.  
53 Don Stanwyck, contribution to topic thread beginning with “Sex prejudice, what else? - (nf),” March 19, 
1984, https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.women/CIrOqkBc-Go/discussion. 
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 Meanwhile, women and feminists were routinely offered a clear vision of public 
speech, which they could join in at any time. For example, responding to the proposal 
for net.women.only, Alan Hu wrote: 
 
...the main point for having net.women.only is to have a forum for women. Why 
not make net.women fill this need? Nothing prevents any of you females out 
there from making [net.women] a group for women. You just have to contribute 
articles for women. If some rude, obnoxious person flames at you, flame back. 
That's what we all do in every other group.54 
 
As an alternative to flaming, women were also instructed to “ignore [flames]” and 
“continue your discussion with the people interested in carrying on a reasonable and 
thought-provoking discussion.”55 Often women who “duke[d] it out with the best of 
them” on Usenet and did not complain about net.women were offered as exemplars and 
proof of women’s abilities should they just choose to use them.56  
On the one hand, because there were no formal barriers to participation on 
Usenet, women were free to speak of what they pleased in whatever way they pleased. In 
effect, this meant women were free to participate as everyone else did: to argue in a 
fashion that “all” would find persuasive, that is, without reference to identity or personal 
experience; to not be offended; to direct their time and energy to persuading, flaming, or 
filtering out, to the best of their ability, anti-feminist topics or contributors; and to not 
sign on if they did not like it or couldn’t handle it. On the other hand, women and 
                                                
54 Alan Hu, August 24, 1983, contribution to topic thread beginning with Liz Allen, “net.women.only,” 
posted to net.women and net.news.groups Usenet newsgroups, August 19, 1983, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.women/lw9bfkm0424/discussion. 
55 Michael J. Fremont, contribution to topic thread beginning with Christine Guzy, “net.feminsts,”  
posted to net.women Usenet newsgroup, August 25, 1983, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.women/JTPkuuEOvqE/discussion.  
56 Ed Pawlak, “Who needs net.women.only?”  posted to net.women Usenet newsgroup, August 2, 1983, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/net.women/6Pq06c2i3Fo/discussion.  
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feminists could abscond to CMC deemed private, confirming the inappropriateness of 
women’s or a more conventionally feminine mode of speech for public CMC and the 
characterization of feminist as a “special,” non-general interest. (By contrast, a 
newsgroup like net.chess might not capture everyone’s interest but, owing to its 
recognizably “public” status could be thought of as formally, potentially “for everyone.”) 
There was no clear way to be “dangerous.” The following section explores an individual 
feminist provocateur who managed to become so. 
 
V. “Without Regard to Sex”: The Minor Rhetoric of Mark Ethan Smith 
At times eloquent, often fervent, even feverish, Mark Ethan Smith entered the 
burgeoning publics of computer-mediated communication “speak[ing] too much… out 
of place and outside the truth.”57 These are Jacques Rancière’s words for describing the 
speech of those who “have no part,” whose person and claims have no place in the 
distribution of the sensible.58 Smith’s strident, feminist speech—sometimes trafficking, 
when pressed, in colorful slurs like “Nazi penis worshipper” and hasty generalizations 
like “[t]hese are the same kind of guys who take time off from developing nuclear 
weapons to molest children or harass women”—was sufficient to make him an outsider 
in the context of early CMC.59 Being a long-term unemployed, formerly homeless, and 
disabled person who would speak of these things when relevant, Smith was far from the 
typical CMC user. 
                                                
57 Rancière, The Names of History: On the Poetics of Knowledge, 24. 
58 Ibid., 24-5. 
59 Mark E. Smith, “Warning: Offensive to techies,” March 11, 1988, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/soc.women/6gj8v0K9ZHQ/discussion. I can find no Usenet 
articles where Smith uses the language “Nazi penis worshippers”; he is attributed with saying this in Katie 
Hafner’s “The Epic Saga of The Well: The World’s Most Influential Online Community (And It’s Not 
AOL)” Wired, 5.5 (May 1997), http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/5.05/ff_well_pr.html. 
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However, it was his living and speaking “without regard to sex” that resulted in 
his being something of a pariah. Smith was (and is) gender non-conforming. While he 
legally changed his name, cut his hair short, and began dressing in a conventionally 
masculine manner, he did not identify as a man or male.60 He describes his decision to 
adopt these conventional markers of manhood in bluntly pragmatic terms: being 
perceived or “passing” as a man was a means to draw closer to the promise of equality, 
to avoid gendered assault and harassment, to improve his opportunities for employment, 
to move uninhibitedly through public spaces, and to be perceived and treated as an 
individual. 
Even so, he did not “renounc[e] [his female] sex.”61 In the context of CMC, this 
meant Smith would mention he was a woman or had “female genitalia” when relevant to 
a discussion, while demanding to be addressed by conventionally masculine pronouns 
(he/him), citing their grammatical use as “inclusive.”62 It was in this sense that he spoke 
outside the distribution of the sensible, that is, that he assumed a nonsensical, or not-yet-
recognizable subject position and yet spoke. Indeed, for a time, he was prolific, 
espousing his views in several Usenet newsgroups and at least four regionally based 
bulletin board services, including the WELL. 
                                                
60 Mark Ethan Smith, “Censorship in Cyberspace,” personal webpage, February 1, 2002, 
http://www.angelfire.com/bc3/dissident/(accessed June 15, 2015); Smith v. Chater, Unites States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, November 17, 1995, filed December 29, 1995, No. 94-55685. 
61 Mark Ethan Smith, July 31, 1988, contribution to topic thread beginning with Robert H. Averack, 
“Language in a Requirements Specification,” posted to comp.society.women Usenet newsgroup, July 28, 
2998, https://groups.google.com/d/topic/comp.society.women/x-vMBDDHDgk/discussion.  
62 Mark E. Smith,  July 18, 1988, contribution to topic thread beginning with Mark E. Smith, “Proposed 
Lawsuit,” July 17, 1998, https://groups.google.com/d/topic/soc.women/NLUs2u11X_s/discussion; 
Mark E. Smith,  “Sexism in Judaism?”, March 22, 1989, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/soc.culture.jewish/9fOvqqspdHU/discussion. Smith generally used 
the terms “woman” and “female” interchangeably to indicate a human with female sex or genitalia. 
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Many men and women accepted Smith’s preferred pronouns, most did not. As a 
result, Smith’s sex was often noted or implied to be female by others. Some announced 
that they had received email correspondence alerting them to Smith’s sex. Most 
commonly, interlocutors would simply refer to Smith using conventionally feminine 
pronouns, a combination of pronouns (s/he, she/he/it, (s)he, etc.), or “it.” Others 
placed Smith’s name in quotes or otherwise signaled to those viewing the discussion that 
there was something amiss with this Mark. For example, David Schnedar, opts to 
reproduce Smith’s signature when referring to him, figuring it as a concession to Smith:  
Acording to --Mark, you have to call me by a name or pronoun of my choice. In 
the future please refer to me as: ‘THE GRAND PUBA, MASTER OF ALL HE 
SEES OR THE ENTIRE UNIVERSE WHICHEVER IS BIGGER’ Or use this 
as a pronoun when refering to me: ‘THE ONE WHO'S NAME MUST NOT BE 
SPOKEN’ … 
 
I use ‘—Mark’ because --Mark does. --Mark seems to be real picky about how I 
refer to --Mark, but --Mark hasn't posted --Mark's prefered method of address 
lately. --Mark, please post the syntax and semantics --Mark would prefer us to use 
when refering to --Mark. Can I please use ‘you.’ Not using it is very difficult.63 
 
The parallel Schnedar constructs between Smith wanting to be referred to by a 
conventionally masculine name and pronouns, on the one hand, and Schnedar being 
referred to as “THE GRAND PUBA…” on the other, recasts Smith’s argument about 
equality to the comic eccentricity of someone who has shifting and inexplicable 
preferences.64 The repeated use of “--Mark” results in awkward, stilted prose, which 
functions to mark the inappropriateness and questionable “reality” of Smith but may also 
                                                
63 David Schnedar, contribution to topic thread beginning with Mark E. Smith, July 17, 1988, “Proposed 
Lawsuit,” July 17, 1988, https://groups.google.com/d/topic/soc.women/NLUs2u11X_s/discussion.  
64 Schnedar typically included “The Grand PUBA Master Of The Entire Universe” in his signature; “THE 
ONE WHO'S NAME MUST NOT BE SPOKEN” was something he appears to have come up with for 
this email.  
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be read as a way of materializing on the screen an authorial distaste and discomfort that 
was presumed to be shared.  
Invariably these methods of (mis)addressing or (mis)referencing Smith would 
generate replies and often flames. Some asked whether Smith was “real or an elaborate 
(and long-standing) hoax” or a “pseudo,” short for pseudonym and used to indicate the 
specified sex of the individual was suspect.65 Smith would aggressively defend his 
“reality” and his “right” to be called by inclusive, conventionally masculine pronouns, 
arguing that to do otherwise was to discriminate on the basis of sex.  
Smith would become infamous in several early computer-mediated 
communication platforms for the varied means by which he asserted the reality and 
coherence of his subject position. He is credited with making a community of the 
WELL, the bulletin-board service discussed in Chapter One, by giving key members and 
systems administrators something they could share and organize in response to: 
frustration with his unconventional behaviors and aggressive outspokenness.66 He was 
also denied access to at least two other bulletin board services. 
In a move echoing that of the WELL’s management, one Usenet veteran, Brian 
Reid, invited readers to see themselves as “a real community” through a shared response 
to the “absurdity” of an article by Smith titled “Proposed Lawsuit,” in which he 
                                                
65 Jim Rees,  “Mark Ethan Smith: For real?” posted to net.admin Usenet newsgroup, September 28, 1987, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/news.admin/dBXRlBfRtac/discussion; Rhonda Scribner, “Re: The 
Difference It Makes . . .”, posted to talk.politics.misc, alt.flame & soc.women Usenet newsgroups, January 
27, 1998, https://groups.google.com/d/topic/soc.women/K1S5vjc1rLQ/discussion.   
66 This was an oft-repeated notion of some key members and vocal emissaries from the WELL, notably 
Howard Rheingold, author of The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier (1993) and Tom 
Mandel, who is central to Katie Hafner’s account of this BBS. Both individuals were interviewed and the 
idea echoed in Hafner’s The WELL: A Story of Love, Death & Real Life in the Seminal Online Community, 2001. 
Hafner apparently made no effort to locate Smith who would respond to Hafner’s book in “Censorship in 
Cyberspace” (full citation in footnote 59), as well as via a public WELL conference.  
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threatened to sue multiple people on grounds of sex discrimination. Reid wrote: “This 
incident is just further proof that USENET is a real community. Now we have our own 
Bag Lady.”67 The reference to a “Bag Lady” plays on gendered, classed and ablist tropes, 
casting Smith’s fervent prose as on par with the inarticulate and utterly dismissible 
ravings of the sort of individual that would likely be beneath most participants’ notice, if 
not an object of their disgust.  
Usenet’s (increasingly) decentralized character made “management” near 
impossible, so no community cohered in finding a means to ban Smith.68 But threatening 
a lawsuit was in some sense the ultimate taboo on Usenet, and so drew a great deal of 
attention. Replies multiplied until a substantial number of articles began addressing not 
Smith, but how to get away from him:  
this is getting out of hand.  you can't get away from this person.  i've already 
added  
/usr/lib/news/expire -f [Smith’s email address] 
to my daily expirations, and the lines 
/From: [Smith’s email address]/:j 
/From: [Smith’s secondary email address]/:j 
to my News/KILL file, but still these postings get thru. what do you have to do 
to stop paying for MES's ravings on your own system???69 
 
                                                
67 Brian Reid, “lawsuit,” contribution to topic thread beginning with Mark E. Smith, “Abusenet--Reply to 
Karl Denninger and other Libertarians. (Was: Re: The Rhetoric of Cruelty),” posted to news.admin, 
misc.legal & soc.women Usenet newsgroups, July 18, 1988, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/news.admin/Pc_4Jo259dE/discussion.  
68 As on the WELL, a community of “old-timers” cohere in remembrance of Smith. Indeed, Smith is 
regularly referenced in participant-made histories, “legends,” and lists of “kooks” of Usenet. For example: 
William VanHorne, “Net.Legends List (long),” posted to alt.folklore.urban, alt.folklore.computers, 
alt.usenet.kooks, March 16, 1994, https://groups.google.com/d/topic/alt.usenet.kooks/VYe-
kn0UcVI/discussion. 
69 John F. Haugh II, “Proposed Lawsuit,” July 17, 1988, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/soc.women/NLUs2u11X_s/discussion.  
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This code would ensure articles written by Smith under his most commonly used email 
address would expire soon after receipt and anything written by Smith under that address 
and another known address would be automatically disposed of, or “junked.” The latter 
would only affect Haugh’s computer, but the former could limit the downstream 
distribution of Smith’s articles.70  
Nonetheless, it clearly was proving inadequate to the task of “get[ing] away from” Smith.  
Others took to advocating a form of collective action aimed at “cutting Mark’s 
dribble off at the source.” Michael Duebner advised, first, that all readers resolve to 
“ignor[e[]” Smith’s posts and, second, that all systems administrators run the expire filter 
“immediately after unbatching incoming news.”71 In elaborating why preventing the 
dissemination of Smith’s articles was necessary, despite the highly prized value of 
freedom to “say anything,” the author references the disability support Smith is known 
to receive, asserting that: 
Carrying the Mark E. Smith traffic has to cease purely for financial reasons. First 
we support Mark via our tax dollars. Then we see our tax dollars being put to use 
insulting us and we are paying to propagate the trash throughout the net. 
 
Schnedar, who had previously referred to Smith as “--Mark” posted a day later, writing: 
 
Mark, I have the solution to your problem. Anyone who wants to be refer[r]ed to 
by a certain set of words and not by others need only to run usenet through a 
filter.  Here is one for consideration. 
 
%% 
" "she" " printf("he"); 
" "hers" " printf("his"); 
                                                
70 The spotty but still extant archived articles from or responding to Smith may well be a testament to 
how extensive efforts were to not see anything from or about him; many articles reference earlier articles 
that are not available in the extensive Usenet archive held by Google. 
71 Michael Duebner, “A rational approach to Mark E. Smith,” July 18, 1998, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/news.admin/4pEYrx4ICbc/discussion.  
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" "she$ printf("he"); 
" "hers$ printf("his"); 
^she  printf("he"); 
^hers  printf("his"); 
David  printf("The Grand PUBA Master Of The Entire Universe"); 
 
Schnedar’s mocking tone is replaced by an effort to “solv[e]” Smith’s “problem,” which 
an offer to aid in implementing or improving the filter suggests is sincere. Whether this 
change is the result of concern that Smith’s “proposed lawsuit” might have traction or 
Schnedar is genuinely persuaded of the validity of Smith’s “problem,” Schnedar again 
obscures what is at the heart of Smith’s desire for conventionally masculine pronouns: a 
claim to equality.  
On Schnedar’s new framing, Smith’s desire reflects an individual preference on 
par with others’ preference to continue using pronouns “appropriate” to Smith’s sex. 
Figured in this way, rather than as a claim to equality, Schnedar offers the promise of a—
if not perfect, then perfectible—program that will allow everyone to get what they want. 
In effect, Schnedar says: Smith is free to be a “he” on his own screen. 
As a practice of publicity, Schnedar’s filter anticipates and cultivates atomistic, 
self-helping individuals who stand in no particular relation of obligation or care to 
strangers addressed. While this use of a filter is unique, the embrace of technology as a 
work-around to fundamentally incompatible visions of the good (for Usenet and beyond 
it) was a defining feature of Usenet and continues to be pervasive in the context of CMC. 
Indeed, in offering the fix, Schnedar could be said to be more nearly treating Smith as an 
individual and equal. By contrast, Smith being unemployed and on disability, Duebner 
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has no trouble treating Smith as a sub-equal. But Smith remained uncontainable until his 
relocation to San Diego resulted in a loss of regular access.72 
 
Smith’s Minor Rhetoric 
I suggest we read Smith’s speech, like Deem reads Solanas’s SCUM Manifesto, as 
a minor rhetoric. The atomistic individual who takes up new technology in order to 
masterfully reshape his world reflected the lived reality of many who built, read, and 
contributed articles to the burgeoning publics CMC afforded. These individuals easily 
saw themselves as being, or at least being reflected, in the “technical core” of Usenet. 
They used software, filters, and coded patches to actively shape their interface with 
Usenet’s CMC publics to reflect their interests, investments, and preferences. And it 
worked, for the most part; but not with Smith. In this way, Smith displaced the feminist 
CMC complaint of domination onto the broader network. 
Like Solanas, Smith “use[d] the language of the majority in such a way as to make 
that language stutter… slow down… halt.” Taking seriously the historical use and 
grammatical definition of masculine pronouns as “inclusive,” Smith claimed a legal right 
to them and his conventionally masculine (legal) name, “while not renouncing [his 
female] sex.”73 In defending this right, he affected an aggressively masculine style, 
browbeating interlocutors with condescending, legalistic, and rationalistic explanations. 
For example, responding to one individual who suggested Smith had a “male name,” 
                                                
72 Email correspondence with Mark Ethan Smith, July 2015. 
73 Mark Ethan Smith, July 31, 1988, contribution to topic thread beginning with Robert H. Averack, 
“Language in a Requirements Specification,” posted to comp.society.women, July 28, 1988, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/comp.society.women/x-vMBDDHDgk/discussion.  
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Smith wrote: “Oh?  Does my name have genitalia?  What makes it male? I do not use a 
male name. Names do not have genitals, therefore they do not have sex.”74  
As the above suggests, Smith’s explanations brought a seemingly private matter—
genitals—to the fore, uncomfortably illustrating the ways in which it these were always 
already being made present. For example, Smith informed one author that he could “still 
mention [his] sex if he need[ed] to” by “simply say[ing]” things like “‘Even though he is a 
woman, kids, Mark is right.”75 When including excerpts from prior articles in which he 
was misaddressed, Smith might replace “she/her” with “(sexual term)” or “[D.P],” 
Smith’s abbreviation for “diminutive pronouns,” that is, conventionally feminine 
pronouns.76 Alternatively, he would respond “in kind,” referring to those with 
conventionally masculine names using “diminutive” pronouns, always making a point to 
explain what he was doing.  
 However imperfectly, Smith destabilized the otherwise robust link between male 
sex and men/the masculine as well as that between females and “women’s speech;” but 
he did so by rejecting all that is conventionally gendered feminine and reinforcing a 
conception of the democratic speaker as masculine, through his practices of public 
speech. The effect of the latter was compounded by Smith’s inability to materialize the 
“privacy” of his female sex, referenced by interlocutors who resisted his “right” to 
conventionally masculine pronouns but also by those who supported him. Indeed, 
supporters frequently shared personal information obtained from Smith in private email, 
                                                
74 Mark E. Smith, March 25, 1989, contribution to topic thread beginning with Mark E. Smith, “Sexism in 
Judaism,” March 22, 1989, https://groups.google.com/d/topic/soc.culture.jewish/Kwc2T-
pZNTM/discussion. 
75 Deem, “Stranger Sociability, Public Hope, and the Limits of Political Transformation,” 447. 
76 Mark Ethan Smith, March 22, 1989, https://groups.google.com/d/topic/soc.culture.jewish/Kwc2T-
pZNTM/discussion.  
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including a history with sexual assault, thus setting Smith up as exceptional in a way that 
made his sex quite present and recasting his living “without regard to sex” as a 
reactionary survival tactic warranting compassion, rather than as an emancipatory 
project. 
Contesting the practices of publicity which excluded him, Smith nonetheless 
remained unrecuperable by a broader feminist public that was unwilling or unable to use 
his tactics, which required a great deal of time and surely also emotional and other labor. 
Even so, in his claiming of masculine pronouns without “renouncing his sex,” Smith can 
be understood to have produced a minor rhetoric. Equally important, Smith was 
something of an object lesson for feminists on Usenet, almost all of whom tolerated, if 
not supported, Smith’s use of masculine pronouns. In responses to Smith they saw a 
commitment among anti-feminists and also among supporters of women’s rights, to 
police gender boundaries. Where prior “academic” discussions of pronouns had 
invariably resulted in many favoring the use of masculine pronouns as “inclusive” and so 
fit to speak of both women and men, reactions to Smith made clear that most did not see 
these terms as quite so capacious or flexible. Harassment directed at Smith also 
illustrated the limits of a minor rhetoric to affect change. Finally, it was in the course of a 
flame war with Smith that the prospect of moderating soc.women began to appear more 




VI.  The Genesis of soc.feminism & Safe Space as a Feminist Counter-Public 
Practice 
Moderation was suggested early on in net.women’s history. However it wasn’t 
until late 1983 that the UseNet software was updated to include a moderated newsgroup 
option, and it would be several more years before it was truly operational.77 By that time, 
rules for forming newsgroups had solidified, making it difficult—especially for 
feminists—to secure the votes needed to start a moderated group. An additional concern 
in what could be expected to be a high-volume group was the workload and time 
commitment, not to mention the emotional labor of having to moderate bigoted 
submissions. Nonetheless, a moderated soc.feminism was created in May 1989 following 
assurances that anti-feminist contributions that were not flames would be welcome and 
the creation of a software patch that would allow for multiple moderators.78  
                                                
77 Although the mod hierarchy was intended to be circulated worldwide, alongside the net* and fa* 
hierarchies (the latter allowed UseNet to “host” or display the contents of ARPAnet mailing lists), there 
were distribution difficulties immediately. Sites running versions older software could not recognize the 
*mod hierarchy. Even when a site was running updated Netnews software, “mod” needed to be added to 
the distribution list. Regardless of the cause, if a site that failed to receive and distribute mod* also served 
as a distribution node for one or more downstream sites, the latter would fail to receive moderated groups 
even if their software was up-to-date and included mod in its distribution. In the months following the 
creation of the mod hierarchy, reports of missing mod groups were common. These reports would slow, 
but not disappear until the deletion of the mod hierarchy shortly after the “Great Renaming” of 1986. 
Even when distribution paths were correct, moderated groups faced other difficulties due to the technical 
affordances of UseNet’s Netnews software, which was designed to facilitate unmoderated posting. Those 
wishing to contribute to a moderated group were asked to send articles to the designated moderator, 
knowledge of which would require one had already encountered an article providing this information. By 
contrast, when posting to an unmoderated newsgroup one addressed the newsgroup. In other words, 
knowledge of the newsgroup (e.g., net.women) simultaneously provided knowledge of where to direct an 
article (net.women). In late 1986, a new version of the Netnews was released that automatically forwarded 
articles sent to a moderated newsgroup on to the designated moderator. However, even years later 
individuals were advised to address the moderator directly as not all sites were running newer software. 
78 From the FAQ: “The original proposer of soc.feminism was Patricia Roberts, who collected the votes, 
worked with Greg Woods to set up a program allowing multiple moderators and chose the initial 
moderators. We were the first multiply moderated group.” Cindy Tittle Moore, “soc.feminism 
Information,” soc.feminism [Usenet newsgroup], March 3, 1992, 
https://groups.google.com/d/topic/soc.feminism/paZQjrVfS2A/discussion, (accessed December 17, 
2015). 
 97 
For the most part, soc.feminism was for discussion of feminism, not a feminist 
newsgroup. Even though moderators were required to publish anti-feminist 
contributions as long as they avoided ad hominem attacks, rejected articles became 
sources of lengthy discussion in soc.women and even several of the “general” 
newsgroups to which all users were advised to subscribe.. In 1992, many expressed a 
desire for the group to narrow its focus, in effect, to “address people as [feminists].” 
Soc.feminism began regularly posting articles reflecting this change and including 
recommended reading and a “FAQ” or “Frequently Asked Questions” list. Heated 
resistance from anti-feminists who were effectively being pushed out led to the creation 
of alt.feminism. Soc.feminism formally changed its charter in 1993 and remained active, 
albeit with slowing activity, through early 2006 (the last post is dated 2009). 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
This chapter illustrates how political imaginary was circumscribed not only by 
dominant masculine-gendered ideals of publicness, but also by the materialization of 
these ideals in the digital “spaces” afforded by CMC. In this case, becoming “dangerous, 
as Deem puts it, required either an (unsustainable) disruption through “inappropriate” 
adoption and corruption of dominant ideals (Zerilli would call this an “anomaly”79) or 
collective action to create a public space apart. 
Many of the practices developed in soc.feminism will be seen in the feminist 
counter-public practice discussed in Chapter Three. But there will also be a number of 
differences. In this sense, Frances Shaw’s argument, noted in my introductory chapter, 
                                                
79 Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom, 49. 
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that online “safe spaces” represent a counter-hegemonic practice in disallowing anti-
feminist speech doesn’t quite go far enough, at least in that portion of the feminist 
blogosphere I study. As will be shown, the “safe spaces” of online feminism develop 
through conflict and negotiation of safety in feminist blogs that were (and still are, to 
some extent) created and managed by white, middle-class, college-educated, cisgendered 
women, but serve increasingly serve broader audiences. Thus it would be wrong to 
attribute the counter-public practice of “safe space” to feminists without also attributing 
it to anti-racists, queers, disabled, and other individuals who challenged its occlusions.  
Perhaps this will give my reader cause for concern. After all, contemporary 
feminist political thought and, more broadly, political theory, have been critical of the 
effectiveness or emancipatory potential of political speech and action that foregrounds 
social particulars, in short: identity politics. One way this has manifested has been in a 
particular question—pervasive in mainstream media and not uncommon to academic 
feminism—which may be put somewhat cavalierly as whither feminism?  
The earliest and most thoroughly “troubled” response to the “whither 
feminism?” question suggested that it was the recognition of, or focus on, differences 
amongst women that led to feminism’s failure or impotence via fragmentation. Among 
the more sustained replies to this line of thinking is Linda Zerilli’s Feminism and the Abyss 
of Freedom. Reworking Hannah Arendt’s political theory to shed light on the 
foundationlessness and world-building (rather than mirroring) nature of politics, Zerilli 
argues that the subject of feminism has never been and cannot be definitively 
determined. Instead, she is only ever given form in particular historical moments through 
word and deed. 
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What draws me to Zerilli is her concern, shared by Deem and Berlant, with 
feminist publics and political imagination. Explaining her motivations for writing 
Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom, Zerilli identifies “the feminist challenge to the 
androcentrism of the public sphere and the constitution of alternative spaces of 
freedom” as having “captured and held [her] interest.”80 What’s more, her critique of 
identity politics is better understood as a critique of those who would derive, through a 
priori theoretical-epistemological inquiry, “the” subject of feminism. She explains: 
My point… has not been to rule out the ‘what,’ that is, the questions of 
subjectivity and identity that have preoccupied feminists. It has been to insist that 
the kind of transformation envisioned by thinkers who focus on these 
questions—if it is not to be restricted to individual cases that can then be written 
off as anomalies—requires the tangible and intangible political relations that 
Arendt calls a worldly-in-between: that which at once relates us and separates us. 
It is in this space of the common world that differences become meaningful and the newly 
thinkable, other ways of constituting identities and configuring social arrangements 
such as gender appear.81 
 
I agree wholeheartedly and because I do I must also ask: what common world is being 
considered? Academia is, of course, a part of the common world, but its relationship to 
other worldly and “everyday” feminist practice is not strictly that of an expert engaging 
an eager layman. Nor, I imagine, would anyone think it should be.82  
Nonetheless, we could simply say Zerilli is focused on theorizing what feminist 
praxis must contend with generally, while I focus on a particular, contemporary instance, 
                                                
80 Ibid., ix. 
81 Ibid., 181 (emphasis mine). 
82 Feminist theory is taken up (or not) in some surprising ways in feminist CMC. Here’s just one example: 
the term “kyriarchy” was coined by feminist theologian, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, to describe systems 
of multiple, overlapping oppression and subordination, not unlike intersectionality (Discipleship of Equals a 
Critical Feminist Ekklesia-Logy of Liberation). Schüssler Fiorenza’s focus is on a feminist theory of power that 
de-centers patriarchy, rather than explaining intragroup conflict along multiple axes of identity. 
“Kyriarchy” became fairly common coinage in especially early 21st-century feminist CMC. However, the 
term has received little traction in cotemporaneous feminist theory. Thanks to Sarah Gram for this and 
many other thoughtful observations. 
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and we agree that collective feminist speech and action in public is crucial to, not only a 
vision of democratic subjects but also a worldly political practice that cultivates subjects 
who imagine freedom and the good life outside the gendered and raced logics of (much) 
liberal political thought. However, in opening her first chapter with the assertion that “it 
is increasingly hard to identify the ‘movement’ in the feminist movement”;83 and 
selecting the exceptional (in an American context84) worldly feminist practice of an 
Italian collective, the writings of French feminist author, Monique Wittig, and the 
decidedly dated 1843 U.S. women’s summit, Zerilli can easily be read as suggesting 
there’s little to learn from contemporary American feminist practice. In other words, one 
might think that American feminist practice has, like American feminist scholarship (on 
Zerilli’s readings), stalled out in its efforts to nail down the subject of feminism as a 
perquisite to acting.  
This impression is compounded in the chapter where Zerilli takes up the 
collective feminist practice of the Milan Women’s Bookstore Collective, best known for 
rejecting the liberal discourse of rights. In a recurring move, Zerilli shifts between the 
historically situated particularities of the collectives’ actions to an amorphous American 
feminism concretely situated, in one instance only, in the feminist theory of Wendy 
Brown. In this case, Zerilli writes: “The Milan feminists, too [i.e., like Brown via her 
Nietzschean critique of identity politics], see the dangers involved in the desire for 
reparations.”85 They further realized, Zerilli notes, that the problem with an “injury 
                                                
83 Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom, 1. 
84 It is not clear that the Milan Women’s Bookstore Collective’s rejection of a discourse of rights would be 
as strikingly radical when situated in its Italian context, as it is likely to read and have been read in the U.S. 
While Zerilli speaks to other translation issues, this is not something she addresses. 
85 Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom, 100. 
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identity” lies not in its origin in lived experience of oppression or marginalization, but in 
not having a vision of what freedom looks like apart from liberalism.86 
Again: “The Italians, too [where “too” situates one in “the context of American 
feminism” mentioned immediately above], had thought that recognizing social 
differences was the answer to feminism’s identity politics.”87 Later, “[r]ecognizing how 
the ‘differences among women’ became, as in American feminism, an empty slogan… 
the Italians come face to face with the limits” of their current practice and switched gears 
to a practice that repurposed inequities (of class, age, and experience) amongst 
themselves.88 In so doing, Zerilli concludes, they imagined and cultivated a feminist 
political subject embedded in relations of inter-generational care, interdependence, and 
obligation. 
In the instances glossed above, Zerilli abstracts from the Milan collective’s 
situated practice a series of lessons that a monolithic “American feminism” might learn. 
In omitting contemporary, worldly U.S. practice one is left to wonder if Zerilli imagines 
the theoretical quagmire of academic feminism to have resulted in a freeze of on-the-
ground practices, or if instead the omission marks a judgment that worldly feminist 
practice should look more like the practice as developed by the Milan Women’s 
Bookstore Collective.  
Whatever the reason, it’s only fair to note that challenges with studying one of 
the major sites of public speech and appearance in the U.S. today—CMC—may well 
have played a role. But let me be frank in suggesting it may also owe something to the 
                                                
86 Ibid., 100, 102. 
87 Ibid., 105. 
88 Ibid., 106. 
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relegation of what happens in the digital spaces and publics afforded by CMC as less real, 
as Chapter One discussed, or even, as Chapter Four elaborates, a repugnance to the 
forms of political action and the types of political claims that seem to be magnified by 
CMC platforms. 
None of this diminishes Zerilli’s superb theoretical account of the relationship 
among worldly practice, public spaces, and political imagination, nor does it preclude the 
capacity of the Milan collective’s practices to inspire. But, as I hope my study of feminist 
CMC above suggests, it does raise questions about the imagined and material space in 
which the collective’s practices unfolded. In other words, alongside and co-constitutive 
of an account of women who collectively experimented with a range of practices in a 
(successful) effort to think outside or beyond a liberal discourse of rights, is an 
untheorized account of the Milan Women’s Bookstore itself: the separatist space it 
afforded, for example, remains unaddressed, as does its situatedness in Milan and in the 









EMBODYING PUBLIC SPEECH:  
THE FEMINIST POLITICS OF SAFETY ONLINE 
 
I.  Introduction  
In October 2009, Melissa McEwan, founder, manager, and primary contributor 
to the feminist blog Shakesville, received “another long-winded email” from someone 
who had been banned from posting comments.1 In an (anonymized) excerpt from the 
email, the banned individual “admit[s] to being taken aback just a skosh.”2 He—a self-
identified “white male who lives an upper-class lifestyle”—goes on to write that: 
In today’s internet format of open discussion, such actions [banning a 
commenter] seem to run contradictory to reasoned debate. Yes I broke the 
cardinal rule of your site, which seems to be ‘Do not under any circumstances 
disagree or attempt to disagree with the Commander In Chief of this site.’ I say 
this not necessarily out of any other impulse than to acknowledge a breach of 
decorum. In truth I loathe most of your ideology. Such loathing isn’t bred out of 
misogyny... No, my loathing of your site is born from contempt for the 
sanctimonious manner in which you post and attempt to defend such.3 
 
In his own words, the author’s primary complaint with Shakesville is not that it is a 
feminist blog, or even with being banned. To be sure, the author was caught off guard by 
the latter, but “just a skosh.” And though he clearly thinks Shakesville’s expectations for 
                                                
1 Melissa McEwan, “I Get Letters,” Shakesville, October 23, 2009, 
http://www.shakesville.com/2009/10/i-get-letters_23.html (accessed December 17, 2015). 
2 Anonymous, quoted in McEwan, “I Get Letters.” 
3 Ibid. 
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commenters are ridiculous and at odds with “reasoned debate,” he acknowledges some 
rule breaking on his part. 
It is instead the “sanctimonious manner” that accompanies the site’s feminist 
content and is used to “defend” practices like banning that deeply unsettles the author, 
inspiring “loathing.” What the author takes as false moral superiority is met with 
“contempt” which, had the author not used the term himself, is apparent in his stilted 
prose, choice of words (e.g., “ideology” rather than “ideas”) and dismissive 
characterization of the site’s detailed comments policy as, in brief, “don’t disagree with 
me.” 
 McEwan dismisses the remainder of the banned commenter’s email with a 
perfunctory “Etc.” and describes the whole as “another long-winded email from an 
aggrieved troll who’s pissed that there’s one space on the ent ire ty  o f  the internetz 
where he’s not allowed to be a misogynistic fuckneck.”4* Noting that she “finds [his 
claims] hilarious” and “deeply amusing,” McEwan seems to include them only as a 
laughable pivot to a more important matter and topic of recurring and impassioned 
discussion: the blog as a “safe space.”5 On this point she writes:  
This space is an experiment that could very well have started with the question: 
What if people who self-selected out of most internet spaces because of alienating bigotry got 
together and had a conversation free from that marginalizing rubbish?6 
 
                                                
4 McEwan, “I Get Letters” (emphasis McEwan’s).  
* Reading reminder: As noted at the beginning of chapter two, I do not use “[sic]” to indicate that 
grammatical or typographical errors, which are often intentional, are the authors’ rather than mine. For 
example, McEwan’s misspelling of the Internet as “the internetz”) is quite clearly deliberate and functions 
alongside other aspects of her response to mock and convey contempt for the idea the cited email 
correspondent relays. Additionally, Internet trolls often use typographical errors to signal to other trolls 
that the post is “trolling,” that is insincere and intended to generate responses that will turn the focus of a 




This question, (and the manner in which it is raised) prompt several others: What would 
a “conversation free from … marginalizing rubbish” look like? How would it attend to 
the varied dimensions across which one may be marginalized? How will such an 
“experimental” space be created and maintained? And, finally, what insights can the 
study of this sort of space offer those interested in political activism in the “age of the 
Internet,” an age in which mass publication via social media has raised concerns about 
the erosion of community and the commercialization or capture of citizens’ attentions?7  
Attending to the play of emotions in these sites and the means by which the sites 
are “built,” I argue that online feminist safe spaces like Shakesville constitute a practice 
of feminist counter-publicity. As with all publics, counter-publics discursively structure 
relations between strangers; but counter-publics do so in a way that challenges norms of 
dominant publicity.8 Informed by negotiations of the Internet medium and affordances 
of blogging platforms, bloggers and commenters at Shakesville and other feminist blogs 
cultivate the speaking subject of democratic discourse as embodied, vulnerable, and 
entangled in relations of care and obligation to the strangers being addressed.  
As a practice of counter-publicity, the study of “safe spaces” offers insight into the 
persistence of inequalities online. However, in contrast with most research of this nature, 
often termed “digital divide” scholarship, equalities of access or training with which to 
make use of access are not central to my account.9 While far from trivial, digital divide 
scholarship can inadvertently reinforce a form of gender essentialism and a masculine-
                                                
7 The Introduction to my dissertation elaborates on these concerns. 
8 Warner, Publics and Counterpublics. 
9 See, for example: Chadwick, Internet Politics: States, Citizens, and New Communication Technologies ; Last Moyo, 
“The Digital Divide: Scarcity, Inequality and Conflict,” in Creeber and Martin, Digital Cultures, 122-138; 
Doug Schuler, “Reports of the Close Relationship between Democracy and the Internet May Have Been 
Exaggerated,” in Jenkins and Thorburn, Democracy and New Media.  
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gendered ideal of public speech, both of which online feminist counter-publicity 
contests.10  
Put otherwise, digital divide literature may lead one to conclude that challenges 
more likely to be visited upon speakers identified as women are best resolved through 
interventions that enable women to speak assertively (that is, “as men”), that make men 
more tolerant of women’s differences (which can make these difference seem natural), or 
simply by increasing women’s “representation” in CMC publics. In practice, feminists—
especially those who identify as women or gender non-conforming—have found 
assertive speech online to be, if anything, a lightning rod for harassment, including 
aggressively bigoted comments, death threats, and the publication of private information, 
such as a home address, termed “doxxing.”11 
 The chapter proceeds as follows: In the Section Two, I discuss feminist history, 
theorizing, and activism around safety and safe spaces. Section Three will familiarize the 
reader with Shakesville and the network of feminist blogs, or the feminist blogosphere, 
of which it is a part and which often shares in the impassioned defense and construction 
of online safe spaces. In Section Four I elaborate my claim that the construction of “safe 
spaces” online constitutes a practice of feminist counter-publicity. Finally, I conclude by 
considering a recurrent critique of such spaces, that they problematically reflect or 
continue a private and apolitical process called “therapy.” 
  
                                                
10 Even as I underscore here the limitations of the digital divide literature to my present analysis, it is 
critical to acknowledge at the same time how important that literature has been to my thinking about 
feminist CMC, including research on gendered and raced disparities between who gets picked up by 
mainstream media and who publishes and participates in online communities. 
11 Phillips, This Is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things. 
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II.  The Politics of Safety in Feminist Praxis 
Looking to histories of feminist activism, the construction of safe spaces online 
is, if not expected, certainly less surprising. Appeals to safety and critiques of its unequal 
availability to formally equal citizens were central to feminist activism to end gendered 
and sexual violence, including the battered women’s and anti-rape movements.12 The 
construction of “safe houses” for victims was and continues to be a key component of 
these movements. 
At the same time, the naming or expectation that other feminist spaces would be 
“safe” has been the subject of substantial feminist critique. Bernice Johnson Reagon’s 
“Coalition Politics: Turning the Century” offers an important early example. In this 
piece, Reagon argues that women’s-only spaces, like the 1981 West Coast Woman’s 
Festival where she gave a speech on “Coalition Politics,” are “not safe” and instead 
“should be a coalition.”13 Reagon’s concern was with appeals to safety being used as a 
cudgel to silence intra-feminist critique in the name of solidarity. Diverse, robust feminist 
community demanded difficult, often uncomfortable conversations about differences—
for example, in race and class—that matter. 
It’s tempting to cordon off these two spaces—safe houses for survivors of 
physical assault, on the one hand, and on the other, feminist spaces which, whether 
physically situated or not are created from and for speech and which give shape to who 
“feminists” are and what they should do. However, to do so obscures shifting meanings 
and emotions associated with safety in these instances.  
                                                
12 Schechter, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of the Battered Women’s Movement. 
13 Bernice Johnson Reagon, “Coalition Politics: Turning the Century,” in Smith, Home Girls: A Black 
Feminist Anthology, 360. 
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Reagon’s critique rests on articulating a link between “safety” in women’s-only 
spaces and uncomplicated, comfortable belonging. In fact, Reagon initially frames safe 
spaces, termed “barred rooms,” as a matter of survival in societies that single out certain 
individuals (figured as members of a “kind”) for violent, untimely death.14 She goes on to 
say, however, that “[t]here is no chance that you can survive by staying inside the barred 
room.”15 Doing so doesn’t alter the conditions that gave rise to the barred rooms and, in 
fact, makes one an easier target by increasing visibility. 
As framed, Reagon’s “barred rooms” facilitate survival by providing spaces apart 
in which to “sift out what people are saying about you and decide who you really are. 
And… construct within yourself and within your community who you would be if you 
were running society.”16 In effect, the barred room is a site of consciousness-raising (C-
R) in which one develops a sense of oneself as political actor facing not isolated 
problems but structural inequalities. 
As with many of her contemporaries who debated to what extent C-R was a form 
of political activism itself or only a necessary precursor, Reagon was concerned with an 
unwillingness to move outward from “barred rooms.” Here it matters that these barred 
rooms were sought as a means of surviving in an oppressive society and, in Reagon’s 
essay, that they are increasingly figured not as barred rooms but as “homes,” comfortable 
spaces in which one finds sustenance figured in terms of maternal nourishment, like “a 
bottle with some milk” and “a nipple.”17  
                                                
14 Reagon, 357-358. 
15 Ibid., 358. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 359. 
 109 
Reagon is in effect tracing the means by which demands for “safety” in the face 
of systemic violence developed into an expectation of comfort. This expectation in turn 
enabled the sidelining of those whose experience of oppression was not fully captured by 
their identity as women, silencing them in the name of an essential and singular group 
unity.18 This is not an unfamiliar critique and it remains an important and often relevant 
one. However, the effectiveness of Reagon’s and others’ re-articulation of “safe spaces” 
in terms of comfortable sites of uncomplicated belonging has become an unhelpful 
truism detached from its development as such, and blind to instances where at times, 
creating safe spaces figured as homes (or that were, in fact, homes) was understood as a 
radical political act.  
bell hooks’ account of Black women’s work to construct “homeplace” in the 
context of racist domination offers an example of the latter.19 hooks argues that in 
finding time and energy to create “safe place[s],” often after laboring in the homes of 
white people, Black women carved out spaces where the dignity of Black people was 
recognized and affirmed. Implicit in hooks’ account is an understanding that having a 
home and being human are entwined imaginaries; those without homes are more likely 
to be seen as animals, brutes, savages.20  
                                                
18 For a historical account written at some distance from these events, see Breines, The Trouble Between Us: 
An Uneasy History of White and Black Women in the Feminist Movement. 
19 bell hooks, “Homeplace (a site of resistance),” in Ritchie and Ronald, Available Means: An Anthology of 
Women's Rhetoric(s), 384. 
20 hooks’ account makes clear that it is white supremacy in the form of slavery, segregation, and 
discrimination that makes Black “home(place)lessness” a reality by co-opting the caregiving labor of, in 
particular, Black women. In turn, this homelessness—detached from an account of where and how the 
caregiving energies of Black women have been co-opted—serves as “proof” of Black people’s status as 
less than fully human. This imaginary continues to function in accounts of the “broken home” of Black 
urban areas, an important point to remember as we move to touch on a final instantiation of the feminist 
activism in the name of safety. 
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Accounts of feminist organizing in the 1960s and 1970s suggests that 
participation in the women’s movement—through C-R groups, marches, feminist 
separatism, etc.—was a means of creating homeplace for women from diverse 
backgrounds.21 Indeed, it was the not unreasonable attachment to these newfound 
homeplaces that has been credited with making it all the more difficult to address 
differences between women.22 
The exception to the “safe space” figured as a site of comfortable belonging has 
been the “safe house” and other activism framed as a response to physical assault. And 
yet, several recent studies—notably Kristin Bumiller’s In an Abusive State: How 
Neoliberalism Appropriated the Feminist Movement Against Sexual Violence, Christina 
Hanhardt’s Safe Space: Gay Neighborhood History and the Politics of Violence, and Emily 
Thuma’s “‘Not a Wedge, But a Bridge’: Prisons, Feminist Activism, and the Politics of 
Gendered Violence, 1968-1987”—have illustrated how feminist activism against rape 
and physical assault targeting women, and gay and lesbian activism against targeted 
assault, have created exclusions similar to those with which Reagon was concerned.23 
Indeed, these more recent accounts paint a stark picture in which the rapist or 
homophobic assailant came to be figured as Black or brown criminals, and those assaulted 
as white, middle- and upper-class citizens.  
                                                
21 See especially Breines, The Trouble Between Us: An Uneasy History of White and Black Women in the Feminist 
Movement, 193-201; Shreve, Women Together, Women Alone: The Legacy of the Consciousness Raising Movement. 
22 Breines, The Trouble Between Us: An Uneasy History of White and Black Women in the Feminist Movement, 193-
201. 
23 Bumiller, In an Abusive State: How Neoliberalism Appropriated the Feminist Movement Against Sexual Violence; 
Emily L. Thuma, “‘Not a Wedge, But a Bridge’: Prisons, Feminist Activism, and the Politics of Gendered 
Violence, 1968-1987” (PhD diss., New York University, 2011); Hanhardt, Safe Space: Gay Neighborhood 
History and the Politics of Violence. 
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Such exclusions were not an immediate or inevitable outcome. The initial 
conception of “safety” advocated by women and queers in the 1960s and early 1970s was 
safety from structural violence supported by the state through police brutality and 
neglect. This created potential for and, in some instances, actual coalitions between 
feminists, gays and lesbians, and other (of course not mutually exclusive) marginalized 
populations, including the poor, Black and other non-white communities, and sex 
workers. 
However, pressure to make targeted assault visible in terms that the state and a 
wider society would recognize and, crucially, fund programs to address, shifted critiques 
away from the state and economic conditions to dangerous streets inhabited by 
presumptively criminal characters.24 In effect, Bumiller and Handhardt argue these 
movements were co-opted by the state, which provided vital funding premised on 
distinguishing between criminals (framed as the product of backward minority cultures 
or individual psychosis) and good citizens who deserve to be safe. Meanwhile, the 
category of “good citizen” remains exclusive in ways that continue to undermine the 
goals of activists. Consider how legal, state-sanctioned responses to sexual assault 
continue to leave ample room for “blaming the victim” should she have been wearing a 
short skirt, working in the sex trade, drinking alcohol, and so on. 
 Uma Narayan’s “Cross Cultural Connections, Border-Crossings, and ‘Death by 
Culture’” illustrates a similar pattern unfolding in U.S. (mis)representations of dowry-
murder in India, which are presented as a function of culture, detached from any account 
of power. The fixation on gendered violence in a distant “elsewhere” stemming from an 
                                                
24 Hanhardt in particular offers a detailed account of the social sciences imbrication in the gay and lesbian 
anti-violence activism. 
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essentially backward culture obscures the persistence of similar gendered violence “at 
home,” namely, the murder of women by intimate partners. We might note two further 
effects of this fixation. First, the “death by culture” explanation facilitates imperialist 
“savior” narratives and policy. Second, it is used to undermine local or domestic feminist 
activism, as when some respond to such activism with pronouncements about the 
“truly” dispossessed women of the world. The latter is not an uncommon response to 
online feminist “safe spaces.” 
As the preceding elaborates, the visceral and isolated (or isolatable) reality of 
physical assault has served as a powerful indictment of inequality; but it can also be used 
to reinforce other inequalities when the safety of some is grounded on racist, classist 
conceptions of good citizens or intractable cultures.25 Recognizing this does not compel 
us to give up on “safety.” On the contrary: while having “safety” might well be an effect 
of power and privilege, feminist critics insist that it should not be.  
In this sense the demand for a “safe space” may be indicative of an expectation 
of comfort that rests on the silencing or exclusion of the relatively disadvantage, but it 
may also serve as an indictment of a society that creates and brutalizes marginalized 
populations and as a reflection of an  impetus to create a new homeplace from which to 
imagine other ways of being. Determining which it is—or to what extent it may be 
both—is not something that can be done in advance. We must instead trace the affects 
and effects of appeals to safety in evaluating their political possibility.  
 
  
                                                
25 Narayan, Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions and Third World Feminisms, 83-117. 
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III:  Shakesville and/in the Feminist Blogosphere 
Broadly understood, the “feminist blogosphere” is a network of personal and 
community blogs that are identified as feminist or feminist-allied, increasingly including 
mainstream outlets with one or more regular feminist contributors.26 Many are also 
described as progressive, queer, and anti-racist. In contrast to personal blogs, which 
feature the work of a single person who identifies as feminist,27 community blogs have 
multiple contributors and typically have both more comments and more traffic.  
This feminist blog network has developed over the past fifteen years coincident 
with the development of “Web 2.0,” or the “social Internet.” Concretely, the feminist 
blogosphere takes shape as one feminist blog connects to another. Connections take a 
variety of forms, but some of the most common include: embedding links to cite a post 
that supports or elaborates some point (in much the same way that academic writing uses 
citations); posting a list of links to “recommended reading”; inviting “guest posts”; 
providing a “blog roll,” or list of recommended blogs; and commenting across sites.28  
As has been noted, a rhetoric of safety is common to many of these sites. Indeed, 
many indicate they are acting politically—even radically—in constructing “safe spaces” 
on the Web. For example, Shakesville’s McEwan writes that the “richness of 
contributions, encouraged by dismantling the disincentives and barriers to participation 
in other spaces, is the radical potential of a safe space.”29 Mia McKenzie of Black Girl  
  
                                                
26 My conclusion elaborates on these distinctions. 
27 See, for example: Fannie’s Room, http://fanniesroom.blogspot.com/(accessed December 17, 2015).  
28 I am in the process of generating/creating a visual representation of this network. 
29 Melissa McEwan, “On Safe Spaces and High-Hoping Fools,” Shakesville, June 11,2009, 
http://www.shakesville.com/2009/06/on-safe-spaces-and-high-hoping-fools.html (accessed September 
13, 2015).  
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Dangerous writes:  
I created this blog as an act of resistance. I created it as a way to reclaim the idea 
of dangerousness in a world that insists that as a black woman I am scary and 
aggressive and angry by default (I am angry, but it is not by default). I created this 
blog as a safe space for queer women of color who are tired of holding their 
tongues so as not to offend non-queer people of color, and white people, queer 
and not queer.30  
 
Others speak of working to “create a space that is safe for the expression of pro-feminist 
ideas”31 or “mak[ing] a safe-R space.”32  
Even when the ideal of a blog as a “safe space” is rejected because it is 
“impossible,” it is rarely without comment or explanation, as with Feministing 
contributor JOS’s call for an “accountable space” in a post titled “There Are No Safe 
Spaces.”33 And in this last case, it is not without contradiction, as Feministing’s 
community standards indicate a commitment to “maintain a progressive and safe 
discourse on the site.”34  
These “safe spaces” are surprisingly fraught, eliciting a range of affectively 
charged responses: hope, anxiety, disappointment, contempt. What do these feminist 
bloggers mean when they speak of their sites in terms of “safe spaces”? Or, put 
otherwise: who or what do they imagine the space to be “safe” from? Who or what is it 
imagined as “safe” for?  
                                                
30 Mia McKenzie, “Resistance is the Secret of Queer Joy,” Black Girl Dangerous, May 25, 2012, 
http://www.blackgirldangerous.org/2012/05/25/20121127resistance-is-the-secret-of-queer-joy/ 
(accessed December 17, 2015).   
31 “Comments Policy,” Feministe, http://www.feministe.us/blog/comments-policy/ (accessed December 
12, 2012).  
32 JenniferP, “Site Policies and FAQs,” Captain Awkward, November 4, 2012, 
http://captainawkward.com/site-policies-and-faqs/  (accessed December 12, 2012).  
33 JOS, “There are No Safe Spaces,” Feministing, August 12, 2009, 
http://feministing.com/2009/08/12/there-are-no-safe-spaces/(accessed December 17, 2015). 
34 “About,” Feministing, http://feministing.com/about/ (accessed October 18, 2013).  
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In answering these questions, I first turn to a close study of Shakesville, whose 
expansion from a personal to community blog generated ample discussion on the topic 
of the blog as a safe space.35 I then elaborate the means by which online feminist safe 
spaces are built. 
 
Shakesville, an Introduction 
Shakesville is an award-winning, well-trafficked community blog, with average 
daily visits numbering above 12,000.36 While its readership is mostly comprised of North 
Americans, Western Europeans, and Australians, the site is visited from people around 
the world.37 Founded in 2004 by Melissa McEwan, a white, U.S. American, college-
educated woman, Shakesville was originally McEwan’s personal blog and named 
“Shakespeare’s Sister.” The blog took on new dimensions and ultimately a new name as, 
McEwan explains, “an entire community of contributors, guest writers, commenters, and 
lurkers grew.”38 McEwan now runs Shakesville as a full-time job, supported by donations 
and paid subscriptions. 
                                                
35 While it is typical for feminist blogs that evolve from personal to community blogs (or otherwise have 
traffic increase or change) to experience conflict over what sort of space the changing site would offer, 
and what that would mean for participants, Shakesville had a particularly fraught transition, which made it 
a fertile ground for discussion of “safe spaces.” One indication of this is the creation of “anti-fan” sites 
from former regular commenters and one contributor, including Drink the Shaker Koolaid 
(http://shakesvillekoolaid.tumblr.com/about); Shakesfail (http://shakesville.tumblr.com/); and an entry in 
the Fail Fandom Wiki (http://failfandomanonwiki.pbworks.com/w/page/58432745/Shakesville). This 
fraught expansion owed, in part, to the make-up of Shakesville’s early audience, a good portion of which 
seems to have identified with “progressive,” but was more dubious of the “feminist” moniker. 
36 Sitemeter, http://www.sitemeter.com/?a=stats&s=sm5lissie (accessed March 14, 2012). More recently, 
McEwan reports over 18,000 page-views (Melissa McEwan, “Fundraiser to Keep Shakesville Going,” 
Shakesville, December 3, 2015, http://www.shakesville.com/2015/12/fundraiser-to-keep-shakesville-
going.html, (accessed December 19, 2015). 
37 Sitemeter. 
38 Melissa McEwan, “Shaxicon,” Shakesville, January 1, 2010, 
http://www.shakesville.com/2010/01/shaxicon.html (accessed December 17, 2015).  
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Daily posts during the week, fall mostly into one of two categories. In the first, 
one finds news-type posts offering critical coverage of mostly U.S. American politics and 
popular culture. When applicable, these posts include or are responded to with details of 
how one might get involved by donating, calling an elected official, and otherwise acting 
to effect change, reflecting support for a broad range of movements for social justice. 
“Traditional” feminist issues, such as combatting efforts to defund Planned Parenthood, 
receive a great deal of coverage;39 but Shakesville contributors frequently ally themselves 
(though not uncritically) with broader left coalitions, including the Occupy movement,40 
as well as narrower coalitions, such as Blogging Against Disablism.41  
The second category of posts—what I have termed “community building and 
support” posts—primarily consist of “open threads,” meaning that they have no set 
matter for discussion. These “open threads” are loosely organized under a variety of 
themes such as “nostalgic” music videos from the 1980s and early 1990s, the “daily dose 
of cute” photo series primarily consisting of photos of pets, and a Friday night “virtual 
pub.” 
A less common category of “meta” posts address the nature of the space the blog 
affords. Here, repeated returns to the ideal of the blog as a “safe” or “safer” space figure 
prominently and typically elicit more comments than Shakesville’s usual fair, including a 
                                                
39 See, for example: Maya Dusenbery, “Attacks on Planned Parenthood are attacks on American Women, 
“Feministing, February 16, 2011, http://feministing.com/2011/02/16/attacks-on-planned-parenthood-are-
attacks-on-american-women/ (accessed December 17, 2015); Irin Carmon, “House Votes to Defund 
Planned Parenthood,” Jezebel, February 18, 2011, http://jezebel.com/#!5764467/house-votes-to-defund-
planned-parenthood (accessed December 17, 2015); and Misty, “Chip, chip, chip…,” Shakesville, January 
31, 2011, http://www.shakesville.com/2011/01/chip-chip-chip.html (accessed December 17, 2015). 
40 Melissa McEwan, “Occupy Everywhere & Economic News Round-Up,” November 1, 2011, 
http://www.shakesville.com/2011/11/occupy-everywhere-economic-news-round.html (accessed 
December 17, 2015).   
41 Melissa McEwan, “BADD: Out of My Closet,” May 1, 2009, 
http://www.shakesville.com/2009/05/badd-out-of-my-closet.html (accessed December 17, 2015).  
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surprising number of contributions from “lurkers,” that is individuals who read but do 
not contribute to the blog.42 The following section takes up “On Safe Spaces and High 
Hoping Fools,” a 2009 post that continues to be linked to regularly, and is described in 
the comment policy as one of five “important pieces to read to understand the culture 
and expectations” at Shakesville.43  
 
Idealizing Safety 
“On Safe Spaces and High Hoping Fools” is an unabashed defense of Shakesville 
figured as a safe space. McEwan opens by asserting that “[t]here are no totally safe 
spaces” and describing her own experience of having been raped in a space presumed 
safe: her childhood home. However, McEwan continues, “[d]espite that, and because of 
that, I’ve tried to make Shakesville as safe a space as is possible, for everyone who 
inhabits it” (author’s emphasis).44 In other words, safe space is an ideal held dear, in part, 
because McEwan’s experience of its failure. McEwan continues: “There is no whole, 
perfect freedom, either, but no one fights for freedomish. The objective serves as 
inspiration to get as close as we can.”45 
McEwan goes on to elaborate what figuring the blog as a safe space means over 
several paragraphs, the first of which espouses a view seemingly compatible with the 
liberal bourgeois ideal, 46 wherein “particulars of the body” do not affect access or the 
                                                
42 It is typical for lurkers to announce a change in this practice by, for example, prefacing a comment with 
“De-lurking to say…” or <de-lurks>. 
43 Melissa McEwan, “Commenting Policy,” Shakesville, January 1, 2010, 
http://www.shakesville.com/2010/01/commenting-policy.html (accessed November 13, 2014). 
44 McEwan, “On Safe Spaces and High-Hoping Fools.”  
45 McEwan, “On Safe Spaces and High-Hoping Fools.” 
46 Warner, Publics and Counterpublics; Warner, The Letters of the Republic; Young, Justice and the Politics of 
Difference, 58-61. 
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ways in which one’s words and actions are evaluated.47 However in situating this ideal as 
part of what a safe space aspires to, McEwan challenges the notion that such an ideal 
could be realized in a space that did not actively work to “ensure that the voice and 
experiences of a disabled trans lesbian of color are as valued as the voice and experiences 
of a straight, cisgender, able-bodied, white male.”48 
McEwan rejects the assertion that a safe space precludes disagreement, but insists 
it does require agreement on a range of practices developed to “dismantl[e]” the 
“disincentives and barriers to participation in other spaces.”49 These disincentives and 
barriers include the use of “slurs,” “silencing strategies (e.g., accusations of hysteria or 
hypersensitivity or humorlessness)” and “the perpetuation of violence, and revisit[ing of] 
violence upon its survivors, by directing its [violence’s] language and images at others.”50 
McEwan similarly rejects the notion that a safe space amounts to a promise of comfort 
or “polite” speech, writing a “safe space doesn’t guarantee freedom from criticism, or 
from mockery of one’s (moribund) ideas or (disgraceful) behavior.”51  
Finally, speaking of her own experience, McEwan suggests the blog as a safe 
space is a site of collective learning, or perhaps more aptly unlearning:  
I am a better person than I once was because people gave me the gift of 
expecting more of me, of setting a higher standard and encouraging me to reach 
for it, of challenging me not to settle into the well-tread grooves of my 
socialization, of admonishing me to reject the vast and varied prejudices and 
myths with which I’d been indoctrinated . . . 
 
                                                






Several commentators pick up on the theme of (un)learning around privilege and even 
the tendency to dismiss the inadequacies of online discourse as irrelevant or, as MollyH 
writes, “eye rolls and ‘pfft, it’s the internet people!’”52 
Throughout, McEwan uses language that deliberately muddles the common 
distinctions between “being” and “harm” in on- versus offline contexts. Participants 
“inhabi[t]” and “congregate” in the space the blog affords. And, as noted above, violence 
has a “language and images” which McEwan figures as both perpetuating worldly 
phenomena of “war, and torture, and sexual assault” and adversely impacting survivors 
of these and other forms of violence. Taken together, McEwan uses the language of 
“safe space” to figure reading and speaking online as embodied practices unfolding 
under conditions of durable structural violence and inequality that has differentially 
shaped those who come to blog.  
 
Constructing “Safe Spaces” Online 
Insofar as these blogs deliver on the promise of a “safe” or “safer” space, it is by 
materializing the ideal through their practices and manipulations of the built design of 
the site. Althusser’s concept of ideology is helpful in making sense of what I mean here 
by “materialization.” Althusser characterizes ideology as “material actions inserted into 
material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological 
apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject.”53 In other words, “ideology” names the 
process through which beliefs about the world are given material form. Analyzing online 
                                                
52 MollyH, comment on McEwan, “On Safe Spaces and High-Hoping Fools.” 
53 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation),” in Lenin and 
Philosophy and Other Essays, quoted in Elizabeth Wingrove, “Interpellating Sex,” Signs 24, no. 4 (Summer 
1999), 876 (emphasis Althusser’s).  
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feminist safe spaces through this lens one finds not only words about safety and 
differentially situated bodies, but tools and practices of regulation, of both the self and 
others. 
 
Everything in Moderation 
The moderation tools that feminists took years to develop on Usenet in the 1980s 
and early 1990s are now a common feature of computer-mediated communication 
platforms like blogs, and labor-intensive moderation practices are a mainstay of online 
feminist safe spaces. Moderators approve or review all comments; delete, edit, or 
otherwise address problematic comments; and ban repeat offenders.54 These moderation 
practices and expectations for commenters are typically detailed in commenting policies, 
which figure prominently on the sites (see Figure 3).  
FIGURE 3: Screenshot from the feminist blog, Feministe, illustrating the prominent 
placement of a comment policy55  
                                                
54 s. e. smith, “Curating Safe(r) Spaces in Comments,” Tiger Beatdown, December 19, 2011, 
http://tigerbeatdown.com/2011/12/19/4277/ (accessed December 17, 2015).  
55 Feministe, http://www.feministe.us/blog/ (Screenshot from March 11, 2014). 
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 Some aspects of these comments policies are unsurprising. For example, they 
consistently refuse to publish comments that traffic in hate speech, threats of violence, 
and bigotry. What is included in these categories can vary and, at many blogs, has 
changed over time, typically in response to readers. More surprising, perhaps, is the not 
uncommon refusal to publish comments from a “devil’s advocate” and rejection of the 
idea that all points of view are valuable, espoused by s. e. smith of Tiger Beatdown: 
I often decline to publish comments... because they don’t add to a conversation 
in a meaningful way and bring the focus of the conversation back on to people 
with privilege... I especially am not interested in entertaining ‘devil’s advocate’ 
arguments, because I find them deeply offensive and they seem to be a favourite 
little trick among some privileged commenters on the Internet.56  
 
Similarly, McEwan writes “we don’t do flamewars with people who treat discussion of 
progressive feminist ideals as an abstract academic exercise or want to play ‘devil’s 
advocate.’”57 Finally, a refusal to “do newbie education on demand,” that is, to explain 
feminist concepts and critiques to those unfamiliar with them is also common.58 
Mockery is also used as a means of shaping exchanges on the site. For example, 
at Feministe, rather than delete a comment, moderators will “fluffinate” it, leaving a 
parody of the original accompanied by a picture of a “Disapproving Giraffe” (see Figure 
4).59 
  
                                                
56 s. e. smith, “Curating Safe(r) Spaces in Comments.” 
57 Melissa McEwan, “Commenting Policy.”  
58 Ibid. 
59 Tigtog, “Moderation Note: Do You See a Need for a Giraffe?” Feministe, February 7, 2013 (updated 
February 2013 and March 20, 2013), http://www.feministe.us/blog/archives/2013/02/07/moderation-
note-do-you-see-a-need-for-a-giraffe/ (accessed December 17, 2015).  
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FIGURE 4: Screenshot of a “fluffinated” comment at Feministe.60 
 
Other sites would “disemvowel” problematic comments or remove all the vowels 
resulting in a string of words that look like nonsense (see Figure 5).  
FIGURE 5: Screenshot of a “disemvoweled” comment at Finally, a Feminism 101 
Blog.61 
Finally, there is a communal aspect to moderation. At minimum, all participants 
are required to familiarize themselves with comment policies and shape their comments 
accordingly. Many sites indicate an expectation that participants educate themselves as 
                                                
60 Jill, “Standing with Adria,” Feministe, March 21, 2013, 
http://www.feministe.us/blog/archives/2013/03/21/standing-with-adria (accessed December 17, 2015). 
61 Disemvoweled troll: dave, July 10, 2011 (5:05a.m.), comment on tigtog, “FAQ: What Do Feminists 
Want?” Finally, a Feminism 101 Blog, March 13, 2007, 
http://finallyfeminism101.wordpress.com/2007/03/13/faq-what-do-feminists-want (accessed December 
17, 2015). “Disemvoweled troll: dave” is also an edit; the user had indicated his name was “dave.” His 
comment likely read as follows before being “disemvoweled”: “FYI…….the time for real male 
empowerment has arrived and it takes the form of –women are too much work, technology is too much 
fun, all expensive items are only for impressing women so forget buying that nonsense (sports cars, gold 
watch etc), porn = freedom from hormones and sexuality starvation, marriage is feminine institution and 
is of no benefit to men and evading it lets you NEVER GROW UP… 
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regards their own privilege and, at sites like Angry Black Woman and Shakesville, likely 
well beyond it via “required reading.”62 While there is no way to enforce that 
commenters undertake this reading before commenting, comments that clearly reflect a 
failure to do so are likely to face criticism and even mockery from moderators and other 
commenters. Readers may also be asked to actively share in shaping the space by calling 
other participants (commenters or contributors) on potentially problematic posts.63 For 
example, commenters at Feministe are asked to submit a comment including “We need a 
giraffe here” to alert moderators of a post they believe does not fit with community 
standards.64  
 
Trigger Warnings and Content Notes 
In addition to moderation practices, “trigger warnings” are a common feature of 
online safe spaces. Trigger warnings are notifications of general categories of content or 
imagery that could elicit a harmful, psychosomatic response in individuals who have 
experienced trauma. As many have noted, individual “triggers” can be deeply 
personalized, including the cologne of a sexual assailant or, for a war veteran, the heavy-
machinery sound that accompanies garbage collection.65 Trigger warnings do not aspire 
                                                
62 “Required Reading,” The Angry Black Woman, http://theangryblackwoman.com/required-reading/, 
(accessed  July 23, 2015); McEwan, “Commenting Policy.”  
63 See, for example, Arkades et al., “‘All In’ Means All of Us,” Shakesville, 9 June 2009, 
http://www.shakesville.com/2009/06/posted-by-arkades-deeky-erica-c.html (accessed December 17, 
2015).   
64 Tigtog, “Moderation Note: Do You See a Need for a Giraffe?”  
65 Roxane Gay, “The Illusion of Safety/The Safety of Illusion,” The Rumpus, August 28, 2012, 
http://therumpus.net/2012/08/the-illusion-of-safetythe-safety-of-illusion/; Jennifer Karady, “Soldiers' 
Stories from Iraq and Afghanistan,” Photographs and Sound Installation, September 25, 2014 – November 
12, 2014, Institute for the Humanities, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan. See also: Gay, Bad 
Feminist.  
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to account for all triggers, but rely on general categories, such as “sexual assault,” 
“transphobia,” or “police violence.” 
Contrary to what much recent mainstream coverage suggests (taken up in 
Chapter Four), feminist bloggers and contributors indicate trigger warnings are not 
primarily intended as a way of avoiding material. Although that is a possible outcome, 
they are intended to give readers information that can better prepare them for content 
that may “trigger” psychosomatic symptoms, including heightened anxiety, flashbacks, 
and fainting. So, for example, Shakesville’s McEwan explains that trigger warnings afford 
readers “the option to assess whether they’re in a state of mind to deal with triggering 
material before they stumble across it.”66 Others mention that where they read a 
potentially triggering piece is of import.  
Using a trigger warning means writing “Trigger Warning,” “Trigger,” “TW,” or 
“Warning” followed by an explanation of what content may be triggering (see Figure 6 
below). These warnings typically appear in the title or at the top of a post—often in bold 
and placed in brackets, or between asterisks—or alongside linked content within a post 
that contains triggering material.  
Comment policies often include a request for commenters to consider whether 
the use of a trigger warning is necessary before posting, and indicate that commenters are 
expected to be responsive to another commenter (or moderator) indicating that have 
been “triggered” by something that was said and not continue in that vein without the 
use of a trigger warning. The use of trigger warnings by commentators may also be 
enforced or modeled by a moderator who edits a comment to add a trigger warning. 
                                                
66 Melissa McEwan, “I Write Letters,” Shakesville, April 13, 2010, http://www.shakesville.com/2010/04/i-
write-letters_13.html (accessed December 17, 2015). 
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FIGURE 6: Screenshot of a “trigger warning” at the feminist blog, Crunk Feminist 
Collective.67 
Many sites, including Shakesville, have opted to replace the language of trigger 
warnings with that of “Content Notes/CN” or “Content Warnings/CW” (see Figure 7). 
This change seems to have been motivated by several things. First, some writers seem to 
have failed to indicate the nature of potentially triggering material, perhaps reflecting 
some confusion about who the trigger warning is “for” (conveying something of the 
author’s state of mind versus conveying information to audience).68 Using the less 
ubiquitous term “content” was thought to prompt the writer to indicate what sort of 





                                                
67 Crunkista, “Memories, Survival and Safety,” Crunk Feminist Collective, August, 27 2012, 
http://www.crunkfeministcollective.com/2012/08/27/memories-survival-and-safety/. 
68 This was the case with Bodies Under Siege (BUS), which has been credited as one of the first sites to 
use trigger warnings. BUS is a Web board founded in 1996 dedicated to recovery-oriented discussion of 
self-harm, but which expanded to include forums for discussion of sexual assault and eating disorders. 
BUS switched to content warnings in the early 2000s. I take up the history of trigger warning’s 
“migrations” in Chapter Four. 
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Figure 7: Screenshot of “content notes” at the feminist blog, Shakesville69 
  
 
Another explanation for the move from “trigger warning” to “content note” or 
“content warning” is that feminist bloggers sought a way to respond to feedback, 
especially from those who experienced psychosomatic triggers, expressing frustration 
with the use of “trigger warning” given the impossibility of identifying and flagging all 
triggers. In other words, they felt it was a promise that could not be fulfilled. Finally, 
content warnings or notes can be read as an effort to flag content associated not only 
                                                
69 Melissa McEwan, “The Friday Blogaround,” Shakesville, October 23, 2015, 
http://www.shakesville.com/2015/10/the-friday-blogaround_23.html.  
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with individual trauma but in addition with what disability scholar Melanie Yergeau terms 
“collective traumas, including, but not limited to, racism, heterocentrism, and ableism.”70  
 
Safe For? Safe From? 
In one sense we could say online feminist safe spaces strive to be “safe for” 
feminist counter-public speech, that is, for public address that anticipates and cultivates 
an audience that is feminist. As Frances Shaw notes in her study of Australian feminist 
bloggers, without these “safe spaces,” anti-feminist speech would dominate.71 And 
indeed we saw this in Chapter Two as feminists struggled to create a Usenet newsgroup 
in which they could address matters of common (feminist) concern. 
Many of the challenges faced by Usenet feminists persist even as the affordances 
of computer-mediated communication have changed. The moderation tools that took 
years for Usenet feminists to develop are now a mainstay of blogging platforms and, as 
discussed above, are central to constructing online safe spaces. Yet feminist bloggers 
remain hemmed in by adherents of both the dominant, libertarian discursive norms of 
CMC and the normative, liberal ideal. 
Running these sites requires a level of expertise with common trolling practices 
aimed at disrupting or derailing conversations. This expertise includes knowledge of 
                                                
70 Melanie Yergeau, “Disable All the Things: On Affect, Metadata, & Audience,” (keynote address, 
Computers and Writing 2014 conference, Washington State University, Pullman, WA, June 6, 2104), 
https://vimeo.com/97721996. 
71 Frances Shaw, “Still ‘Searching for Safety Online’: collective strategies and discursive resistance to 




rhetorical practices common to trolls,72 silencing strategies as well as technical know-how 
(for example being able to identify “sockpuppeting,” which is the practice of using a 
different handle or pseudonym to continue posting after one has been banned or to 
create the appearance that others agree with you). At times it requires a tech-savvy team 
to get the site back up and running after massive, coordinated spamming, hacking, or 
Denial-of-Service attacks.73 
Constructing these safe spaces is a laborious and time-consuming commitment. 
There is every indication that it is often an emotionally draining and sometimes fearful 
one. In describing the costs of running Shakesville as a “safe space” for public feminist 
discourse, McEwan writes: “I get disturbing email. People have come to the door… my 
sense of security is no longer what it was. That’s not a small thing for a survivor of sexual 
assault with post-traumatic stress disorder.”74 In a similar thread, Tiger Beatdown’s s. e. 
smith writes:  
People have sent me my social security number, information about my family 
members, identifying details that make it very clear they know exactly how to find 
me. They have politely provided details of exactly what they’d like to do to me 
and my family, they send me creepy things in the mail...75 
                                                
72 Interestingly, it seems that part of what makes trolls identifiable is the troll’s desire to be identified by 
other trolls who may be viewing or participating in the same comments thread. See: Phillips, This Is Why 
We Can’t Have Nice Things. 
73 Melissa McEwan, “On Labors of Love, Hope, Growing Pains, Gratitude, and Teaspoons,” Shakesville, 
November 17, 2008, http://www.shakesville.com/2008/11/on-labors-of-love-hope-growing-pains.html; 
Melissa McEwan, “Still,” Shakesville, May 21, 2010, http://www.shakesville.com/2010/05/still.html; s. e. 
smith, “On Blogging, Threats, and Silence,” Tiger Beatdown, October 11, 2011, 
http://tigerbeatdown.com/2011/10/11/on-blogging-threats-and-silence/.  
74 McEwan, “On Labors of Love, Hope, Growing Pains, Gratitude, and Teaspoons.” 
75 s. e. smith, “On Blogging, Threats, and Silence.” 
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Flavia Dzodan, also of Tiger Beatdown, sheds some light on “disturbing” and “creepy” 
messages feminist women bloggers,76 receive: 
Let me tell you this: you are going to be called a cunt. Or, like I was, you are 
going to be invited to kill yourself because you are a waste of humanity. You are 
going to be threatened with rape. Your photos, if you happen to be a public 
figure, are going to be distributed as further proof of your ugliness and in a 
baffling case of transitive relation, this supposed ugliness is going to be used as 
proof that your opinion is invalid... If you are a minority (i.e. not White), your 
ethnicity will be generalized and used as a stereotype to qualify your opinion. And 
you will always be a slut and a bitch. Because online, we are all hypersexualized 
bitches who should just know their places and shut up.77 
Contributors at most of these feminist sites have taken breaks from blogging, they have 
seriously considered shutting their blogs down, and many write of feminist bloggers who 
did shut down their sites or withdrew behind a password.   
 
IV.  Constituting and Contesting Authoritative Public Speech Online 
Situating feminist blogging practices in the context of theorizing on publics and 
counter-publics entails attending to the social imaginaries they shape, that is, to how they 
shape participants’ understanding of the world and themselves in it, and of legitimate or 
authoritative public discourse. In doing so I hope to illustrate that the feminist 
                                                
76 There’s a lot of evidence to suggest that women bloggers, even those who are not (openly) feminist, 
receive these sorts of comments routinely. See for example: See for example: Helen Lewis Hasteley, “‘You 
Should Have Your Tongue Ripped Out’: The Reality of Sexist Abuse Online,” November 3, 2011, 
http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/helen-lewis-hasteley/2011/11/comments-rape-abuse-women; 
Vanessa Thorpe and Richard Rogers, “Women Bloggers Call for a Stop to ‘Hateful’ Trolling by 
Misogynist Men,” The Observer, November 5, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/05/women-bloggers-hateful-trolling?CMP=twt_gu; and 
Helen Lewis Hasteley, “On Rape Threats and Internet Trolls, New Statesman, November 6, 2011, 
http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/helen-lewis-hasteley/2011/11/rape-threats-abuse-sex-female. 
77 Flavia Dzodan, “Politics and Gender Imbalance Online: Women Are Not Participating,” Tiger Beatdown, 
September 5, 2011, http://tigerbeatdown.com/2011/09/05/politics-and-gender-imbalance-online-
women-are-not-participating/. 
 130 
blogosphere is engaged in a politics understood as a world-making practice that always 
also arises from the contestation over, or construction of, legitimate authority. 
To begin with, it’s worth briefly noting how odd these digital feminists’ “safe 
spaces” look when contrasted with the liberal ideal of public discourse. Mockery, 
censure, and banning appear strangely punitive when contrasted with existing ideals of 
democratic discourse where, to quote public sphere theorist Jürgen Habermas, “the 
unforced force of the better argument” wins the day. To be sure, Habermas’s account of 
the bourgeois public sphere has been roundly critiqued for failing to sufficiently attend to 
differences in power and access, and otherwise problematically idealizing a moment of 
public discourse.78 And, we might add, that the conditions feminist bloggers are 
operating in are far from ideal. But while we could—and many have—admitted 
moderation as a reasonable response to non-ideal conditions, mockery and other forms 
of disparaging discourse, the refusal to “do newbie education on demand” (itself a rather 
disparaging framing of those unfamiliar with feminist thought), as well as disallowing 
devil’s advocates to have their say, may seem out of hand.79 
 Iris Marion Young’s discussion of public speech in Justice and the Politics of Difference 
gives us a foothold to begin making sense of these practices. Young argues that the ideal 
of the civic public “as impartial and universal,” detached from any one’s particular lived 
experience has been a powerful tool for creating hierarchies of valued public speech. As 
Young explains:  
                                                
78 Goodman, Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment; Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the 
Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” in Calhoun, Habermas 
and the Public Sphere; Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference. 
79 McEwan, “Commenting Policy.” 
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By assuming that reason stands opposed to desire, affectivity, and the body, this 
conception of the civic public excludes bodily and affective aspects of human 
existence. In practice this assumption forces homogeneity upon the civic public, 
excluding from the public those individuals and groups that do not fit the model 
of the rational citizen capable of transcending body and sentiment. This exclusion 
has a twofold bias: the tendency to oppose reason and desire, and the association 
of these traits with kinds of persons.80 
It is this opposition between reason and affect, desire and the body, that has resulted in 
tropes such as the “hysterical woman” and “angry Black woman,” in addition to diverse 
other means of excluding, marginalizing, and disciplining women and others. 
Historically, these exclusions took place at the level of discursive consciousness, a 
term Young borrows from Anthony Giddens to refer to “those aspects of action and 
situation which are either verbalized, founded on explicit verbal formula, or easily 
verbalized” (think: “women are incapable of rational thought”).81 In contemporary liberal 
societies committed to formal equality, Young argues, these exclusions increasingly play 
out at what Giddens terms the levels of practical consciousness and the basic security 
system. The former refers to “habitual, routinized background awareness” (think: 
assumptions about the relationships between poverty and laziness or criminality) and the 
latter to a “basic level of identity security and sense of autonomy” (think: an “instinctive” 
reaction of “that’s unfair” to the mention of affirmative action).82  
The result is a subtler, often unconscious form of exclusion enacted through 
aversion, avoidance, and unintentionally condescending behavior. At the same time,  
the dominant social etiquette often finds it indecorous and tactless to point out 
racial, sexual, age or ablist difference in public... The discomfort and anger of the 
oppressed at this behavior of others towards them therefore remain unspoken if 
                                                
80 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 109. 
81 Ibid., 131. 
82 Ibid. 
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they expect to be included in those public contexts, and not disturb the routines 
by calling attention to forms of interaction. 83  
When someone does speak up, Young continues, they are often “accused of being picky, 
overreacting, making something out of nothing, or of completely misperceiving the 
situation.” In other words, they are “met with denial[s] and powerful gestures of 
silencing” which can leave them “feel[ing] slightly crazy” and disinclined to speak out in 
the future.84 
 Young’s analysis provides insight into typical responses to the marginalizing 
discourse that feminist bloggers receive (and draw attention to) through their practice of 
creating safe spaces. Consider the fact that it is widely accepted in the U.S. that bigoted 
language, hate speech, and rape threats are just a part of Internet discourse. Not a 
desirable part, of course, but a part nonetheless. The general sense is that, while it’s not a 
part that any reasonable person likes or approves of, there is nothing to be done about it 
short of state censorship, which next to no one supports, including feminist bloggers.85 
Finally, this marginalizing discourse is frequently represented as the byproduct of a 
“vocal minority”86 or of Internet trolls just looking to get a rise and thus often framed as 
“unreal.”  
Taken together these characterizations of marginalizing discourse on the Web 
work to re-establish the ideal of public speech as impartial, civil, unaffected, and 
                                                
83 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 134. 
84 Ibid. 
85 One feminist blogger has appealed to a website (Reddit), that has served as a venue for sharing “soft-
core” pornographic images of children and non-consensual pornographic images of women, to discipline 
writing and sharing practices within their communities so as to prevent state intervention. See: Zeynep 
Tufekci, “Free Speech and Power: From Reddit Creeps to anti-Muslim Videos, It’s Not *Just* ‘Free 
Speech,’” Technosociology, October 14, 2012, http://technosociology.org/?p=1135. 
86 Melissa McEwan, “So Here’s What Happened,” Shakesville, March 20, 
2013http://www.shakesville.com/2013/03/so-heres-what-happened.html.  
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disembodied, in contrast to both the uncivil, aggressive prose of an angry few and those 
who would make a mountain out of the molehill that is marginalizing discourse by 
framing it as harmful. The effect is two-fold and somewhat contradictory. On the one 
hand, it appears that marginalizing discourse is not a “real” bar to discourse on the Web 
and that taking it as such is indicative of overreaction or hypersensitivity, both signs of 
illegitimate public speech.87 On the other hand, in granting the pervasive presence of 
non-ideal interlocutors, marginalizing discourse on the Web can be used to devalue 
online public speech and reinforce mainstream media outlets (including their online 
manifestations) as authoritative spaces for “the public’s” appearance.88 
The Telegraph’s Brendan O’Neill’s response to a coordinated effort by women 
bloggers in November 2011 to raise awareness about the misogyny women bloggers and 
commenters disproportionately face online offers an example: 
...the most striking thing about these fragile feminists’ campaign is the way it 
elides very different forms of speech. So the Guardian report lumps 
together “threats of rape”, which are of course serious, with “crude insults” and 
“unstinting ridicule”, which are not that serious. If I had a penny for every time I 
was crudely insulted on the internet, labelled a prick, a toad, a shit, a moron, a 
wide-eyed member of a crazy communist cult, I’d be relatively well-off. For better 
or worse, crudeness is part of the internet experience, and if you don’t like it you 
can always read The Lady instead... 
 
Of course it is true that the standard of discussion on the internet leaves a lot to 
be desired. There is a remarkable amount of incivility and abusiveness on the 
web. But that is no excuse for attempting to turn the internet into the online 
equivalent of a Women’s Institute meeting, where no one ever raises their voice 
or “unstintingly ridicules” another or is crude. I would rather surf a web that 
caters for all, from the clever to the cranky, rather than put up with an internet 
                                                
87 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference. 
88 Miia Kosonen and Hanna-Kaisa Ellonen, “From Ivory Towers to Online Bazaars? The Internet, Social 
Media and Competing Discourses in the Newspaper Industry,” Knowledge Management Research & Practice 8.2 
(June 2010), 135-145. 
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designed according to the needs of a tiny number of peculiarly sensitive female 
bloggers.89 
O’Neill both normalizes marginalizing discourse (“crudeness is part of the internet 
experience”) and distances himself and an unspecified but performed ideal of public 
discourse (“the standard of discussion on the internet leaves a lot to be desired”) from it. 
He presents himself as evidence that one can be unaffected by “crude ridicule,” which 
has been divested of the misogyny that began the campaign (“If I had a penny for every 
time I was crudely insulted on the internet… I’d be relatively well-off”).  
The array of responses to marginalizing discourse that the campaign attempted to 
highlight—its effects, for example, on the emotional and mental wellbeing of women 
bloggers and on their ability or willingness to address a public—is collapsed into a matter 
of preferences (“if you don’t like it…”). The fact that the campaign foregrounded 
marginalizing language directed at authors rather than readers disappears as well (“… you 
can always read The Lady instead”). O’Neill concludes by affirming that the Internet is 
already an equally accessible platform (it “caters for all”) and that the “tiny number” who 
think otherwise are simply “peculiarly sensitive” (note that rape threats—the one thing 
O’Neill admitted as serious—disappear after the first mention).  
In short, O’Neill presents two options: deal with it (that is: be like me, experience 
and engage the Web as I do) or get off the Web. I argue that Shakesville, Tiger 
Beatdown, and more broadly the feminist blogosphere choose or rather construct a third 
                                                
89 Brendan O’Neill, “The Campaign to ‘Stamp Out Misogyny Online’ Echoes Victorian Efforts to Protect 




possibility captured by McEwan’s impolite and aggressively referential prose: “I’ll be over 
here carving out my own space, in the shape of a fat cunt”90 
 
V.  The Feminist Blogosphere as a Counter-public 
In “carving out” these safe spaces on the web, feminist bloggers constitute 
themselves as a counter-public, that is, is a “[space] of circulation in which it is hoped 
that the poiesis of scene-making [or world-constituting power of publics] will be 
transformative, not replicative merely.”91 They offer a different social imaginary, one in 
which arguments detached from particular, embodied persons and an account of power 
(recall the Habermasian ideal where “the unforced force of the better argument” wins 
out) are figured as absurd. Consider the following response to O’Neill’s article from Sady 
Doyle, founder of the feminist blog Tiger Beatdown: 
Ladies! A man has come, to tell you what you can take seriously! Aren’t you 
relieved? 
Anyway. Aside from the blatant self-contradiction—feminists are fragile and 
delicate and weak, so weak they are going to TAKE OVER THE WORLD and 
RULE IT WITH AN IRON FIST—this is actually just, um, stupid. The threats 
and the name-calling aren’t all that terrifically different. Sure, one kind of speech 
is actionable, and the other isn’t. One kind of speech can require action—if it’s 
credible—and the other just requires a use of the “delete” or “block” button. But 
it’s all meant to accomplish the same thing: Making you shut up... 
when you [speak of these things], they call you a whiny little girl who can’t handle 
the Internet. Because, of COURSE multiple chainsaw-rape comments aren’t a big 
deal! They’re just words! Sticks and stones! Suck it up, you big Orwellian diaper 
baby! 
                                                
90 McEwan, “So Here’s What Happened.”. I should note that “fat cunt” is one of the most common 
“responses” McEwan receives because she is a visibly fat woman. 
91 Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, 122. 
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To you, my friends, I say: Fuck that noise. All of this matters. A hostile work 
environment matters. Being afraid of your own in-box matters. Deleting your 
blog because that’s the only way for you to have a normal, non-hate-filled life 
matters. ‘Accepting’ that continual, virulent, hateful misogynist abuse is a pre-
condition for being a lady who talks about thing, or for challenging sexism in any 
way, no matter who you are: That matters.92 
Doyle’s scathing, sarcastic response to O’Neill’s argument construes it as nonsensical 
(“aside from the blatant self-contradiction…”) and “stupid,” and O’Neill himself as, to 
use Young’s words, having “completely misperceive[ed] the situation.” Doyle’s sarcasm 
also indicates that it’s “obvious”—and absurd to think otherwise—that marginalizing 
words harm or powerfully and adversely affect recipients, that this matters, and that its 
mattering is not a sign of weakness or hypersensitivity. Finally, Doyle’s account is also an 
account of power in which it is “obvious” that sexism exists (consider that “Ladies! A 
man has come, to tell you what you can take seriously! Aren’t you relieved?” needs no 
explanation to be read as sarcasm). 
These contests of words (and the imaginaries they construct) happen at more 
micro levels, too, as commenters and moderators enforce the ideal of the blog as a safe 
space. For example, in responding to a post co-authored by several Shakesville 
contributors titled “‘All In’ Means All of Us,” which reiterated that those commenting 
on the blog were expected to participate in making the blog a safe space by attending to 
their own and others’ use of triggering or bigoted language and silencing strategies, 
commenter bluey512 writes: 
[Shakesville is] not an environment conducive to critical thought and debate, 
which is what I generally am looking for on the internet. Apparently, Shakesville 
                                                
92 Sady Doyle, “Why Are You in Such a Bad Mood? #MenCallMeThings Responds!” Tiger Beatdown, 
November 7, 2011, http://tigerbeatdown.com/2011/11/07/why-are-you-in-such-a-bad-mood-
mencallmethings-responds/.  
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is for those who have already decided they agree with Melissa on most 
everything, are not interested in further critical thought or debate on certain 
issues, and simply want leadership and like-minded community.93 
 
Commenting on  Shakesville’s post, “‘All In’ Means All of Us,” one individual insists that 
“the phrase ‘safe space’ should probably be something like ‘non-argumentation zones’ 
rather than impl[ying] that there’s something unsafe about people saying mean things 
about you on the Internet.”94  
In a follow-up comment bluey512 is careful to acknowledge that there are 
inequalities in the world and people who suffer from them. It seems, however, that these 
people—figured by bluey512 as a hypothetical Black population, but above all, as not 
“here,” in the space in question—experience something other than “mere” psychical 
discomfort. Shakesville commenter PizzaDiavola challenges bluey512’s depiction, 
writing: 
I think that in framing this discussion as an abstract, hypothetical discussion, 
you’re forgetting that the specific situation at hand is neither abstract nor 
hypothetical… By choosing to treat the discussion at hand as if it were about a 
hypothetical someone hypothetically and unjustly claiming oppression, you’re 
making this discussion about something that it’s not, and in my eyes, treading 
dangerously close to suggesting that Liss was falsely claiming to be oppressed 
when she specifically said, ‘This triggers me.’ Please remember that we are talking 
about a real person and real actions, right now.95 
 
bluey512 does not return to the thread to respond.  
While bluey512 and dhex’s comments are fairly representative of critiques of safe 
space. It is worth briefly noting another form of critical response: those that are expressly 
                                                
93 bluey512, 10 June 2009 (11:14a.m.), comment on Arkades et al., “‘All In’ Means All of Us.”. 
94 dhex, 11 June 2009 (10:16a.m.), comment on Agi, “From Each According to His Disability,” Who is 
IOZ?, June 10, 2009, http://whoisioz.blogspot.com/2009/06/from-each-according-to-his-
disability.html?showComment=1244647881638#c861389657491516213. The number of threads posted 
on blogs other than Shakesville to discuss Shakesville’s “safe space” is quite surprising. 
95 PizzaDiavola, 10 June 2009 (01:37p.m.), comment on Arkades et al., “‘All In’ Means All of Us.”  
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bigoted (that is, those that play out at the level of discursive consciousness). An 
infamous, deliberately unmoderated post in which McEwan critiques the use of rape 
jokes drew the following comments (this is, incidentally, precisely the type of post that 
would include a “trigger warning,” in this case for sexual violence and threats and fat 
hatred): 
Please die, PLEASE??????????????????????? Fat and Ugly is noway to go through 
life. 
 
The only tragedy is that a bullet didn’t rip through your brainstem after you were 
used for your one and only purpose in this world. You should consider yourself 
lucky that some man finds a hideous troll like yourself rape-able. 
 
whats the difference between a rape joke and raping a woman? the rape joke still 
has intrinsic worth after its been used once.96 
In general, comments like these are simply not permitted at Shakesville and other safe 
spaces; individuals who post comments of this nature are banned and their comments 
removed. It is worth noting, however, that when responded to at all (prior to deletion), 
posts of this nature are met with general disapprobation, including from commenters like 
bluey512 and dhex.97 Indeed, the “reasoned” critical commenter frequently attempts to 
establish their credibility by distinguishing themselves from others (often figured as a 
                                                
96 YOU FAT UGLY POT BELLIED PICKELED PIG, May 11, 2007 (5:11p.m.), Guy Compton, May 
11, 2007 (10:06p.m.), and blew whale April 25, 2011 (5:51a.m.), comments on Melissa McEwan, “Rape Is 
Hilarious,” Shakesville, May 11, 2007, http://shakesville.wordpress.com/2007/05/11/rape-is-hilarious/.   
97 For example: “Throughout your writings you make reference to a need to redefine manhood; I wonder 
if you might explain how or why this might be necessary? You frequently allude to men's boorish 
behavior toward women—to be sure, the examples you give are just ludicrously offensive. I have nothing 
but scorn for men who would grab a woman on a train, for example, or whistle at them. I have very rarely 
seen such behavior, though, and I know a large number of men who would never even consider acting so 
obnoxiously. I wonder if perhaps you are not projecting a couple of semi-civilized idiots’ misogyny onto 
about half the world.” Quoted in Melissa McEwan, “Troll Math and Teaspoons,” Shakesville, August 18, 
2010, http://shakesville.com/2010/08/troll-math-and-teaspoons.html.  
 139 
small minority and/or as trolls) whose behavior is “really” sexist, racist, ablist, etc., 
thereby implying that their behavior is not.  
The distinction between a clearly bigoted commenter and a commenter like 
bluey512 is important in that, while the former is not tolerated, most feminist blogs will 
and do engage the latter, requesting they be attentive to potentially triggering or offensive 
language, confronting and challenging underlying assumptions, directing them to the 
commenting policy and “Feminism 101” readings available on the blog, and explaining 
the reasons behind the commenting policy before taking other action such as banning. 
Sometimes these replies are taken in stride, met with an apology and a commitment to 
improve. Often they are met with (at least some initial) resistance, but it is not 
uncommon to read of a commenter who describes having misstepped when they first 
began commenting in a safe space like Shakesville. 
 
Embodied Strangers 
To understand the political work of feminist safe spaces one must consider them 
as a feminist counter-public practice and thus as a means of structuring discursive 
relations between strangers that challenge dominant discursive norms. Feminist blogs 
like Shakesville can be understood as working to transform public discourse by re-
imagining “appropriate” democratic stranger sensibilities, that is, how the other-equal of 
public address is imagined. Central to this re-imagining is the vulnerable, feeling body 
whose appearance on the scene of public discourse cultivates interdependence, 
distributed agency, and relations of care.  
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Recall the incorporation of content or trigger warnings to provide information to 
readers who are then better positioned to determine the best way to engage material that 
could elicit a debilitating psychosomatic or disabled response.98 Focusing narrowly on 
those who read for or “use” trigger warnings and clarifying often gross misperceptions 
regarding the nature of a trigger and the typical function of trigger warnings, leads 
feminist disability studies scholar Angela Carter to argue for their conceptualization in 
terms of “access.” 
This is an important contribution, but if we remain here, we fall short of a 
counter-public practice. What’s more, one could say that dominant modes of CMC 
publicity are centrally concerned with access tailored to individualized needs or 
preferences by means of technical fixes. Of course, few technical fixes exist that support 
disabled individuals’ access (applications for epileptics are the only thing I was able to 
find). Indeed, when mainstream, feminist-allied blog Jezebel was faced with a “barrage” 
of comments including “rape GIFs,” or short, animated depictions of “violent 
pornography” over several months, it took a public call-out on the part of Jezebel editors 
for its parent company, Gawker Media, to procure a technical fix.99 Nonetheless, my 
point is that one could imagine a technical fix supporting such access, for example, a 
plug-in that scanned text for keywords or categories input by a user and alerted said user 
to their presence.  
                                                
98 Angela Carter, “Teaching with Trauma: Trigger Warnings, Feminism, and Disability Pedagogy,” 
Disability Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (Spring 2015); Yergeau, “Disable All the Things: On Affect, Metadata, 
& Audience,”  
99 Jezebel Staff, “We Have a Rape Gif Problem and Gawker Media Won't Do Anything About It,” Jezebel, 
August 11, 2014, http://jezebel.com/we-have-a-rape-gif-problem-and-gawker-media-wont-do-any-
1619384265 
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I’d like to suggest that trigger warnings—incubated in Web boards for discussion 
of trauma and recovery, adapted by feminist forums, reworked for “crip” blogs centered 
on (dis)ability, and picked up by queer microblogs—be considered a counter-public 
practice, that is, as a collective world-building practice. Discussions of trigger warnings 
that focus narrowly on those who read for them erase the writer who, in voluntarily 
incorporating them, is also “using” trigger warnings. Such discussions likewise obscure  
how writers who use trigger warnings offer not only a vision but also a practice of agency 
as distributed: here, “access” is achieved through the collaboration of writers and readers. 
Moderation tools and their absence or failures (detailed in Chapter Two) offer another 
example of the ways in which feminist counter-public practice online contribute to an 
agency more readily experienced as non-sovereign, embedded in both the human and 
non-human.100 
Considering trigger warnings as a counter-public practice requires that one 
account for their possible effects on both writers and readers, with the latter understood 
to include not only those who actively read for them but also those who might note 
them in passing. As Melanie Yergeau has argued, “trigger warnings… anticipate a disabled 
response, at a guttural and embodied/enminded level. And, more than this, they actively 
decenter normative audience expectations.”101 In anticipating “disabled” responses, the 
writerly practice of including a trigger warnings encourages one to move outside or 
                                                
100 While many would agree the experience of an individual as sovereign agent is theoretically unsound or 
ontologically incoherent, in some ways, the digital revolution offers a more perfect lived, felt experience 
of this form of agency for many. We see this in Chapter Two, where feminists’ articulation of problems 
within ostensibly feminist newsgroups were met with the insistence that users simply needed to use the 
various filters correctly to achieve desired outcomes. The excessive speech of the “unconventional 
woman,” Mark Ethan Smith, which spilled out of its appropriate newsgroup into several general 
newsgroups offered a brief experience to many unfamiliar with it of the ways filters might utterly fail to 
achieve desired outcomes. More on this in Chapter Four. 
101 Yergeau, “Disable All the Things: On Affect, Metadata, & Audience.” 
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beyond one’s own experience of trauma, or lack thereof. Such moves are supported by 
recommended reading that broadens the scope and content of “common knowledge.”  
In these ways, trigger warnings cultivate relations of care and obligation between 
a writer and her public premised on recognition of vulnerability and situated 
embodiment, or what Judith Butler has termed the “social ontology” of the body. Butler 
elaborates: “to be a body is to be exposed to social crafting and form… In other words, 
the body is exposed to socially and politically articulated forces as well as to claims of 
sociality—including language, work, and desire—that make possible the body’s persisting 
and flourishing.”102 “Caring” under these conditions requires writers to pause and reflect 
on the possible effects of their words given the persistence of inequality of differentially 
situated and embodied readers. Indeed, as a writerly practice, the fact that one can 
anticipate certain things as potentially triggering, such as a graphic account of sexual 
assault, turns on an understanding of the connection between the events graphically 
depicted and structural violence and inequality.103 
This decentering of a normative audience has also affected “normal” readers who 
do not read for trigger warnings. For example, commenting in response to a mainstream, 
feminist-allied blog post on the topic of trigger warnings, Jules writes: 
I am in favor of trigger warnings. I am not a survivor of rape or any other 
typically-triggering experience, but seeing the trigger warning often reminds me 
that the freedom I have to not be triggered by graphic material is a privilege. It 
reinforces the pervasive nature of trauma and raises my level of empathy/ 
consideration for those who have survived sexual assaults /domestic violence, 
etc.  
 
                                                
102 Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?, 3.  
103 As many have noted, any one individual’s “triggers” can be deeply personalized, including the cologne 
of an sexual assailant or, for a war veteran, the sound of garbage collection 
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It takes me only a second to read the words ‘trigger warning’ but the lessons 
about the nature of PTSD are more lasting, and it reminds me that there are 
people out there reading the same thing I am reading for whom THIS IS 
PERSONAL.104 
 
More typically, and perhaps especially at first, trigger warnings are met with resistance by 
“normal” readers.105 I do not dwell on this reader here, as she is central to the following 
chapter.106  
 
Writing the Body 
Aside from practices premised on a vision of strangers addressed as vulnerable 
and embodied, the vulnerably body is performed through accounts of embodied, 
affective responses to things read or written. For example, in a post discussing the 
relationship between a past trauma and present-day fatigue and depression (and, 
implicitly, the relevance of both these things for public discussion), Tiger Beatdown’s 
Flavia Dzodan writes: “I sit here typing and deleting, typing and deleting, again, another 
try… I take a breath and I type.”107 CMC adaptations of the theatrical genre, which 
                                                
104 Jules, comment on Amanda Hess, “Trigger Warnings and Being an Asshole,” The Sexist (The Washington 
City Paper blog), April 16 2010, http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/sexist/2010/04/16/trigger-
warnings-and-being-an-asshole/ (accessed December 17, 2015).  
105 I was certainly one of these readers and can speak from personal experience of having been irritated by 
trigger and content warnings when I began regularly reading feminist blogs. I have come to experience 
them as specialized, user-created “tags,” not unlike the ubiquitous “NSFW,” an acronym for “Not Safe 
for Work” indicating that material that follows or is linked to contains graphic imagery and/or sound that 
may draw unwanted (especially supervisory) attention in the workplace. 
106 For those unfamiliar, “tags” are a standard aspect of many social media platforms used to organize 
content, usually appearing at the end of a post. On blogs, tags make posts easier to find and link (literally 
hyperlink) to others that are likewise tagged. So, for example, a political blogger might tag posts with 
“Republican primary” or “global warning,” as relevant. Interested readers could click on the tag at the end 
of the post to find other posts offered on the subject. 
107 Flavia Dzodan, “Here I Am. Fatigue, Depression and Infertility,” Tiger Beatdown, February 27, 2013, 
http://tigerbeatdown.com/2013/02/27/here-i-am-fatigue-depression-and-sterility/.  
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indicate what players are doing while speaking, also serve as signposts of the vulnerable, 
feeling body. So, for example, contributors  “*cringe*” and “<seethes>.” 
I say “she” not because these digital feminist sites are only “populated” by 
women (it is not uncommon for participants to identify as a cisgendered man, as 
genderqueer or trans*) but because, as elsewhere, gender does work in making sense of 
bodies and expectations of their capacities and it is the vulnerable, feeling body that has 
been figured as a woman.108 However, in contrast to its historical use,109 the vulnerable, 
feeling body is not that of an absolute Other, but is figured as the self or the other-equal 
of democratic discourse. In short, embodiment that renders one vulnerable and that 
might elicit strong feelings becomes the norm—it is the expected “condition” of 
strangers— though the particular form vulnerability may take cannot be known in 
advance. It is neither synonymous with victimhood nor an indicator of less valued public 
speech. This embodied public speaker challenges the idealization of the independent 
speech-actor whose obligation to strangers begins and ends with good intentions, as in 
the liberal, bourgeois norm, or who has no obligation to strangers addressed, as is the 
case with those committed to a libertarian model of unregulated public speech. 
 
  
                                                
108 Joan Scott, “Gender as a Useful Category of Analysis,” American Historical Review 91, no. 5 (December 
1986); Scott, Gender and the Politics of History. 
109 For example, it is well documented that this imagined body—figured symbolically as the nation, or the 
white, colonial woman who was thought to be an irresistible object of desire of colonized men—has been 
hailed in speech and writing in order to motivate and legitimize the policing and delimiting of proper 
realms of actions for a whole range of sub-equals: Black Americans, colonized populations, and even the 
women (white and otherwise) whose imagined bodies served as the grounds for such policing. See: Enloe, 
Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics; Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial 
Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule. 
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Contemptible Speakers 
Crucial to the feminist counter-public practice is the appropriation of affective 
stances associated with dominance via the acceptance, even promotion, of mockery, 
sarcasm, and other disparaging discourse in the feminist blogosphere. Recall that Young 
notes the use of aversion and condescension to subtly establish hierarchies of valued 
speech in contemporary liberal societies. Similarly, Don Herzog’s study of public 
discourse and conservatism in early nineteenth-century England suggests contempt 
reflects an “an account of high and low” and was used to reinforce but also to upset 
existing hierarchies.110 Simply put, “whoever served as an object of contempt could 
constitute the lower orders and whoever got away with expressing contempt could 
constitute the upper orders;” the former were marked as illegitimate public speakers, the 
latter as legitimate, authoritative.111  
Mockery, contempt, and dismissive sarcasm function similarly in these feminist 
blogs to delimit legitimate public speakers. Of course these are contested demarcations; 
recall O’Neill’s (shall we say contemptuous?) framing of feminist bloggers as “fragile” 
and “peculiarly sensitive.” Regardless, by mocking, by stating that they’re “not offended, 
[they’re] contemptuous,”112 or that they’re “quite comfortable with making privileged 
people uncomfortable”113 on their blogs, feminist bloggers adopt affective stances 
                                                
110 Don Herzog, Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders, 235. 
111 Ibid, 245. 
112 Melissa McEwan, “Say It with Me Now,” Shakesville, January 8, 2013, 
http://www.shakesville.com/2013/01/say-it-with-me-now.html; Melissa McEwan, “Remember…” 
Shakesville, August 26, 2009, http://www.shakesville.com/2009/08/remember.html.  
113 s. e. smith, “Curating Safe(r) Spaces in Comments.” 
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associated with authority and legitimate public speakers.114 They also invite others—
strangers—“to get the joke,” to join them in being “contemptuous” rather than 
offended.115  
 
VII.  Conclusion, or: Is This Therapy? 
I have argued that feminist “safe spaces” on the Web should be understood as 
part of a practice of counter-publicity that challenges dominant ideals of public speech 
that effectively silence and exclude marginalized groups, including but not limited to 
women. Central to this practice (and the motivation for it) is a care and attention to the 
varied ways in which systemic inequalities are embedded in language, which in turn 
shapes one’s experience of the body and the world. The body which can and has been 
harmed, and which can and has been made grounds for dismissal, exclusion, silencing, 
and violence, centers and authorizes feminist bloggers’ construction of safe spaces.  
Recalling that a rhetoric of “safe spaces” is by no means new to feminist theory 
or practice, and likewise that it has a troubled history, and the now powerful association 
between “safe spaces” and comfortable, therapeutic, and otherwise politically 
unproductive spaces,116 we must yet ask: Are feminist blogging communities like 
Shakesville and Tiger Beatdown akin to the “safe spaces” Reagon speaks of? Are 
                                                
114 This may explain, in part, why feminist bloggers routinely receive bigoted, hateful invective; as Herzog 
puts it: “One is angry at a rough equal, not a patent inferior” (Herzog, Poisoning the Minds of the Lower 
Orders, 236). 
115 McEwan, “Remember…”  
116 For example, the language and troubling of “safe spaces” are ubiquitous in pedagogical studies. See for 
example: Kim Hackford-Peer, “In the Name of Safety: Discursive Positionings of Queer Youth,” Studies 
in Philosophy and Education 29, no. 6 (November 2010), 541-556; Kyoko Kishimoto and Mumbi Mwangi, 
“Critiquing the Rhetoric of ‘Safety’ in Feminist Pedagogy: Women of Color Offering an Account of 
Ourselves,” Feminist Teacher19, no. 2 (2009), 87-102; Barbara S. Stengel, “The Complex Case of Fear and 
Safe Space,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 29, no. 6 (November 2010), 523-540; Lisa Weems, “From 
‘Home’ to ‘Camp’: Theorizing the Space of Safety,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 29, no. 6 (November 
2010), 557-568. 
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participants opting out of the real work of politics or, at best, immersing themselves in 
pre-political preparation for that real work? I would say yes and no; that is: “yes” to the 
first question and “no” to the second. 
Feeling welcome, wanted in the conversation, and free—even encouraged—to 
write frankly of (often lived experiences of) marginalization in a public venue certainly 
seems to offer a source of nourishment and support like that associated with Reagon’s 
“barred rooms.” And indeed, it is not uncommon for contributors to liken feminist blogs 
to havens, refuges, and homes.117 The sites also provide spaces in which participants 
figure out who they are and what they want society to be, similar to C-R groups before 
them, and perhaps also to the therapeutic encounters that Nancy Luxon has recently 
suggested are sites of political education.118 Some CMC participants first come to 
understand themselves as feminists by engaging on the blogs; for others, what it means 
to be and act as a feminist may change. For example, Shakesville commenter, “mcheg,” 
writes: 
this morning I came to realize that what you all do here is not confined to this 
space. I realised that though I may not contribute here, you have changed the way 
I contribute in the world. Your impact goes so far beyond this safe space. I 
wanted you to know that, BECAUSE of the way I see this community move 
through the world, I started to move through it differently. I speak up when I 
see/hear hurtful speech and behavior more often, In spaces that are certainly not 
safe. I guess you should just know that what you have taken on in creating this 
safe space, goes so much farther than you may ever know.119 
So, yes, there is likeness between the safe spaces of feminist blogs and those Reagon 
spoke of as “barred” against an inhospitable world. 
                                                
117 Graham, 9 June 2009 (4:26p.m.), comment on Arkades et al., “‘All In’ Means All of Us.” ; McEwan, 
“Commenting Policy.” 
118 Luxon, Crisis of Authority: Politics, Trust, and Truth-telling in Freud and Foucault. 
119 mcheg, 10 June 2009 (8:43a.m.), comment on Arkades et al., “‘All In’ Means All of Us.” 
 148 
Despite this similarity, I think one would be mistaken to see these sites as 
apolitical or merely pre-political. Here we might recall hooks’ account of the home-
making as a political act in contexts where homespace is both denied and taken as 
indicative of one’s lesser status. But we must also consider the different “spaces” at play. 
While it is possible to construct a blog like a barred room by requiring a password, this is 
not how feminist community blogs like Shakesville operate. On these blogs, feminists 
address strangers as feminists and invite them—but ultimately compel participants—to 
adopt their counter-public stance. 
What’s more, fraught discussions of what sort of space feminist blogs like 
Shakesville would offer as they transitioned from personal to community blogs indicates 
that what was meant by safe(r) spaces—who would be safe, what or who they would be 
safe from, and what this would mean for participants—is not clear or “given” by any 
pre-determined set of characteristics. Instead, it developed over time, in and through 
exchanges on the blogs.  
Consider, for example, that McEwan and other Shakers made regular use of the 
word “lame” in first several years that Shakesville was up and running (there were lots of 
references to “John McLame,” for example). The term was only designated “off-limits” 
after Shakers contacted McEwan expressing that they found the word ablist and 
marginalizing. In subsequent years anti-ableism become a far more visible dimension of 
the blog. For example, Shakesville has participated or advocated participation in BADD: 
Blogging Against Disablism Day since 2009 and, in 2010, the “Today in Disablism” 
 149 
series was introduced.120 As a result of this and similar changes, a not insignificant 
number of individuals who previously identified as Shakers “departed” or were expelled 
from the blog after refusing the terms under which public speech could appear in its 
“safe space.” Indeed, many of the most vociferous critics of Shakesville’s increasingly 
inclusive (in one sense)—but also undoubtedly more rigid and demanding—commenting 
policy were former regulars on the blog. 
It’s quite natural—that is, I think it’s built into a dominant ideal of good public 
speech and writing—to read the above account of ablist language and look at these sites 
and not see political action, to see instead something like hysterics splitting hairs, cloying 
sentimentality, or perhaps therapy. But doing so fails to make sense of the strange mix of 
vulnerable bodies and strong words that are fixtures of these sites.  
To paint them as spaces of the uniquely sensitive individuals obscures their 
claim—at times delivered in a stridently unsympathetic reference to “fee-fees” (feelings) 
and “male tears”121—that their practices aren’t about feeling good or comfortable, but 
about justice and the pervasive, often banal inequalities that differentially shape life 
outcomes. Indeed, in the account that opens this chapter, McEwan recasts the miffed 
correspondent who wrote a lengthy complaint following being banned as oversensitive. 
That these representations of abrasive humor generally fail to appear in mainstream 
                                                
120 For example, McEwan and other Shakers made regular use of the word “lame” in first couple years 
that Shakesville was up and running (lots of references to “John McLame,” for example). The term was 
designated off-limits after a Shaker wrote to McEwan expressing that it was ablist. In subsequent years 
(dis)ableism has become a recurring topic on the blog. The category “Today in Disablism” was begun in 
2010, during which time there were 20 posts tagged under it. Through November 1, 2011, there have 
been 19 posts tagged “Today in Disablism.”  
121 The Feminist microblog Misandry, offers a great example. Misandry uses GIFs (short, animated 
graphics) to parody the notion that feminism advocates the hatred and persecution of men and mock 
readers who write in expressing their discomfort with, or sense of being “picked on” by, feminist analyses. 
At the same time, the microblog uses content notes to alert readers to ableism and cis-sexism, among 
other things, when the authors deem such alerts to be appropriate. See: http://male-tears.tumblr.com/.  
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representations—or are taken literally as proof that feminists are “man haters” (which of 
course overlooks the many feminists who are men)—is political and part of a long-term 
resistance to visible feminist publicity online, as my second chapter illustrated.  
In arguing that online feminist “safe spaces” and the practices they engender 
constitute a practice of counter-publicity aimed at refiguring authoritative public address, 
my objective is not to figure “safe spaces” as the solution to exclusionary practices of 
publicity. Indeed, contestation within the feminist blogosphere over the “reasonable” 
scope and expectation of “safety” illustrates that the political stakes go all the way 
down. What’s more, taking seriously the ways imagined public spaces and public 
selves shape expectations, practices, and the built design of different sites means that 
the physical  reality of, for example, a psychosomatic response to “triggering” 
language is a secondary, rather than primary focus of my research. Put otherwise, my 
claim is that the trigger warning do work regardless of whether a reader is enabled, 
through its inclusion, to avoid a harmful psychosomatic response. That said, we can 
(and I do, in the following chapter), argue that figuring the public self as embodied, 
vulnerable, and entangled in relations of obligations to the strangers addressed, is a 
politically productive imaginary for those invested in a democratic citizenry that cares 









ON ‘TRIGGER WARNINGS’: TOUGH SUBJECTS, REVOLTING SUBJECTS,  
AND THE PUBLICIZATION OF STRUCTURAL HARM 
 
I.  Introduction  
In recent years, trigger warnings—used to notify readers of content that may 
elicit or “trigger” an adverse psychosomatic response and discussed in Chapter Three as 
part of feminist counter-public practice online—have traveled beyond the social media 
contexts in which they developed.1 Mainstream feminist blogger Amanda Marcotte 
dubbed 2013 “the year of the trigger warning” after well-known television producer 
Shonda Rhimes tweeted agreement with fans indicating a trigger warning would have 
been appropriate before an episode of Scandal including a rape scene.2 In point of fact, 
                                                
1 Trigger warnings have hardly remained unchanged in social media contexts, as Chapter Three elaborates. 
It appears that their first migration was from Internet forums intended for the discussion of trauma, 
disorder, and recovery. Bodies Under Siege (BUS), a web board founded in 1996 dedicated to recovery-
oriented discussion of self-harm but which expanded to include forums for discussion of sexual assault 
and eating disorders, has been cited as one of the first to use trigger warnings. Whether feminist bloggers 
initially adopted trigger warnings in response to requests from readers, or those blogging brought this 
practice with them from forums like BUS is unclear, but one can find them being used on Ms. Magazine 
message board in the late 1990s, when participants discussed sexual assault. By the early to mid-2000s, 
one can find trigger warnings used without explanation on online feminist safe space, and by 2010 
feminists’ use of trigger warnings was common enough to draw attention—and critique—from anti-
feminist Susannah Breslin. See: Amanda Hess, “Trigger Warnings and Being an Asshole,” April 16, 2010, 
The Sexist,http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/sexist/2010/04/16/trigger-warnings-and-being-
an-asshole/; Susannah Breslin, “Trigger Warning: This Blog Post May Freak You the F*** Out,” 
True/Slant, April 13, 2010, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150510014919/http://trueslant.com/susannahbreslin/2010/04/13/trig
ger-warning-this-blog-post-may-freak-you-the-f-out/. 
2 Amanda Marcotte, “The Year of the Trigger Warning,” Slate, December 30, 2013, 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2013/12/30/trigger_warnings_from_the_feminist_blogosphere
_to_shonda_rhimes_in_2013.html. Tweet available at: 
https://twitter.com/shondarhimes/status/402575982302740480.  
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Rhimes and her fans were speaking of the use (or creative misuse) of the TV parental 
guidelines advising “viewer discretion.” What was striking was Rhimes’ ready recognition 
and use of the term “trigger warning,” which Marcotte suggested marked its admission as 
a “mainstream concept,” even as she notes she does not use them herself and predicted 
“that most people will end up tuning them out.”3  
Recent responses to the prospect of trigger warnings appearing in the classroom 
via student request or university policy—generating ample discussion both amongst 
academics and of academia—suggest Marcotte’s prediction was hasty. Those taking issue 
with trigger warnings argue they have a deadening or “chilling effect” on discussion, and 
cultivate demanding yet intellectually and emotionally enfeebled students and readers.4 
Proponents have suggested trigger warnings can be helpful “tools” that enable students 
and others to engage challenging material, cultivate empathy, and incite or improve 
discussion. 
                                                
3 Marcotte, “The Year of the Trigger Warning.” Though a feminist blogger, Marcotte’s dismissive stance 
on trigger warnings is not entirely surprising. See my conclusion for more on Marcotte and differences 
between the “safe spaces” of feminist blogging and mainstream online feminisms. 
4 American Association of University Professors, “On Trigger Warnings,” American Association of University 
Professors, August 2014, http://www.aaup.org/report/trigger-warnings; Jack Halberstam, “You Are 
Triggering Me! The Neo-Liberal Rhetoric of Harm, Danger and Trauma,” Bully Bloggers, July 5, 2014, 
https://bullybloggers.wordpress.com/2014/07/05/you-are-triggering-me-the-neo-liberal-rhetoric-of-
harm-danger-and-trauma/; Jenny Jarvie, “Trigger Happy,” New Republic, March 3, 2014, 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/116842/trigger-warnings-have-spread-blogs-college-classes-thats-
bad; Laura Kipnis, “Sexual Paranoia Strikes Academe,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, September 27, 
2015,  https://chronicle.com/article/Sexual-Paranoia-Strikes/190351/; Greg Lukianoff, “The Coddling 
of the American Mind,” The Atlantic, September 2015, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-american-mind/399356/; 
Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt, “The Backstory to ‘The Coddling of the American Mind’,” The 
Atlantic, September 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/greg-lukianoffs-
story/399359/; Richard J. McNally, “Hazards Ahead: The Problem With Trigger Warnings, According to 
the Research,” Pacific Standard Magazine, May 20, 2014, http://www.psmag.com/health-and-
behavior/hazards-ahead-problem-trigger-warnings-according-research-81946; Jennifer Medina, “Warning: 
The Literary Canon Could Make Students Squirm,” The New York Times, May 17, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/us/warning-the-literary-canon-could-make-students-
squirm.html?_r=1; Edward Schlosser, “I’m a Liberal Professor, and My Liberal Students Terrify Me,” 
Vox, June 3, 2015, http://www.vox.com/2015/6/3/8706323/college-professor-afraid. 
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This chapter takes the recent migration of “trigger warnings” as an inroad for 
exploring broader reception to the vision and practice of what I earlier introduced as a 
“feminized” democratic subject. I argue that how stories of the current “crisis” associated 
with trigger warnings get told—how trigger warnings work in the framing of who “we” 
are and what is befalling “us” today—are illustrative of a broad and viscerally felt 
attachment to a modern or even hyper-modern subject. Drawing from Sara Ahmed’s 
work on the “feeling of structure,” I argue that those advocating for trigger warnings 
appear on the scene of broader public discourse as “killjoys.”5 As such, they threaten the 
positive affect that signals “fitting” participants in online speech, classrooms, and 
politics, which also keep us affectively attached to—delighted by, admiring of, desirous 
of mimicking—resilient, adaptive, “tough” subjects not unlike those incited by neoliberal 
discourse.  
 I conclude by staging an encounter with contemporary theorists who envision 
affirming, ethical self-cultivation as a means to dethrone what Stephen White terms 
modernity’s “Teflon subject.” I propose that online feminists cultivate a democratic 
subject not unlike that which recent political theory has sought to cultivate via affirming 
visions of ethical life. Yet her reception suggests potential challenges for those 
advocating affirmative ethics as the means by which we might arrive at more generous 




                                                
5 Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness. 
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II.  Trigger Warnings Go Traveling 
For the most part, the popular response to the migration of trigger warnings 
beyond marginal social media contexts has been critical. Those taking issue with TWs 
and in particular their spread beyond marginal websites express concern that the 
warnings amount to “coddling,” which will have a deadening effect on public 
discussion.6 Often, after correctly noting that—and here I quote from recent critic, Jenny 
Jarvie of New Republic—“[w]e cannot anticipate every potential trigger,” they move to 
assert that there is thus “no rational basis for applying” them at all.7  
What’s more, those who want or might benefit from trigger warnings are 
represented as oversensitive, fragile, and committed to remaining so rather than moving 
beyond a past trauma. Indeed, it is common for critics to explain that the “proper” way 
to recover from trauma is through exposure, which is figured as incompatible with the 
use of trigger warnings.8 These critiques share in failing to discuss how trigger warnings 
function in the feminist blogs they generally (and somewhat mistakenly) credit with 
creating.9 They likewise rarely if ever offer a discussion of how trigger warnings function 
in classrooms, where they have been used voluntarily by some faculty for at least several 
years.10 In place of these histories of actual practice, trigger warnings are termed or 
                                                
6 Greg Lukianoff, “The Coddling of the American Mind.”  
7 Jenny Jarvie, “Trigger Happy.”  
8 Lukianoff and Haidt, “The Backstory to ‘The Coddling of the American Mind’”; McNally, “Hazards 
Ahead: The Problem With Trigger Warnings, According to the Research.” 
9 See Footnote 1. 
10 Ruxandra Looft, “How Do Trigger Warnings Fit into the Classroom Lesson Plan?” Shakesville, February 
12, 2013, http://www.shakesville.com/2013/02/how-do-trigger-warnings-fit-into.html.  
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clustered with a “new P.C.,” or political correctness, that includes the language of 
microaggressions.11 
There are, undoubtedly, relevant connections between trigger warnings and the 
wide range of issues grouped under the terms “political correctness,” including 
representations of diversity in the academy (as it pertains to students and teachers, the 
research foci of departments, or classroom materials), how to speak across politicized 
identities, accommodating individuals with disabilities after the Americans with 
Disabilities Act passed, and critiques and activism to regulate or suppress pornography. 
In narratives of trigger warnings, most of these “old P.C.” issues are depicted as having 
died a well-deserved death in the 1990s (or at least ceased to take center stage), and those 
that are not are no longer classed as a form of political correctness (e.g., accommodation 
to disability).12 In characterizing trigger warnings as a new P.C., authors prime one to 
read for dead ideas and indeed, inherently dead-end ideas. 
The criticism arising in response to the trigger warning’s migration has created 
strange bedfellows: liberals dedicated to free and civil debate, libertarians committed to 
unregulated speech, and feminist and queer theorists concerned with neoliberal co-
optation have found common cause in denouncing the practice. There are differences 
across these critiques, notably the feminist and queer concern with a neoliberal 
propensity to individuate structural violence and constitute all actors as consumers (in 
this case, students are thought to be at risk of becoming consumers of universities, 
                                                
11 “Microaggressions” refers to the subtle means by hierarchies of value reproduced through interpersonal 
interactions (as when a person of color is asked where they’re “really” from). 
12 Melanie Yergeau, “Disable All the Things: On Affect, Metadata, & Audience,” (keynote address, 




“shopping” for an experience that will never be uncomfortable). Nonetheless, the 
commonalities bear examination. Below, I elaborate on critical responses to trigger 
warnings found in Jonathan Chait’s “classic liberal” (his characterization) article in New 
York Magazine and feminist and queer theorist Jack Halberstam’s polemical blog on the 
topic.  
 
Real Victims: The Shrinking Space for (Jonathan Chait’s) Ideas 
Jonathan Chait’s “Not a Very P.C. Thing to Say” (2015) nicely illustrates some of 
the ways by which mainstream critiques of trigger warnings proceed. Consider the 
following passage introducing both trigger warnings and microaggressions: 
At a growing number of campuses, professors now attach “trigger warnings” to 
texts that may upset students, and there is a campaign to eradicate 
“microaggressions,” or small social slights that might cause searing trauma. These 
newly fashionable terms merely repackage a central tenet of the first P.C. 
movement: that people should be expected to treat even faintly unpleasant ideas 
or behaviors as full-scale offenses.  
 
Chait does not offer an example of a trigger warning or describe how it might be used. 
His explanation for why warnings are being “attach[ed] to texts”— because they “may 
upset students”—invites the reader to consider the seemingly limitless material that 
might upset, mischaracterizing and trivializing what those who use trigger warnings argue 
is at stake.  
Similarly, microaggressions defined as “small social slights that might cause 
searing trauma” fails to provide an adequate definition; but juxtaposing “small social 
slights” with “searing trauma” nonetheless conveys that the language of 
microaggressions is premised on a drastic imbalance between cause and effect. Detached 
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from any account of structural inequality and its reproduction, one might well summon 
to mind an isolated occasion where one was not invited out for drinks by co-workers or 
a romantic partner who failed to notice a new haircut.  
The repeated framing of trigger warning and other P.C. speech practices as the 
overreactions or the disordered reaction of those who cannot see the obvious disparity 
between “small… slights” and “searing trauma,” the “faintly unpleasant” and “full-scale 
offens[ive],” traffics in gendered tropes of the hysteric touched on in Chapter Three. 
What’s more, collective speech practices voluntarily adopted in many spaces and recently 
advocated for in new spaces are refigured as unreasonable restraints or impositions, in 
the form of “expect[ations],” on a “people” that includes Chait and his (imagined) 
reader, but not those to whom he attributes these expectations. As a result, those who 
read for trigger warnings are depicted as dependent on a people who have no such 
dependencies themselves.  
As with most mainstream writing on the subject, Chait’s account of trigger 
warning hinges on his reader not “getting it,” on making the language of “trigger 
warnings” and “microaggressions” utterly alien. Chait’s prose works to achieve this end 
by introducing, but under-explaining, new terminology and practices, and “over-
explaining” how one is ought to regard the new, but functionally empty terms.  
 
The Queer Resilience of Jack Halberstam 
Where Chait sees trigger warnings as the return of “P.C. culture” and an 
alarmingly resurgent and cohesive radical left, feminist and queer theorist Jack 
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Halberstam* sees a rhetoric that divides and undermines just such a movement. In her∗ 
polemical blog post on the topic, “You Are Triggering Me! The Neo-Liberal Rhetoric of 
Harm, Danger and Trauma,” Halberstam, like Chait, characterizes trigger warnings—
alongside physical safe spaces, especially those for LGBTQ youth, and criticism directed 
towards the “appropriation” of bigoted slurs—as indicative of the “re-emergence” of the 
language and practices of an earlier (1980s, early 1990s) political left.  
Unlike Chait, Halberstam does not associate this moment with the political 
correctness of a frightening, illiberal left, but with a feminism increasingly divided against 
itself. Where Chait suggests Bill Clinton’s successful bid for presidency put an end to an 
earlier P.C. moment, Halberstam argues it was “books on neoliberalism, postmodernism, 
gender performativity and racial capital that turned the focus away from the wounded 
self” toward structural inequality abetted by capitalist exploitation and the “multitudes, 
collectivities, collaborations, and projects” that might challenge inequality and 
exploitation. 
Halberstam’s divided feminism warrants further comment. On the one hand, he 
suggests, it was the space given to a “weepy[,] white lady feminism” that divided the 
feminist movement. On the other hand, it is a specifically a “rhetoric of harm and trauma 
that casts all social difference in terms of hurt feelings and that divides up politically 
allied subjects into hierarchies of woundedness.” The former (“weepy[,] white lady 
                                                
∗
Jack Halberstam, who formerly published under the name Judith Halberstam, indicates no pronoun 
preference though it may be equally apt to say he prefers the ambiguity of “no preference.” In her own 
words: “I think my floating gender pronouns capture well the refusal to resolve my gender ambiguity that 
has become a kind of identity for me” (See: Jack Halberstam, “On Pronouns,” personal website, 
September 3, 2012, http://www.jackhalberstam.com/category/uncategorized/gender-pronouns/). As just 
performed here, I will float between the use of conventional masculine and feminine pronouns when 
referring to Halberstam. 
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feminism”) raises the prospect of elite white women commandeering a more radical 
feminist movement in order to serve their narrow interests. The use of the term “lady” 
signals a privileged class position, but also (and especially when paired with “weepy” and 
“white”) almost Victorian visions of elite women whose delicate sensibilities and prudish 
propriety were used to discipline, through shame but also legislation, “proper” and 
“respectable” behavior.   
Meanwhile, the latter (feminists obsessed with “hierarchies of woundedness”) 
raise the specter of “identity politics.” This specter takes on some flesh when Halberstam 
writes: “Once upon a time, the appellation ‘queer’ named an opposition to identity 
politics, a commitment to coalition, a vision of alternative worlds. Now it has become a 
weak umbrella term for a confederation of identitarian concerns.” 
 On Halberstam’s account, “weepy white lady feminism gave way to reveal a 
multi-racial, poststructuralist, intersectional feminism” in the 1990s once “people began 
to laugh, loosened up… got over themselves and began to talk.” Talking ultimately lead 
to the “recogni[tion] that the enemy was not among [them].” Halberstam grants that her 
generational narrative “flatten[s] out” complicated histories and is polemical in its effort 
to make a point that must be made: namely, that talk of harm, trauma, and bigoted 
language is regressive, divisive, and de-politicizing. 
One of the major support struts of Halberstam’s polemic is, polemically put: “I 
have feminists and queers of color on my side.” In associating trigger warnings 
exclusively with weepy, “anti-porn, anti-fun,” white ladies, Halberstam summons the 
figure of the elite white woman controlling the agenda, even as the identity politics he 
 160 
references is largely considered to encompass the practices of non-white feminists and 
other left activists.  
Casting the publicization of vulnerability and harm on “weepy white women” 
obscures the fact that feminists of color have repeatedly and compellingly called out a 
broader feminist movement, arguing that “the enemy” was in fact very much among 
them at times. What’s more, this framing plays into the trope of the “strong Black 
woman” whose strength is measured by a capacity to endure, to continue on in the face 
of unrelenting hardship. Halberstam in effect uses queers and feminists of color as a 
prop indicating she is on the “right” side of things.  
Spaces of collective action may not often feel like uncomplicated “homes,”13 but 
I question Halberstam’s assumption that these spaces will or should feel like a night out 
at one’s favorite comedy club. The desire for humor, pleasure, and play can be turned to 
disciplinary purposes just as well as the desire for safety, which need not be synonymous 
with comfort, and neither of which can be determined a priori as individualizing, 
depoliticizing, or otherwise “bad politics.” 
 
III.  Tough Subjects: Neoliberalism, “Slave Morality” and Thick Skins 
While Halberstam’s account is deeply problematic, trigger warnings and especially 
the prospect of university policy mandating their usage might reasonably raise concerns 
about neoliberal cooptation. Neoliberalism lends itself to the individuation, privatization, 
and commercialization of structural harms. In turn, these harms are figured as fixable 
                                                
13 See Chapter Three. 
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through legalist or bureaucratic solutions that strengthen the very institutions that are 
implicated in reproducing the harms.  
The slippage, noted at the beginning of this chapter,  between trigger warnings 
and TV parental guidelines in an instance involving the depiction of rape on an episode 
of Scandal presents a helpful inroad into the accusation that trigger warnings are 
infantilizing. U.S. television does not use the language of trigger warnings. Instead, shows 
with “mature” content may open with an announcement that “viewer discretion is 
advised,” accompanied by a brief explanation of what prompts the advisory. 
Explanations often cite “content labels,” in addition to the audience rating, specified in 
industry-wide TV parental guidelines. Parental guidelines were instituted in response to 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and, as the name implies, were intended to 
facilitate parents’ control over content viewed by children.14  
Paired with the V-chip included in new TVs, parents could enforce a blanket ban 
on shows based on the intended audience and/or specified content. The content labels 
include “D” for “suggestive dialogue (usually means talk about sex)”, “L” for “coarse or 
crude language,” “S” for “sexual situations,” “V” for violence, “TV-Y7”for shows for 
children ages seven and above, and “FV” for “fantasy violence.”15 The prevalence and 
intensity of these content categories determine the audience rating, which specifies who 
is intended to view the program and directs—at times urges—an appropriate parental 
response. Programs designated for “mature audiences” (TV-MA) may contain all of the 
                                                
14 “Understanding the TV Ratings,” The TV Parental Guidelines, http://www.tvguidelines.org/ratings.htm, 
(accessed December 17, 2015). 
15 Ibid.  
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above and their adult audiences are presumed to have an unproblematic or masterful 
relationship to such content. 
Reflecting the conservative, Christian sensibilities of a Republican base and the 
congressman who advocated for them, parental guidelines are intended for use by 
parents in protecting children from exposure to “adult” content, especially sexually 
explicit material. As such, parental guidelines can be viewed as exemplary of what Lauren 
Berlant theorizes as infantile citizenship, which specifies a tradition of imagining that 
“the best of U.S. national subjectivity can be read in its childlike manifestations and in a 
polity that organizes its public sphere around a commitment to making a world that 
could sustain an idealized infantile citizen.”16  
The infantile citizen represents an aspiration for unreflective, unproblematic 
national belonging, premised on “a belief in the state’s commitment to representing the 
best interests of ordinary people.”17 As such, the category of citizenship “contract[s]… to 
something smaller than agency: patriotic inclination, default social membership, or the 
simple possession of a normal national character.”18 In our contemporary moment, 
Berlant argues, children, and especially the fetus, have been mobilized by conservatives 
as the embodiment of the ideal infantile citizen.19 In the case of TV parental guidelines, a 
collective “we” is called upon to protect this ideal citizen, in part by ensuring “ordinary 
people” remain a recognizable category, attached to nostalgic, often overtly Christian, 
classed, raced, and gendered visions of normalcy and childhood. 
                                                
16 Berlant, The Queen of America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship,  28. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 27. 
19 Although the child seems an obvious figure for the ideal infantile citizen, Berlant traces the infantile 
citizen as far back as Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, in which adult citizens’ childlike love of 
the nation is lauded, but also seen to render them vulnerable to becoming “passive, and overdependent on 
the ‘immense tutelary power’ of the state…” (Berlant, The Queen of America Goes to Washington City,  27). 
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In contrast, trigger warnings are intended for a general audience, inclusive of 
those who have experienced trauma, which both reflects and plays a part in reproducing 
structural violence. In this sense, trigger warnings might trouble a vision of “normal” 
citizens as the developmental outcome of protective parents empowered by the state and 
television industry. Where TV parental guidelines make safety and normalcy the work of 
individuals, first through the figure of discerning parents and then through that of the 
“mature” viewer, trigger warnings make safety a collective practice and challenge any 
notion of “normalcy” that is unreflective of the all too normal experience of systemic 
inequality that manifests in sexual assault, racialized violence, and ablist exclusion.  
Students advocating for the use of trigger warnings are simultaneously advocating 
for “equality,” by prompting or even compelling a conversation about what we read and 
discuss and how these are framed. The underlying or motivating claim is, in effect, that 
structural violence and its local manifestations in personal trauma are harmful and a bar 
to equality. We can see this in the following summary from a Columbia University forum 
on the topic: 
Students… have felt that Literature Humanities and Contemporary Civilization’s 
curricula are often presented as a set of universal, venerated, incontestable 
principles and texts that have founded Western society. Such a presentation does 
not allow room for their experiences in the Western world or in class discussions. 
While these founding principles have been liberating in many ways, instructors 
should more consistently acknowledge during class discussions that many of 
these same principles have created an unjust, unequal, and oppressive existence 
for many…20 
 
                                                
20 Members of the Multicultural Affairs Advisory Board, “Our Identities Matter in Core Classrooms,” 
Columbia Spectator, April 30, 2015, http://columbiaspectator.com/opinion/2015/04/30/our-identities-matter-core-
classrooms, (accessed December 17, 2015); BWOG Staff. “Reading Lit Hum’s Rapes.” BWOG: Columbia 
Student News. May 10, 2014. http://bwog.com/2014/05/10/reading-lit-hums-rapes/, (accessed December 
17, 2015).  
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The effects and affects of the language of “safety” and “harm”—like that of “equality,” 
“freedom,” or “pleasure”—cannot be wholly determined in advance. At the same time, it 
is surely also the case that part of why the former are being taken up is attributable to a 
neoliberal discursive context where these words have traction. What’s more, in the 
context of the hierarchically structured relationship between instructors and students, 
where the former is both expert and authority, appeals to equality are less likely to read 
as coherent.  
Might trigger warnings be dramatically repurposed as a tool for the bureaucratic 
administration of harms? It’s certainly conceivable, but the bigger threat on Halberstam’s 
account stems from the “divisiveness” they sow amongst potential allies. But where does 
this divisiveness come from? Wendy Brown’s classic work on ressentiment in Left politics 
(which Halberstam cites) provides some insight. 
 
Revisiting “Wounded Attachments” 
In her now classic chapter and article on “wounded attachments,” Brown 
mobilizes Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals to diagnose the political left’s difficulty in 
coalescing in ways that would support a radical political project. Brown suggests the 
“wounded attachments” of the political left consist of political vision and activism 
circumscribed by identities that are “effects of disciplinary and liberal modalities of 
power. ” These identities also kept us bound to an unattainable idea: liberalism’s false 
universal, embodied in the figure of the white, masculine, middle-class individual.21 In 
other words, the exclusion that first motivated the politicization of identity persists, 
                                                
21 Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity, 61. 
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keeping one attached to an identity formed through an enduring “wound,” which makes 
one amenable to liberalism’s legalist adjudication of harm.  
Brown then elucidates how liberalism incites ressentiment, “the moralizing revenge 
of the powerless, ‘the triumph of the weak as the weak,’”22 which explains the left’s 
difficulty in forming a durable, collective politicized identity. Attached to an identity 
forged through identification and protest by individuals whose political vision and 
identity is grounded in affirmation of their own strength, excellence, good fortune, and 
so on, ressentiment compels one to “establish[] suffering as the measure of social virtue” in 
a bid to redeem one’s painful past.23 Having elevated the suffering that defined it as the 
mark of “the good,” wounded politicized identity takes pleasure in revenge and the 
castigation of those who have not shared in their suffering, promising a poor political 
ally. 
Seeking a way forward, Brown notes the virtue of forgetting before quickly 
concluding that, “at least in its unreconstructed Nietzschean form, [counseling 
forgetting] seems inappropriate if not cruel.”24  Instead, she suggests setting aside 
Nietzsche on the grounds that his “skills as a diagnostician often reach the limits of their 
political efficacy in his privileging of individual character and capacity over the 
transformative possibilities of collective political intervention, in his remove from the 
refigurative possibilities of political conversation or transformation.”25  
Brown stands in a somewhat strange and shifting relationship to the diagnostic 
tools she adopts in reading Nietzsche for insight into identity politics and the seeming 
                                                
22 Ibid., 67. 
23 Ibid., 70. 
24 Ibid., 74. 
25 Ibid. 
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stuck-ness of the political left. Most obviously, she abandons him in the final pages and 
recasts a desire for revenge as a desire for recognition, as when she writes “more than 
revenge,” the pain identity politics seems to wear on its sleeve might reflect a desire to  
“be heard into a certain release, recognized into self-overcoming, incited into possibilities 
for triumphing over, and hence, losing, itself.”26 It is interesting to note that Brown 
concludes by suggesting communicative practices as a means past the “impasse” of 
identity politics. The practices she suggests center on the articulation of a desired, 
collective future rather than, or at least alongside, one’s identity. So, for example, Brown 
suggests replacing “I am” with “I want this for us.”27  
There is another, less obvious moment where Brown’s use of Nietzsche as a 
diagnostician appears unstable. As Rebecca Stringer observes in her important work on 
the feminist disavowal and discomfort with the language of “victimhood,”28 Brown 
suggests that tension between liberalism’s promise of individual freedom and equality 
means that even those individuals who are seen to embody liberalism’s false universal—
white, (at least) middle-class men—are “incite[d]” to ressentiment.29 In other words, the 
aristocratic morality to which slave morality is envisioned as reacting doesn’t exist. In its 
stead is another slave morality and perhaps, above all, a desire to be Nietzsche’s noble 
barbarian, shaping and then finding the world in one’s image and concluding, not unlike 
the God of Genesis, that it was good.  
                                                
26 Ibid., 74-5. 
27 Ibid, 75. In later works, Brown returns to themes of woundedness and a stuck left, finding inspiration 
in the radical democratic theories while expressing discomfort with the scholarship of women’s studies. 
Whether this discomfort is rooted in a perceived attachment to “women” as a stable identity, or to a focus 
on reactionary, “wounded” political projects is not always clear. See: Brown, Edgework: Critical Essays on 
Knowledge and Politics. 
28 Stringer. Knowing Victims: Feminism, Agency and Victim Politics in Neoliberal Times. 
29 Brown, States of Injury, 66-7. 
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“Happy” Slaves 
 Sara Ahmed’s The Promise of Happiness presents an alternative reading of 
Nietzsche’s slave morality, and specifically his characterization of it as reactionary, that is, 
as a negation of that which it is not (the strong, the best, the happy). Ahmed suggests 
that Nietzsche misreads the significance of the aristocratic morality which declares: “we 
the noble, we the good, we the beautiful, we the happy ones!” Where Nietzsche finds 
“spontaneous” self-affirmation, Ahmed suggest we “reread [this self-affirming] 
happiness as the displacement of [good] fortune.”30 
 Nietzsche does not advocate a return to aristocratic morality. However, in 
obscuring the ways in which the aristocratic morality might be understood as reactive 
and his slave morality as creative, in making an affectively charged distinction between 
the creative and reactive, the active and passive, Ahmed suggests he obscures the 
relationship between contingent good fortune and self-affirmation. Because Nietzsche 
also sets up the latter (self-affirmation) as the litmus test of a morality that takes the 
mortal world as its reference, one ends up with a vision of the good tethered to having 
the goods.  
 Nietzsche was writing at a time when a Christian vision of morality focused on 
the afterlife and the diminishment of desire was pervasive. But the charge that a vision of 
the good life or a political project or identity is “merely reactive” continues to be a 
powerful means of discrediting it as a worthwhile vision. Similarly, the seeming 
persistence of negative emotions—anger, dissatisfaction, unhappiness—directed towards 
the status quo is taken as an indication that one lacks a vision of the good and has only a 
                                                
30 Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness, 207 (emphasis Ahmed’s). 
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vision of the “not good” which, because derivative, lacks an affirmative orientation.  
 Equally important, Ahmed argues, is that, in the context of structural inequality, 
the desire to be or to perform the self-affirming aristocratic subject, a happy subject, can 
be perverse. This is because the form of happiness, the vision of the “good life,” 
afforded the marginalized keeps them attached to ways of being and moving in the world 
amenable to the very system in which one was excluded or marginalized. This may mean, 
as in Ahmed’s reading of Sophie in Rousseau’s Emile, that one finds happiness in making 
others happy (or at least one is supposed to). 
  In our contemporary moment, one form that “happiness” takes is consenting to 
the privatization of harm and trauma, which reflects but also facilitates the persistence of 
structural inequality. Insofar as those who suffer structural harm and trauma are 
encouraged to address this suffering in a broader public discourse, it is as heroic 
survivors or overcomers, those who, by remaining unbent and unbowed, confirm that 
“we” need not move in the world differently. In these instances—Emile’s Sophie and the 
heroic overcomer—“happiness” requires that one surrender ways of being and moving 
in the world that would challenge its terms and not only its visuals. It might also, as 
Lauren Berlant argues in Cruel Optimism, encourage one to mistake surviving, for the 
“good life.”31 
 
IV. Thick Skins and White Fragility 
 We can see something of this in Roxane Gay’s thoughtful account of trigger 
warnings, “The Illusion of Safety/The Safety of Illusion,” first published on the literary 
                                                
31 Berlant, Cruel Optimism. 
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website The Rumpus and recently republished in Bad Feminist. Gay writes: 
I used to think I didn’t have triggers because I told myself I was tough. I was 
steel. I was broken beneath the surface, but my skin was forged, impenetrable. 
Then I realized I had all kinds of triggers… There are things that rip my skin 
open and reveal what lies beneath, but I don’t believe in trigger warnings.32 
 
More precisely, Gay does not believe in the reality or promise of safety that she takes 
trigger warnings to hold out. As a survivor of sexual assault with her own, deeply 
personal triggers, she knows any such promise cannot be perfectly realized. Even so, Gay 
suggests that they “might be ineffective, impractical, and necessary for creating safe 
spaces all at once,” noting that the “illusion of safety is as frustrating as it is powerful.”33 
 Gay concludes by meditating on the connection between her not “feel[ing] safe” 
or “believing in safety” and her “fascinat[ion]” with “enduring”: “Human endurance 
fascinates me, probably too much because more often than not, I think of life in terms of 
enduring instead of living.”34 What can we make of this complex compulsion to 
“endure” rather than “live,” to “be impenetrable”? 
 On the one hand, it’s eminently understandable as a defense against expecting 
harm and the failure—once more—of safety’s promise. Aspiring to invulnerability makes 
it possible for Gay to endure, but it also circumscribes that existence, narrows its frame, 
and precludes “liv[ing].” What might this mean concretely?  
                                                
32 Gay, Bad Feminist, 150-51. First published online: Roxane Gay, “The Illusion of Safety/The Safety of 
Illusion.” The Rumpus. August 28, 2012. http://therumpus.net/2012/08/the-illusion-of-safetythe-safety-
of-illusion/ (accessed December 17, 2015).  
33 Gay, Bad Feminist, 151. 
34 Ibid., 152. 
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 The work of a number of Black feminist bloggers and scholars engaging the trope 
of the “strong Black woman” offers something of a challenge.35 For example, responding 
to praise of the stoic strength of a young Black girl following the circulation of videos 
and images of her being sexually assaulted at a party, Robin Boylorn of Crunk Feminist 
Collective, writes: 
Maybe instead of being impressed that blackgirls can withstand so much suffering 
and become role models for strength, we should be concerned about their 
emotional wellness, their vulnerability, their humanity. 
I am not always strong. When I hurt, I cry. I sob deeply and from my belly 
releasing heartbreaking wails and screams until I feel more empty than sad. There 
is nothing wrong with feeling pain and expressing it but society doesn’t let black 
victims mourn, society doesn’t want black people to feel. We are made to believe 
that our feelings are dangerous so we suppress them. We are told, repeatedly, 
even amongst ourselves that we are nonfragile so we think we must live up to 
those expectations.36 
Who can be mourned? Who can mourn without seeming over-sensitive? Without being, 
therefore, weak? Whose weakness warrants consideration? Judith Butler’s Frames of War 
suggests that “grievable lives,” those that we recognize and mourn when lost and harmed 
are also those that inspire collective action. From this perspective the compulsion to not 
feel or express pain, to “endure,” might function to support the structural inequality to 
which it simultaneously provides some minimal, individualized protection. 
                                                
35 Robin Boylorn, “Unbreakable or The Problem with Praising Blackgirl Strength,” Crunk Feminist 
Collective, July 22, 2014, http://www.crunkfeministcollective.com/2014/07/22/unbreakable-or-the-
problem-with-praising-blackgirl-strength/; Adee Roberson, “Precious Mettle: The Myth of the Strong 
Black Woman,” Bitch Media, May 13, 2014, https://bitchmedia.org/article/precious-mettle-myth-strong-
black-woman; ray(nise) cange, “Why I’m Not Ready To Rule Out Suicide In the Case of Sandra Bland,” 
Black Girl Dangerous, July 23, 2015, http://www.blackgirldangerous.org/2015/07/why-not-ready-rule-out-
suicide-in-the-case-of-sandra-bland/.  
36 Boylorn, “Unbreakable or The Problem with Praising Blackgirl Strength.” Similarly, Mia McKenzie of 
Black Girl Dangerous has written a novel, The Summer We Got Free, speaking to the ways in which those who 
are marginalized become attached to survival mechanisms that circumscribe the fullness of their lives. 
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 On the other side of the expectation or compulsion to be invulnerable or to 
endure is a (policed) expectation to not disrupt the status quo. Robin DiAngelo’s 
research on white fragility is important here. According to DiAngelo: 
White Fragility is a state in which even a minimum amount of racial stress 
becomes intolerable, triggering a range of defensive moves. These moves include 
the outward display of emotions such as anger, fear, and guilt, and behaviors such 
as argumentation, silence, and leaving the stress-inducing situation. These 
behaviors, in turn, function to reinstate white racial equilibrium. Racial stress 
results from an interruption to what is racially familiar. 37 
 
Aside from the fact that trigger warnings are used for race-related violence, the concept 
of white fragility can be helpful for thinking through the responses to trigger warnings 
and the ways they may both intensify and disrupt neoliberalism.  
 
Fragile “Normal” Selves 
Writing for the New Yorker, Jay Caspian Kang recalls a professor—well before 
trigger warnings were a talking point—who prefaced a graduate-level lecture on 
Nabokov’s Lolita with this: “When you read ‘Lolita,’ keep in mind that what you’re 
reading about is the systematic rape of a young girl.”38 Following this “unwelcome” 
pronouncement, Kang, who had previously turned to Lolita “whenever” he needed 
inspiration, found he “could no longer pick up the book without feeling the weight of his 
[professor’s] judgment.” He continues: “The professor wasn’t wrong to point out the 
obvious about Humbert and Dolores Haze… but I haven’t read ‘Lolita’ since.” 
                                                
37 Robin DiAngelo, “White Fragility,” International Journal of Critical Pedagogy 3, no. 3 (2011):  54-70. 
38 Jay Caspian Kang, “Trigger Warnings and the Novelist’s Mind,” New Yorker Magazine, May 21, 2014, 
http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/trigger-warnings-and-the-novelists-mind.  
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In conversation with Alexandra Brodsky, an editor at the community blog 
Feministing, Kang recounts the above. Brodsky replies: “What a delight it must be to 
read a book full of graphic accounts of sexual violence and still have the book not be 
about sexual violence to you!” But then asks why a “depersonalized, apolitical reading 
[was] the one we should fight for.” We might ask in turn: Why conclude that Kang’s 
reading is “apolitical”? With this conclusion Brodsky undercuts the force of her first 
reply, which suggested there was something absurd about not seeing sexual violence as 
central to Lolita, rather like the absurdity of “not seeing race.” And indeed Brodsky’s 
reply calls to mind Kang’s own frustration when a “white person would say… a book 
written by a person of color somehow ‘transcended race,’ as if that was the highest 
compliment that could be paid.”  
But I think the heart of the “problem” with trigger warnings can actually be 
found in Kang’s confession that he “could no longer pick up the book without feeling 
the weight of his [professor’s] judgment.” What exactly is the judgment here? Here’s 
what we know:  
1. The professor prefaced a lecture on Lolita with admittedly “obvious” context.  
2. Kang struggles and fails to rekindle his old relationship with the text (“I tried to 
put it out of my mind and enjoy Lolita’s cunning, surprising games with 
language.”) 
3. Kang feels judged (“feeling the weight”) 
4. Kang characterizes that feeling as a response to the professor’s judging him (“his 
judgment”) 
 
Kang attributes ownership of the judgment to the unnamed professor, but it seems to 
come from Kang himself. Indeed, I would argue this is the “personalizing” or 
“individualizing” moment facilitated by trigger warnings: a statement of “the obvious” is 
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transmuted—by Kang—into judgment of Kang (presumably that his pleasure in reading 
Lolita might reflect or share in a pleasure in sexually assaulting girls). But Kang recalls all 
the reasons Lolita inspired him, and finding no trace of “enjoys assaulting girls,” feels 
wrongly accused (by himself, you’ll recall) and upset at the professor whose prefatory 
comments function as a bar to the pleasures of his prior, innocent read. 
 The threat (and potential) of trigger warnings is not that individuals, like Kang, 
who experience them as “unwelcome intrusion[s]” into the hermeneutically sealed 
sanctuary created through the communion of reader with text come to see that sanctuary 
as mythical and feel guilty for the innocent pleasure he once took in an author and 
defensive about a lost, “innocent” relationship with a text. Of course, insofar as Kang, 
owing to his guilt, withdraws from conversation on the topic, his professor’s reminder 
might indeed have had a “chilling effect” on Kang’s speech (even as it created more 
space for Brodsky’s to appear).  
The threat of trigger warnings is that individuals like Kang read Lolita reflecting 
on the possible connections between the pleasures of Nabokov’s masterful, “cunning” 
prose and “the systemic rape of a young girl.” But such reflection in no way obliges one 
to self-flagellate or burn books: the threatening call is rather to stand in a more critical 
relationship to pleasure and displeasure, to the ways both draw us unthinkingly, viscerally 
into alliances and repels us from the wounds of others that we may nonetheless play a 





IV.  Conclusion: Bad Affect and Revolting Subjects 
Chapter Three elaborated on a digital feminist practice of counter-publicity that 
constitutes the speaking subject of democratic discourse as embodied, vulnerable, and 
embedded in relations of obligation to strangers addressed that extend beyond good 
intentions to a consideration of effects. I also argued that the collaborative construction 
of a “safe space” offers a lived, felt experience of agency as entangled with others and 
the world, e.g., when a writer’s use of a trigger warning is understood to enable another’s 
engagement with difficult content. CMC tools, including filters and moderation software, 
their absence and failures, touched on in both my second and third chapters, offer 
another example of the ways in which online feminist counter-public constitute a 
feminized subject whose agency is more readily experienced as non-sovereign. 
A feminized subject is not a feminine-gendered subject, nor one that would 
privilege women and others who more nearly embody conventional feminine attribute. 
Rather, such a subject is a corrective to the masculine gendered subject of modernity: 
agentic, but not sovereign, a being whose individuality is ineluctably bound up in worldly 
matter and meaning.39 Although pursuit and inquiries into a feminized subject have long 
been a feminist preoccupation, the growing interest in a chastened or humbled subject, 
cultivated through ethics inspired by new approaches to theorizing matter, language, and 
their entanglement, is illustrative of a broadening of this concern. Here, to be 
“chastened” or “humbled” is a desirable thing; it brings one in closer alignment with the 
                                                
39 My choice of words is, in part, a deliberate provocation, an effort to stage the sort of “unhappy” 
moment my work on the reception of trigger warnings describes. 
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reality that we have never been discrete, sovereign agents, and that imagining ourselves as 
such paves the way for exploitive relations with human and non-human others.40 
This new materialist or post-human critique is different, although certainly 
indebted to the feminist critique that the modern subject is masculine-gendered.41 
Characterized as a naturally free and autonomous individual, this subject was initially the 
preserve of men and required women to be subject to necessity (rather than free), 
dependent and charged with care of dependents, and seen as part of a group or caste 
(rather than as individuals). In short his “natural” capacities were leveraged off of—and 
so depended upon—others’ lack of such subject-status.42  
And yet, even as many political theorists have come to agree that conceptualizing 
individuals as independent, discrete, sovereign agents is theoretically unsound, 
ontologically incoherent, and conducive to the construction of a class of sub-equals, the 
digital revolution seems to offer some a more perfectly lived and felt experience of 
precisely these things. We saw this in Chapter Two, where feminists’ complaint with 
(anti-feminist) men dominating Usenet newsgroups intended for the discussion of 
women’s issues or feminism was often met with the insistence that users simply needed 
to use the various filters correctly to achieve desired outcomes. The excessive speech of 
Mark Ethan Smith, which spilled out of its “appropriate” newsgroup into several 
                                                
40 Washick and Wingrove, “Politics That Matter: Thinking about Power and Justice with the New 
Materialists.” 
41 Indeed there’s a great deal of overlap between the two, which is unsurprising given the foundational 
role of feminist theorists like Donna Haraway. Science and Technology Studies has also been highly 
influential. 
42 Carole Pateman, The Disorder of Women; Wendy Brown, States of Injury, especially Ch. 6 Charles Mills’ The 
Racial Contract offers a similar account centered on race.  
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“general” newsgroups, offered a brief, unpleasant experience to many unfamiliar with the 
ways filters might utterly fail to approach much less achieve desired outcomes.43  
Beyond the unequally achievable promise of finding or making CMC in one’s 
image, the Internet and various manifestations of the digital—conceptualized as a “tool” 
or “resource”—are often used to incite individuals to be resilient, adaptive, lifelong 
learners (still employable) who can always “reinvent themselves.” Similarly, in the context 
of CMC—then and now—“toughening up” or “growing a thick skin” is routinely 
presented as a solution to online harassment. If we take seriously the discursive 
democratic theory on the cultivation of the modern democratic subject through the 
circulation of speech and writing, these things surely matter. 
However, Left political theory has increasingly gravitated to affirmative political 
or ethical projects as the means of cultivating what I have termed a feminized subject. 
Doing so, these projects fail to grapple with the bad affect that accompanies a subject 
whose agency is not imagined as sovereign and indeed requires others, and whose 
individuality does not rise above but rather develops in relation to others: such a subject 
is burdensome, imposing, perhaps even revolting, in the dual sense of the term. 
Rather than contend with this bad affect, the affirmative visions place a broad left 
coalition in an imagined future (or past) beyond division. We see this in Halberstam’s 
nostalgic framing and incitement to return to an idealized, anti-identitarian, queer  
  
                                                
43 A recent interesting parallel: The organizers of the tech conference, SXSW (South-by-Southwest) were 
inundated with threats of rape and other violence, not unlike those feminist bloggers receive, following 
their acceptance of a panel on the topic of online harassment. Initially they cancelled the panel but after 
major corporate interests pulled out, they developed a daylong summit on the topic. Jessica, Conditt, 
“SXSW apologizes, launches day-long Online Harassment Summit,” Engadget, October 30, 2015, 
http://www.engadget.com/2015/10/30/sxsw-apologizes-launches-day-long-online-harassment-summit/, 
(accessed December 17, 2015).  
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coalition. In figuring such a coalition as the effect of recognizing that “the enemy” was 
outside, Halberstam’s affirmative political project is “strategic” in the way advocated by 
radical democratic theorists. More precisely, Halberstam’s broad anti-identitarian “we” is 
imagined as constituted through recognition of an antagonist, a “them.” My point is that 
such an approach fails to attend to the ways in which hegemony “gets under our skin,”44 
such that a broad “we” remains imaginable, but not practicable. We might be able to see 
a shared interest in a counter-hegemonic project, but are repulsed when asked or 
compelled to move in the world differently. In this case, Halberstam’s appeal to lighten 
up, laugh and be resilient reinstates a modern, neoliberal subject at the heart of his queer 
praxis.    
Meanwhile, the new materialists and post-humanists whose work I noted above, 
and in my introduction, have advocated affirmative ethical projects.45 In saying this I 
mean that, appeals to see and move in the world differently, responsibly, and with care 
for a broad range of others are routed through wondrous accounts of the world, the 
mattering of matter that exceeds and upends human agency, and the irrepressible 
liveliness and creativity of life. So, for example, Jane Bennett writes: 
My aim in Vibrant Matter, for example, was to tell a tale that might work to adjust 
the “regime of the sensible” so that child-like/childhood experiences of 
wonderful objects might again rise to the surface. The aim, in other words, was to 
alter the perceptual field—the style of sensing and feeling and thus also 
thinking—of the humans participating in the assemblage… Akin to a tradition of 
romantic radicalism that runs from Percy Shelley’s “Defense of Poetry” to Guy 
Debord’s “A User’s Guide to Detournement” and Herbert Marcuse’s “Essay on 
                                                
44 Ahmed, 216. 
45 I would argue that, despite her growing interest in ethics informed by the entanglement of language, 
bodies, and the world, Judith Butler does not fit here. Far from affirmative, her ethical inquiries are 
centered on mourning, grief, and the ways we do or do not extend these to or participate in these with 
others.  
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Liberation,” new materialisms use grand onto-images as spurs to human-scale 
acts of creative and collective endeavor.46 
Similarly, feminist and post-humanist theorist Rosi Braidotti, writes:  
The key notion in posthuman nomadic ethics is the transcendence of negativity. 
What this means concretely is that the conditions for renewed political and 
ethical agency cannot be drawn from the immediate context or the current state 
of the terrain. They have to be generated affirmatively and creatively by efforts 
geared to creating possible futures…47 
 
While it’s especially clear in the second citation, both of these calls to action function by 
holding up a unifying, affirming, ethical vision as a means of “transform[ing]” destructive 
modern subjects with a will to dominate everything “into their opposites.”48 I agree that 
this is an urgent political project. I also agree with Brown’s analysis that neoliberalism 
works by generating divisive, bad affect. However, I question the presumption that an 
affirmative political vision is the means through or past the impasses created by divisive, 
bad feeling in neoliberal times. 
 Feminist practices of counter-publicity developed in online safe spaces offer one 
site where a feminized subject is not only imagined, but also lived and practiced. These 
sites are often unlovely, but perhaps it is in this very unlovelyness that we gain insight 
into how we might collectively begin to detach ourselves from ways of being and moving 
in the world that undercut principled, perhaps richly theoretical, commitment to 
liberatory political practice 
Humor will go on. The swift creation of the Twitter handle, “Jock Halberslam” 
(@halberslam) to parody Halberstam attests to this conclusion (Figure 8). 
                                                
46 Jane Bennett, “Ontology, Sensibility and Action,” Contemporary Political Theory 14, no. 1 (February 2015): 
83. 
47 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013), p. 191.  
48 Bennett, “Ontology, Sensibility and Action,” 84 
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FIGURE 8: Screenshot from the Twitter feed of “Jock Halberslam” 
(@halberslam).49  
Pleasure will go on and will remain complicated. One can take pleasure in things 
and also be critical of those pleasures: an impeccable cappuccino at a café in one’s old, 
now-gentrifying neighborhood; gay bridal magazines; one could go on and on… It is not 
possible to instantly excise oneself from the structures, which create these things as both 
pleasurable and problematic.  
In this context, collective, counter-public practice that cultivate less defensive 
subjects, subjects less fearful and reactive in the face of their own inevitable complicity 
with local and global structures of power, are better suited to the risks and challenges of 
coalition politics than visions of a broad left coalition sustained by an irreverence that 
evades difficult topics or the good feelings accrued through individuated, ethical practice. 
                                                
49 @halberslam “Jock Halberslam,” Twitter feed, https://twitter.com/halberslam, (screenshot from 










My first foray into the material explored in this dissertation was in 2010. A 
project that began as a single paper on the feminist blog Shakesville unfurled in many 
directions. Some threads I’ve followed, some I had to set aside for later. While I cannot 
fully unpack later, a number of recent changes are worth noting here, alongside 
directions for future research.  
One of the most striking changes in feminist CMC is the substantially enlarged 
mainstream presence of feminist authorship. Until recently, feminist contributions to 
mainstream online journalism and Left-progressive blogging were quite limited. Feminist 
authorship on mainstream sites—online sites associated with print newspapers, but also 
“A-list” Left-progressive blogs—was exceptional throughout the better part of the 
2000s.  
In 2015, prominent feminist authorship online is, if not common, at least 
unexceptional. The success of Jezebel, a blog intended as an alternative to “backwards” 
women’s magazines and owned by Gawker Media, and liberal-leaning, (now) feminist-
friendly sites like Salon.com and The New Republic, and online news aggregators, like The 
Huffington Post, have normalized feminist authorship and commentary.1  
                                                
1 Moe, “The Five Great Lies of Women’s Magazines,” Jezebel, November 1, 2007, 
http://jezebel.com/262130/the-five-great-lies-of-womens-magazines (accessed December 19, 2015); 
Salon, http://www.salon.com/, (accessed December 19, 2015); The New Republic, 
https://newrepublic.com/, (accessed December 19, 2015); The Huffington Post, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/, (accessed December 19, 2015). 
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At the same time, online feminist safe spaces have become more precarious 
because the success of mainstream feminism authorship with corporate backing has 
made it more difficult to retain regular contributors and traffic. With more people 
finding recognizably, if not explicitly feminist content on corporate-owned mainstream 
sites, traffic on the collaboratively constructed online safe spaces that are central to this 
dissertation has declined.2  
Active authorship on a voluntary basis has always been a challenge, but the 
viability of feminist authorship as a source of relatively secure income is fairly recent. So, 
for example, Feministe founder Jill Filipovic is now Senior Political Writer for 
Cosmopolitan Magazine, one of the women’s magazine to which Jezebel sought to present 
an alternative back in 20073; Crunk Feminist Collective co-founder, Brittany Cooper, 
now has a weekly column at Salon; and Tiger Beatdown’s Sady Doyle is now a freelance 
journalist who regularly contributes to mainstream online publications, including The 
Atlantic and The Guardian.  
 The blog-to-mainstream publication trajectory is not unique to this moment (and, 
of course, is not unique to feminism). What is unique is that, increasingly, mainstream 
feminist freelancers have gotten their start by participating in the construction of online 
feminist safe spaces. In order to better understand the impact of this unique background 
and experience, more work is needed on elaborating the relationship between 
mainstream feminist authorship and feminist blogging.  
                                                
2 Echo Zen, “Boring, technical post about winter Feministe series…,” Feministe, October 1, 2015, 
http://www.feministe.us/blog/archives/2015/10/01/boring-technical-post-about-winter-feministe-
series/ (accessed December 19, 2015).  
3 Nicole Levy, “Cosmopolitan.com Hires Jill Filipovic, Burnishes Feminist Cred,” Politico Media, April 25, 
2014, http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/media/2014/04/8544253/cosmopolitancom-hires-jill-
filipovic-burnishes-feminist-cred (accessed December 19, 2015). 
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Catalyzing Different Safe Spaces 
Preliminary research suggests a fracture in the U.S. feminist blogosphere 
beginning around 2007 and centered on critical responses to the increased mainstream 
presence of feminist online writers, including the opportunities to publish that became 
available to select (white, college-educated, straight, cisgendered) feminists bloggers, 
notably Jessica Valenti of Feministing and Amanda Marcotte of Pandagon. While both 
Valenti and Marcotte were criticized for being inattentive to racism within feminism and 
to their own raced or unreflectively white-washed presentations of feminist activism, 
Marcotte’s actions in 2007 and 20008 appear to have afforded something of a critical 
juncture for feminist CMC.  
 Marcotte, who joined the liberal blog Pandagon in 2004 after a short stint 
running a personal blog, was instrumental in Pandagon’s development as a liberal 
feminist blog (Pandagon was not and did not aspire to be a safe space). In her 2007 
book, It’s a Jungle Out There: The Feminist Survival Guide to Politically Inhospitable Environments, 
Marcotte not only did not address racism as a feminist issue but also included multiple 
retro comics-style images of a white, Barbie-type woman saving and working alongside a 
Clark Kent-type white man, to fend off darker complexioned natives (see Figure 8). 
These images were removed from subsequent printings and both Marcotte and Seal 
Press apologized for reproducing a tired racist trope. However, many were 
understandably frustrated with these apologies given an earlier, pre-publication 
discussion (initiated by Marcotte) of the book’s cover art, which initially depicted a 
similar white, Barbie-type woman in the clutches of an anthropomorphized, black gorilla.  
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Equally if not more problematic was the charge of intellectual theft or failure to 
acknowledge the earlier work of feminists of color, one result of which was a prominent 
feminist of color blogger, brownfemipower, shuttering her blog.4 At stake for those who 
critiqued Marcotte was less the issue of intellectual property than the erasure of the 
intellectual labor. Also at issue was the 
characterization—made by Marcotte 
and several white feminist 
supporters—of critical pushback to 
Marcotte as a tired and predictable 
response to feminist “success,” 
which obscured the interlocking 
systems of oppression that made 
success (and erasure of one’s labor) 
a more likely outcome for some 
than others.5 That this obscuration 
played on gendered tropes of 
women as catty infighters, trivializing criticism by recasting it as the inevitable nitpicking 
of jealous women, exemplified the ways in which mainstream feminism undercut the 
principles and goals espoused.   
                                                
4 brownfemipower, “Some Context,” April 16, 2008, https://bfpfinal.wordpress.com/2008/04/16/3/ 
(accessed December 20, 2015). 
5 Amanda Marcotte, “Book Cover!” Pandagon, August 20, 2007 
https://web.archive.org/web/20071023055731/http://pandagon.blogsome.com/2007/08/20/book-
cover/ (accessed December 20, 2015). 
FIGURE 9: Image from Amanda Marcotte’s It’s 
a Jungle Out There: The Feminist Survival Guide to 
Politically Inhospitable Environments (2007).  
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This prior mainstreaming of online feminism appears to have catalyzed some 
white feminist bloggers to evaluate their blogging practices: who they linked to, who 
contributed guest posts, who their spaces were “safe” for, who was included and who 
excluded. Initially, the safe spaces of feminist CMC were understood as a response to a 
hostile Other: anti-feminists (Internet trolls and otherwise), but also liberal-progressives 
who characterized feminism as divisive. Going forward, those who continued to 
construct their blogs as “safe spaces” increasingly did so with an awareness that their 
adversary was also within themselves and that, as Tiger Beatdown and Red Light Politics 
contributor Flavia Dzodan, put it: “FEMINISM WILL BE INTERSECTIONAL 
OR IT WILL BE BULLSHIT!”6 In the future, I hope to elaborate on the conflict 
between Marcotte and brownfemipower, and its connection to the “building out” of safe 
spaces as sites of intersectional feminist practice. 
 
Precarious Safe Spaces 
Current mainstreaming has put quite a bit of pressure on individual and 
community safe space blogging, and on the feminist blogosphere as a whole. As feminist 
writing for a popular audience becomes common and is pitted against the typically 
slower rates of publication on feminist blogs figured as safe spaces, traffic at the latter 
has declined. As traffic declines, sustaining blogs becomes more costly. Feministe’s 
“tigtog” recently (October 2015) posted on the topic of declining page-views, explaining 
that “the sustainability of keeping the blog running” is in question because “advertising is 
                                                
6 Flavia Dzodan, “MY FEMINISM WILL BE INTERSECTIONAL OR IT WILL BE BULLSHIT!” 
Tiger Beatdown, October 10, 2011, http://tigerbeatdown.com/2011/10/10/my-feminism-will-be-
intersectional-or-it-will-be-bullshit/ (accessed December 18, 2015). Dzodan’s emphasis. 
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no longer covering… hosting costs,” that is, the cost of making the site accessible via the 
World Wide Web.7 Being one of the oldest, continuous-running feminist community 
blogs with an extensive archive—Feministe was founded in 2000—makes sustainability 
more costly and finding an alternative, potentially more affordable hosting package more 
challenging.8  
While Feministe remains active, other and especially smaller feminist safe space 
blogs have gone dormant. Here it’s worth noting that, as other blogs become inactive, 
those that remain active lose out on page-views they might have received by being linked 
to via postings on those formerly active blogs. When blogs like Tiger Beatdown and 
Angry Black Woman go inactive—as both have done—nodes in the network (literally) 
linking one blog to another go dark. 
The safe spaces that remain active have had to adapt. Feministe plans to offer not 
“more frequent,” but  “more regular” and more specialized posts offering in-depth 
feminist reviews of games.9 The content of the proposed series undoubtedly reflects a 
growing interest in feminism and games culture stirred up by recent attention to women 
in the video games industry, including harassment of women games producers and 
depictions of women in video games.  
Indeed, Feministe expressly pitches their new series as complementary (rather than 
competitive) to Anita Sarkeesian’s successfully crowd-funded work at the nonprofit, 
                                                
7 tigtog, “Hello, we’re back, and what happened,” Feministe, October 7, 2015, 
http://www.feministe.us/blog/archives/2015/10/07/hello-were-back-and-what-happened/ (accessed 
December 19, 2015).  
8 Ibid. 
9 Echo Zen, “Boring, technical post about winter Feministe series…” 
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Feminist Frequency, which explores how women function as tropes in video games.10 
The harassment Sarkeesian received for her “Tropes vs Women in Video Games” has 
been widely publicized in a way that is uncommon, despite the still banal harassment of 
those who identify as women online and especially vocal feminist women. (Here it’s 
worth noting that “adapting” in the face of decreased revenues, which does not seem to 
have been accompanied by decreased trolling and online harassment, is simply untenable 
for many.) 
One especially widespread adaptation by feminist bloggers has been to create a 
Twitter account and use it, in part, to direct traffic to their blogs. As one might expect 
however, having a Twitter account and having a Twitter presence are not the same. The 
latter require substantial work that demonstrates familiarity with the Twitter platform 
and networking skills. Sites like Crunk Feminist Collective and Shakesville have been 
more success than others in developing this presence.11  
Even so, Shakesville’s founder and primary contributor, Melissa McEwan—who 
runs the blog as full-time job—has recently (2015) conveyed that it is not be sustainable 
for her to continue her work if donations continue at the current rate.12 McEwan and 
                                                
10 Feminist Frequency: Conversations with Pop Culture, http://feministfrequency.com/, (accessed December 19, 
2015). 
11 Feministe is relatively inactive despite a large number of followers (24,600). On 6,199 tweets, @feministe 
has only 12 “likes” (@feministe, Twitter feed, December 18, 2015, 
https://twitter.com/Feministe?ref_src=twsrc^google|twcamp^serp|twgr^author). By contrast, Crunk 
Feminist Collective has 14,800 followers and 796 “likes” and Shakesville has 14,700 followers 2,476 “likes”; 
this indicates a smaller, but more dedicated group of followers. 
 (@crunkfeminists, Twitter feed, December 18, 2015, 
https://twitter.com/crunkfeminists?ref_src=twsrc^google|twcamp^serp|twgr^author; @shaketweetz, 
Twitter feed, December 18, 2015, https://twitter.com/Shakestweetz). Crunk Feminist Collective and 
Shakesville also “follow” more people, which would expand their network (999 and 718, respectively, 
versus @feministe’s 76). 
12 Melissa McEwan, “Important Fundraiser,” Shakesville, August 18, 2015,  
http://www.shakesville.com/2015/08/important-fundraiser.html, (accessed December 19, 2015); Melissa 
McEwan, “Fundraiser to Keep Shakesville Going,” Shakesville, December 3, 2015, 
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other sites like Feministing have had to become much more vocal in asking for the 
financial support of its readership;13 this is especially important at Shakesville which, as 
part of its safe space practice, does not accept ads and thus has no revenue from 
advertising.14 Feministing and Black Girl Dangerous have repurposed as non-profit 
organizations, likely to make obtaining grants more feasible, and to encourage donations 
through an increased perception of legitimacy and transparency as an entity to which one 
might donate. 
The increased precariousness of online feminist safe spaces and the feminist 
blogosphere reflects the successful uptake by a broader public of ideas and practices 
cultivated by feminist blogging. At the same time, popular uptake may defang what is 
most radical about the practices of counter-publicity cultivated in safe spaces: the 
cultivation of a democratic subject as feminized, that is, as situated in material contexts 
reflecting structural inequality which demand relations of responsibility to strangers that 
extend beyond good intentions.  
For example, well-known and well-trafficked blogger, Hugo Schwyzer, drew this 
traffic in part by reinventing himself as a male feminist and “ally.” Schwyzer circulated a 
revisionist account of his prior history of sexist abuse which made it appear that he was 
taking responsibility for worldly manifestations of structural inequality not directly tied to 
his identity, and from which he benefitted. At the same time, a number of relatively 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.shakesville.com/2015/12/fundraiser-to-keep-shakesville-going.html, (accessed December 
19, 2015). 
13 Lori Adelman, “This Giving Tuesday Help Turn Feminism’s ‘Movement’ into a Sustainable 
Movement,” Feministing, December 1, 2015, http://feministing.com/2015/12/01/this-givingtuesday-help-
turn-feminisms-moment-into-a-sustainable-movement/, (accessed December 19, 2015). 
14 McEwan, “Important Fundraiser.” 
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marginalized women and, in particular, women of color, rejected Schwyzer’s revisionist 
narrative based on ongoing harassment that they were continuing to experience.  
Unfortunately, Schwyzer’s new reputation and revised narrative overshadowed 
these women’s accounts not only in a mainstream public, but also within the feminist 
blogosphere. Ultimately, it was the “hashtag activism” of Hood Feminism’s Mikki 
Kendall, who started the hashtag “solidarity is for white women,” that prompted the 
unraveling of Schwyzer’s account.15 More research needs to be undertaken on the 
discourses of “being an ally” arising from online feminisms, and efforts to challenge 
those who, like Schwyzer, repurpose feminist counter-public practice to achieve success 
in a liberal-individualist public. “Clapping back” by, for example, asserting that one does 
“not get a cookie” for basic human decency are increasingly popular idioms and fruitful 
places to begin this research.16 
Finally, the publicization of harassment of women game developers, women 
gamers, and women critiquing games culture, noted above, has led to an increased 
awareness and criticism of gendered inequality online. However there is a tendency to 
figure harassing behavior as stemming from a small but vocal minority often termed 
“trolls” and figured as emasculated (because imagined as nerdy and/or sexless) young 
men, dwelling in their parent’s basement. This characterization of trolls occludes larger 
questions of responsibility and valued public discourse that online feminist safe spaces 
                                                
15 Kathleen Jercich, “Hood Feminist: The creator of #solidarityisforwhitewomen talks race and online 
feminism,” In These Times, January 2, 2014, http://inthesetimes.com/article/15979/hood_feminist 
(accessed December 20, 2015); Jia Tolentino, “A Chat with Mikki Kendall and Flavia Dzodan About 
#SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen” The Hairpin, August 16, 2013, http://thehairpin.com/2013/08/solidarity-
is-for-hairpin/ (accessed December 20, 2015). 
16 The Angry Black Woman, “Things You Need to Understand—#9,” The Angry Black Woman, April 29, 
2008, https://theangryblackwoman.wordpress.com/2008/04/29/no-cookie/ (accessed December 20, 
2015). 
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dramatize, as well as evidence that nearly one-third of Americans have engaged in 
trolling, or deliberately disruptive behaviors intended to silence or “derail” public online 
conversation or communities. It also ignores that trolling is not inherently anti-feminist.17 
In short, the focus on trolls sets up an Other who is increasingly easy to disparage, 
without addressing the pervasive misogyny that make gendered harassment via trolling 
pervasive and also makes emasculation the “natural” form of disparagement of those 
who engage in such practices. More research is needed to unpack the fraught relationship 
between trolling, particular demographics, and practices of publicity online.
                                                
17 Phillips, This is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things; Virgil Texas, “How I Infiltrated a White Pride Facebook 
Group and Turned It into 'LGBT Southerners for Michelle Obama',” Vice Magazine, August 3, 2015, 
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